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ABSTRACT
Foreign policy analysis stands at the crossroads of different issues and academic 
disciplines, including political economy and international relations. In this study, the 
foreign policies of Greece and Spain are analysed in the period between 1945 and the 
early 1990s, in the context of the world-system approach in which foreign policy is 
considered a part of the interaction between a single world-economy and multiple 
political structures (nation states).
In other words, this is a study of the political economy of foreign policy. The foreign 
policies of Greece and Spain are analysed in the context of the world and national 
levels of the organisation of power and production. In this general context, the two 
countries are defined as the interesting but debatable category of semiperiphery 
states in the world-system hierarchy of states. The analysis of Greece and Spain 
shows that the foreign policies of both countries were strongly affected by their 
semiperipheral development patterns during both the “expansion-hegemonic rise” 
and “contraction-hegemonic decline” periods of the world-economy.
The study examines the relative impact of national and international structural 
factors, the distribution of wealth and power, the state, external and internal 
economic and power elites on the foreign policies of Greece and Spain. The 
examination demonstrates the effect of their semiperipheral status on their foreign 
policy. The main theoretical contention of the study is that the world-system analysis 
and the concept of “semiperiphery” provide a useful framework for the study of the 
political economy of the foreign policies of middle income countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Foreign policy can be analysed in different contexts and at different levels. Since it 
stands at the crossroads of different issues and academic disciplines, and also bridges 
the “internal environment” with the “international system”, explanations of foreign 
policy depend on how the researcher perceives the foreign policy environment and 
formulates his/her explanatory/analytical framework. In other words, depending on 
the context different approaches and variables may explain the conduct of foreign 
policy. In this study I analyse the foreign policies of Greece and Spain in the context 
of the world-system approach in the period between 1945 and the early 1990s. In 
fact, world-system analysis does not directly and systematically deal with foreign 
policy. However, it does provide a “social totality” - “a modem world-system” - in 
which foreign policy is a part of the interaction between “ a single world-economy” 
and “multiple political structures” (nation-states). Thus in this study foreign policy is 
considered a function of the complex interaction between “internal/societal” and 
“external/systemic” and “political” and “economic” factors. Accordingly, I look at 
the relationship between the foreign policies of Greece and Spain and the structure of 
the international system, the structure of the states in question, domestic economic 
and political structures, external and internal economic and political elites.
Broadly speaking this is a study of the political economy of foreign policy. I 
attempt to analyse foreign policy in the context of the world and national levels of the 
organisation of power and production. I consider whether Greece and Spain belong 
to the interesting but debatable category of “semiperiphery” in the world-system 
hierarchy of states, and I examine whether they followed “semiperipheral foreign 
policies” during the period under consideration. In the chapters devoted to each of 
the separate countries I illustrate how the foreign policies of the two countries are 
related to their developmental patterns. I divide the period from 1945 to 1990 into 
two sub-periods, the first from 1945 to the mid-1970s, and the second from the mid- 
1970s to the early 1990s. This division relates to the reorganisation of the world 
power and production structures in the mid-1970s. In world-system analysis these 
periods are called the “expansion” and “contraction” periods of the world-economy 
respectively. This is the background for my examination of the changes in the power-
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production structures of Greece and Spain between the “expansion” and 
“contraction” periods of the world-economy. I demonstrate how these changes in the 
world and national power-production structures led to changes in the foreign policies 
of these countries.
The general argument of this study is that the concept of “semiperiphery” 
provides a productive framework for the study of the political economy of the foreign 
policies of “middle income” countries. In fact, the debates about the existence, the 
shape and the boundaries etc., of the semiperipheral zone of the world-economy are 
still continuing. The last two edited works on the semiperiphery present various 
aspects of the discussions and some basic shortcomings of the concept (see Arrighi, 
1985 and Martin, 1990a). Thus the concept of semiperiphery has not been totally 
clarified yet. However, the central aim of my study is not to clarify it. Instead this 
study contends that there are a significant number of states that fall neither into the 
“developed” nor in to “underdeveloped” categories of states. Among related concepts 
such as “developing countries”, “newly industrialised states”, “middle income 
countries” etc., the concept of “semiperiphery” used in world-system approach 
provides a comprehensive framework, even in its present form, and is a good tool to 
study and explain various phenomena (here the focus is on foreign policy) in these 
“intermediate countries”.
The first three chapters that follow discuss the theoretical and conceptual 
perspectives used in this study. In Chapter 1 ,1 analyse briefly the phenomenon and 
the study of foreign policy, its evolution, nature and definition, the main schools in 
foreign policy analysis and their meaning for world-system analysis. Chapter 2 
examines how foreign policy is analysed at the systemic and structural levels. Since 
world-system analysis is a systemic-structural approach this will provide the reader 
with a general understanding of the issues. I begin by briefly explaining early system 
theories and structural approaches and their understanding of foreign policy. I go on 
to look at Modelski’s “world system analysis” which is built upon “global political 
structures”, in order to be able to compare it to Wallerstein’s “world-economic
9
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structure”. In the second half of the chapter, I examine “world-system analysis” and 
focus on its relevance in foreign policy analysis. In Chapter 3 I focus entirely on the 
concept of “semiperiphery”. In the first part of the chapter I discuss the nature and the 
characteristics of semiperipheral states and their mobility in the “world-economy” 
and the “inter-state” system. I then examine various arguments on the 
operationalization of the concept, and emphasise the existence of different kinds of 
semiperipheral states in the semiperipheral zone of the world-economy. Finally I 
argue that semiperipheral states have common foreign policy orientations in the 
expansion and contraction periods of the world-economy.
Chapter 4 is a transitionary chapter from theory to the case studies in which I 
analyse the common elements in the political and economic development of Greece, 
Spain (and also Portugal) and their “peculiar” position in the inter-state system in an 
historical context. As a result of similar rapid changes in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
(GSP) in the mid-1970s, social scientists have studied the three countries together 
and have produced a considerable amount of theoretical, empirical and comparative 
work. However, many of these studies conclude that similar developments in the 
political and economic structures of GSP started long before the mid-1970s. Thus, in 
the second part of Chapter 4 I discuss the main approaches to the GSP countries, 
including those studies which emphasise their semiperipheral status.
Chapters 5 - 8 are the case study chapters in which I apply the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks to Greece and Spain . Each chapter is divided into three 
sections dealing with the economic environment, the political environment, and 
foreign policy in the framework of semiperipheral development. In each chapter I try 
to show how developments in the economic environment go hand in hand with 
developments in the political and foreign policy environments.
In chapters 5 and 7 I examine Greece and Spain respectively in the period 
between 1945 and the mid-1970s. In world-system analysis 1945 to the mid-1970s 
is considered as the period of “US hegemony” and the “expansion” period of the
10
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“world-economy”. In this global context I discuss the nature of the national power- 
production structures in the two countries and the roles of the US, internal political 
institutions, economic, political and military elites in the establishment and 
functioning of this structure. I show that the functioning of this structure fits the 
semiperipheral patterns described by world-system analysis. Finally, I illustrate that 
the foreign policies of Greece and Spain were an integral part of this power- 
production structure and were shaped according to the interests of the external and 
internal actors that formed it
In chapters 6 and 8 ,1 examine Greece and Spain respectively from the mid- 
1970s-until the early 1990s. On the one hand, this period corresponds to the 
“contraction” period of the world-economy. On the other hand, it is the period in 
which there was a “relative decline of US hegemony” and “the emergence of Europe 
(especially the EEC) as a new economic and political seat of power”. Accordingly, I 
look at the changes in the national power-production structures in the context of these 
global level changes and emphasise the decreasing role of the US and the increasing 
influence of Europe/EEC on the economic and political developments in Greece and 
Spain. I demonstrate how Greece and Spain benefited from these changes at the 
global and national levels; examine what the changes were in the position of the 
external and internal actors in the power-production structure; and consider to what 
extent the changes in the national power-production structure fit into semiperipheral 
development patterns. Furthermore, I argue that the differences between Greek and 
Spanish semiperipheral developmental patterns occurred because of their different 
locations in the semiperipheral zone. Finally, I show that the foreign policies of both 
Greece and Spain were shaped in this period by their different semiperipheral 
developmental patterns and mobilisations in the world-system hierarchy of states, as 
well as by the interests of the external and internal actors who controlled the power- 
production structures.
As I show in the Greek and Spanish cases, despite its shortcomings, 
semiperiphery can be a very useful concept for analysing the links between the
11
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extemal/systemic and internal/societal economic and political sources of foreign 
policy, and also for explaining changes in foreign policy. More generally, the concept 
of semiperiphery enables us to understand the crucial links between foreign policy 
and political economy.
In this study I used both primary and secondary sources published in English. 
In the conceptual and theoretical chapters I used the original works of various 
scholars on related issues. In the case studies, my analysis of the economic 
environment during different periods has largely based on OEEC/OECD Country 
Reports for Greece and Spain from the late 1940s to the early 1990s. However, in 
examining the political and foreign policy environments I mainly used secondary 
sources to trace the main developments and outcomes. I also interviewed a number of 
Greek and Spanish country specialists (.Prof R.Clogg, Prof. CM. Woodhouse, Prof. 
N.P.Mouzelis, Prof. Th.Couloumbis, Prof. P.Preston, Dr. G.Petrochilos, 
Mr.K.Karras, Mr. A.Gooch, and Prof F.Rodrigo) for the case studies.
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CHAPTER I 
UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY
1. Introduction
Broadly speaking foreign policy is the behaviour of states mainly towards other states 
in the international system through their authorised agents. However, there are several 
ways to explain the external behaviours of states. In other words, the study of foreign 
policy as a sub-field of international relations can not be confined within the boundaries 
of any one approach. The study of foreign policy requires inter and/or multidisciplinary 
investigations. This means that foreign policy can be examined at different levels of 
analysis and be viewed from different perspectives of the family of social sciences. 
Students of foreign policy are therefore confronted with a phenomenon whose 
boundaries are quite flexible and which allows various kinds of frameworks for study
(1). The explanation of foreign policy can range from the childhood experiences of an 
individual leader to the characteristics of the international system depending on the 
framework in the researcher's mind and what he or she wants to explain. Accordingly 
foreign policy studies undertaken up to now reflect this diversity of interest among the 
researchers.
2. The Nature and the Definition of Foreign Policy
The subject matter of foreign policy comes to the fore when one asks the question 
Who are the main actors of the international system ?'. And when it comes to the 
international system, states are the main actors in it. As the main actors the behaviours 
of states in the system deserves particular attention. It is at this point that the area of 
inquiry for the sub-field of foreign policy analysis become apparent. It focuses on the 
external behaviours of governments and more specifically on their authorised 
representatives, since states almost always act through their official agents. While 
international politics focuses on international relations in the way that macro economics 
deals with the aggregate behaviour of whole national economies, foreign policy focuses 
on the international relations in the way that micro economics deals with the behaviour 
of individual actors such as firms and consumers (McGowan, 1973:11-12).
Understanding Foreign Policy
In order to clarify the concept foreign policy further it might be useful to look at 
it in a closer perspective. If foreign policy is a governmental activity, what distinguishes 
foreign policy from other governmental activities ? Is there a clear division between 
domestic policy and foreign policy, or are there close interactions between the two ? 
First of all, foreign policy is directed towards the external environment of a state. In 
other words, foreign policy is a policy designed to be implemented outside the 
territorial boundaries of a state. As Clarke and White put it, 'Foreign policy, like 
domestic policy is formulated within the state, but unlike domestic policy is directed 
and must be implemented in the environment external to that state' (White, 1989:5). 
Another way of differentiating foreign and domestic politics can be associated with 
those studies that consider foreign policy as 'high politics' and hence a very 
differentiated area of governmental activity. This view equates foreign policy with 
security and the fundamental values of the state in which the domestic politics should 
not interfere. Some others, like W.Wallace, see foreign policy as a boundary issue 
between domestic politics and the international environment (Wallace, 1974:12-17). 
According to Wallace, foreign policy is a boundary problem in two respects. First, 
foreign policy plays the role of bridge between the nation state and its international 
environment. Second, it is the boundary between domestic politics and government 
(Political Science) and international politics and diplomacy (International Relations). 
This means that an understanding of foreign policy requires a mixture of knowledge 
which covers both domestic and international politics. Here, the problem is the 
difficulty of keeping foreign policy at the boundary line (White, 1989:7). If the 
researcher looks at it from the view point of political science, he or she will focus on 
domestic determinants, whereas the researcher looking from the perspective of 
international relations will examine determinants from the international environment in 
order to explain foreign policy phenomena. If we go a step further and investigate the 
boundary between foreign policy and other academic disciplines, the situation becomes 
more complex. In other words, those who are studying relationships between foreign 
policy and its sources (e.g. personality of leaders, policy makers, governmental 
structures, culture, economic development, geography, international system, etc.) will 
inevitably make use of any one or a mix of the academic disciplines of psychology,
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sociology, economy, public administration, history, philosophy, and geography, 
depending on their units of analysis.
Let us now look at the definition of the concept. In 1962, Modelski defined 
foreign policy as the “system of activities evolved by communities for changing the 
behaviour of other states and for adjusting their activities to the international 
environment” (Modelski, 1962:6). According to Modelski, states deal with this issue 
through their policy makers who are entitled to act on behalf of their community. 
Holsti, on the other hand, describes foreign policy from the point of view of the 
researcher; “the student who analyses the actions of a state towards external 
environment and the conditions -usually domestic - under which these actions are 
formulated is concerned essentially with foreign policy” (Holsti, 1983:19). McGowan 
in 1973 offered the following definition; “foreign policy could be defined as the actions 
of national or central governments taken towards other actors external to the legal 
sovereignty of the initiating governments” (McGowan, 1973:12). Wilkenfield develops 
this definition as follows; “foreign policy is those official actions (and reactions) which 
sovereign states initiate (or receive and subsequently react to) for the purpose of 
altering or creating a condition (or problem) outside their territorial sovereign 
boundaries” (Wilkenfield et al., 1980:22). On the other hand Russettand Starr define 
foreign policy as the stuff of international relations; “People do not agree on exactly 
what should be included here, but they are concerned with the policies that states 
declare, the decisions taken within governmental circles, the actions actually taken by 
governments, and the consequences of the behaviour of governments and their official 
representatives. Foreign policy is the output of the state into the global system” (Russet 
and Starr, 1985:191).
In sum, one can say that foreign policy is an official activity formulated and 
implemented by the authorised agents of sovereign states as orientations, plans, 
commitments and actions which is directed towards the external environment of the 
states. Since foreign policy covers a very wide area it is almost impossible to give it a 
complete definition. Nevertheless, a shorthand definition of foreign policy is given by
15
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C. Hill; “Foreign policy is the sum of official external relations conducted by 
independent actors in international relations” (2).
Now let us look at how major approaches in international relations explain the 
phenomenon of foreign policy.
3. Traditional Understanding
Realism has always been identified with traditionalism in international relations. 
According to realists, politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature (Morgenthau, 1978:3-15). The central beliefs in this approach were that 
the structural condition in the international political system - which is made up of 
sovereign states - is anarchy, and just like self-interested individuals, these sovereign 
states pursue their national interests in an endless process of maximising their power 
since interest is defined in terms of power. Accordingly, this approach makes explicit 
assumptions about the foreign policies of states (White, 1989:10-11 and Smith, 
1986:15). First of all it is the state and not any other entity that can conduct foreign 
policy. The sovereign state is the prime actor in the international political system. 
Second, realists assume that states, or governments on behalf of states, are unitary 
entities. This means that like any individual, states have objectives and act purposefully 
in accordance with these objectives. The realist conception of state and foreign policy 
assumes that states are rational actors, therefore they do not act haphazardly but 
deliberately. Foreign policy action is the product of rational behaviour; it is based on, 
calculation of means and ends and the benefits of alternative courses of action in order 
to maximise the benefits. There must be proportionality between the rational interests 
and power of a state in order to pursue rational foreign policy. Thus rationality explains 
why states act as they do. In this realist picture of international relations, power 
becomes the driving force since in order to promote their interests states seek to 
maximise their powers. This means that foreign policy is nothing but a struggle for 
power between states. Two other dimensions of realist thinking in relation to foreign 
policy are worth mentioning. The first is that the realist approach views foreign policy 
from the environment external to the state. The determinants of foreign policy can be
16
Understanding Foreign Policy
found in the anarchic international environment rather than in the domestic 
environment. Accordingly, the balance of power in the international system, and the 
situation of a state in the system are the fundamental determinants of foreign policy. 
Secondly, in realism it is “high politics” that dominates the foreign policy agenda of 
states. In other words, while military and security issues are overemphasised, economic 
dimensions of foreign policy, named as “low politics” are de-emphasised. The realist 
belief in the autonomy of political sphere is prone to overlook the interaction between 
foreign policy and other spheres such as economics, law, or ethics.
4. Behavioralism and the Challenge of Decision Making Approaches
The reaction to the realist interpretation of international relations and foreign policy 
came from what is labelled as the Behaviouralist School. The first behavioural 
challenge was called the Decision Making Approach, and was applied to foreign policy 
by Snyder and his associates in 1954 (Snyder et al., 1962). According to decision 
making theory, foreign policy is nothing but a series of decisions taken by the official 
decision makers. Hence the explanation of foreign policy is the explanation of the 
behaviour of an individual or a group acting in a structured domestic machinery in 
order to decide which course of action to adopt.
A cursory glance at the decision making approach reveals the fact that it was 
strongly influenced by the basic premises of the realist school. First of all, despite its 
identification of the state with its official decision makers, the state remained the only 
actor in the international system. Second, the rational actor model of realism was 
translated into the Decision Making Approach as rational decision maker or rational 
decision making process. Hence, like the abstract state of the realist school, the 
concrete decision maker(s) began to calculate the pluses and the minuses of alternative 
courses of action, and chose the most appropriate (beneficial) course that would lead to 
the achievement of the desired goal(s).
Nevertheless, behaviouralism, under the label of the decision making approach, 
brought very significant changes to the concept of foreign policy (White, 1989:13-15).
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First, it introduced the idea that the states or the governments are all abstractions, and 
are not able to behave by themselves. They could act only through concrete individuals 
known as decision makers. Thus the Behaviouralist School equated the state with the 
official decision makers whose behaviours, unlike abstractions, can easily be observed 
and analysed. Second, the Decision Making Approach challenged the “objectivist” 
perspective of realism by proposing a “subjectivist” outlook. According to the Decision 
Making Approach, the definition of the situation by the decision makers is the key to 
the explanation of the behaviour of states. What counts is not the objective realities of 
the international environment but the subjective perception of that environment by the 
decision maker(s). Thirdly, the introduction of the impact of the internal setting and 
societal factors on the decision maker(s) and the decision making process showed the 
significance of domestic sources of foreign policy as opposed to realists who focused 
almost totally on the external sources of foreign policy.
Besides these important differences, the main controversy between 
behaviouralism and realism was methodological. The common tendency of traditional 
scholars was to study the foreign policies of individual countries. Their beliefs were 
based on the uniqueness of the foreign policies of states. According to the traditionalists 
foreign policy should be studied by individualising rather than by generalising. 
Consequently, they advocated detailed case studies of the foreign policies of individual 
states which usually employed an historical-diplomatic method based on intuition and 
insight. For behaviouralists the central aim was to study international relations 
“scientifically”, and the main concern of 'scientific' studies was to reach generalisations 
rather than to reach specification. In order to achieve this end, behaviouralists looked 
for patterns and regularities in the behaviours of states which, at the end would lead to 
theory building. Inspired by the positivism and empiricism used in other academic 
disciplines, behaviouralists advocated the construction of hypotheses about the 
behaviours of states and the collection of observable “objective” data for the 
verification of these hypotheses. Without having an observable data base, according to 
behaviouralism, the discipline of international relations could not reach a sound general 
theory. Hence, in order to evaluate data “objectively” behaviouralists began to employ
18
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quantitative techniques in the explanation of foreign policy. The aim of the 
behaviouralists was to introduce universal scientific methods in the field of 
international relations.
The advent of behaviouralist thinking was indeed a breakthrough in the field of 
international relations and foreign policy. The publication of David Singer's paper, 
“The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations” brought a new feature in 
the studies of foreign policy (Singer, 1961). According to Singer the foreign policies of 
states could be explained at two different levels; either at the level of nation states or at 
the level of international system. One could give priority and overemphasise the impact 
of either level of analysis in explaining foreign policy behaviour. Despite its several 
problems, it can be said that this division has led to the enrichment of foreign policy 
studies. One of the consequences of Singer's article was the emergence of systems 
analysis which gives priority to the systemic determinants of foreign policy. The aim of 
these systemic studies were more than the explanation of foreign policy behaviour. 
Being loyal to the behavioural understanding of science, they tried to predict the 
behaviours of states through creating different systemic models (Kaplan, 1957; 
McClelland, 1966; and Rosecrance, 1966). Nevertheless their understanding of the 
system was somewhat simple. The system, according to those early system analysts of 
foreign policy, was the sum of its constituent parts, and they only paid attention to the 
behaviours and interactions of a few great powers, ignoring the lesser actors of the 
system. On the other hand, at the state level of analysis the decision making school 
emphasised the domestic sources of foreign policy. Its impact on the foreign policy 
studies was remarkable (White, 1989:14-17).
5. Comparative Foreign Policy Approach (CFP)
The most striking school of behaviouralism came under the title of Comparative 
Foreign Policy Approach (CFP). The emergence of the comparative study of foreign 
policy was the direct result of the behavioural movement of the 1950s. The central idea 
of the behavioural movement was to establish social scientific methods of research 
which meant systematic-empirical data collection, conceptualisation, hypothesis
19
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testing, and theory building. In parallel to this scientificism, the ultimate aim of CFP 
was to build up a general theory of foreign policy through the use of methods borrowed 
from the natural sciences.
According to Rosenau (Rosenau, 1966) foreign policy analysis has suffered 
from a lack of testable generalisations of foreign policy behaviour. In other words, 
foreign policy analysis was devoid of general theory. With this in his mind, he first 
identified a series of explanatory variables of foreign policy: (1) Idiosyncratic; (2) Role; 
(3) Governmental; (4) Societal; (5) Systemic. He considered these five categories of 
variables as the main sources of foreign policy behaviour. Nevertheless, he argued that 
the degree of the explanatory power of these variables might well change in relation to 
the state(s) under investigation. In other words certain variables would better explain 
the foreign policy of a particular state than others, depending on the typology the state 
under investigation. According to Rosenau (1968) foreign policy analysis had been 
dominated by non-comparable, non-cumulative single case studies for decades. Even 
the decision making approach had not considered the possibility of comparing the 
perspectives of decision makers of different countries but had simply improved the 
quality of the case histories. What was needed, argued Rosenau, was not to enumerate 
foreign policy variables and to discuss them as if they operate identically in all states, 
but to generate a comparative analysis that could allow relevant generalisations. In 
CFP, comparison was conceived in methodological terms rather than in terms of 
subject matter: comparison was a method. One could investigate foreign policy 
phenomena in different ways, and the comparative method was only one of them. It 
was a suitable method to generate and test hypotheses about foreign policy behaviour 
that applied to more than one state. Thus the aim of CFP was to identify similarities and 
differences in the foreign policy behaviour of more than one state in order to reach 
generalisations.
In the CFP school, foreign policy was regarded as the composite of national and 
international politics. Studies of foreign policy therefore had to focus on the association 
between variations in the behaviour of nations and variations in their external
20
Understanding Foreign Policy
environment. Given the national and international dimensions, the subject matter of 
foreign policy, would naturally overlap with other fields of social sciences. If a foreign 
policy analyst was interested in the sources, contents and consequences of foreign 
policy as a totality, such analysis would inevitably overlap with other fields of inquiry.
In relation to the question of rationality, CFP regarded foreign policy behaviour 
as purposeful behaviour. Yet the meaning of the term “purpose” in CFP was presented 
somewhat differently to what is conventionally accepted. Being purposeful in CFP 
meant that officials do not act randomly. They always act with some goal in mind, but 
these goals might not necessarily be highly concrete or rational, or part of a plan. They 
might be unrealistic but they are formulated in order to achieve something. It is in this 
sense that the foreign policy behaviour is purposeful.
In sharp contrast to the regularity seeking nature of CFP in explaining foreign 
policy behaviour, the case study approach insists on the uniqueness of the foreign 
policies of each state. It is not possible, therefore, to explain the foreign policies of 
states through a common methodology and a common approach. In case studies, history 
is the place where the foreign policies of individual states are to be studied. One can 
explain foreign policy only through the detailed analysis of the individual histories. A 
central belief in case studies is that explanations of foreign policy behaviours through 
generalisations result in the loss of the unique factors that make up any foreign policy 
action.
6. Changes in the Agenda and New Approaches
The CFP began to decline in the mid-1970s. The reasons stemmed both from changes 
in the international environment and from the problems within the discipline itself 
(Smith, 1986:19-22 and Rosenau, 1987:2-4). First, in the mid-1970s the role of the 
economy in international relations and in the conduct of foreign policy increased 
remarkably. With the advent of nuclear stalemate and the increasing demands of the 
Third World for economic welfare, the central concerns of foreign policy which were 
traditionally focused on political-military matters began to be challenged. As issues of
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economic interdependence and political economy became dominant in the global 
agenda, the traditional assumptions about the role and the limits of the state began to 
diminish. Students of foreign policy who used to equate the state with its government 
or decision makers began to consider the role, competence, and autonomy of state when 
faced with the non-govemmental actors both in and outside the state. The role of the 
state as an actor in international relations began to decline with the emergence of 
competent non-state actors in global affairs. Furthermore, with growing 
interdependence at the global level, the distinction between domestic and foreign 
policies declined considerably.
In the mid-1970s the international relations, and hence the foreign policy 
agenda began to shift from political-military issues to economics and political 
economy. The main characteristic of this shift was a dissatisfaction with the state- 
centric outlook of existing approaches. Thus the fields of international relations and 
foreign policy came under the influence of what is known as “The Complex 
Interdependence Approach”. The main focus of this school was the complex nature of 
world politics which could best be characterised as transnational relations (Keohane 
and Nye, 1971 and 1977). According to the Complex Interdependence Approach, the 
role of non-governmental or non-state actors in world politics was as significant as that 
of states. In other words, transnational corporations and transgovemmental 
organisations played significant roles in world politics. Nevertheless, their roles were 
somewhat different from those of states; they were involved in economic rather than 
political-military issues. In the period of detente, according to the Complex 
Interdependence School, world politics could not be confined solely to the realist view 
of politics among states. Economic issues, through the complex web of transnational 
relations had become an important issue in world politics. Thus, with the increasing 
importance of economic issues, and their interaction with politics, the world had 
entered into a state of complex interdependence. Nevertheless, the Complex 
Interdependence Approach remained a contributor rather than becoming a distinct 
framework to be studied.
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Since the Complex Interdependence did not lead to an overall revolution other 
new approaches began to offer some advanced frameworks for the study of 
international relations and foreign policy. “Neo-realism” and “World System Analysis” 
were the most striking examples of these new approaches which were subsumed under 
the general title of structuralism. Inspired by early system theories and the Complex 
Interdependence Approaches, these new frameworks focused on aggregates (systems) 
rather than particulars (states) in explaining foreign policy behaviour.
The neo-realist approach of K.Waltz (Waltz, 1979) tried to explain foreign 
policy behaviours from a structural-systemic perspective. Waltz's systemic perspective 
was different from the early systemic theorists. According to early system theories, a 
system was defined as a totality composed of its parts. In other words, the international 
system was composed of nation states, and their interactions were central to system 
studies. For Waltz a system was still composed of interacting units, but it was more 
than its parts. Apart from nation states, according to Waltz, the international system 
has a structure which is distinct from its constituent units. In this way Waltz clearly 
establishes a distinction between system level and other levels of analysis. The structure 
is the system level component of the international system and operates as the organising 
engine. And it is this structure of the international system that determines the 
behaviours of states.
The second approach under the general heading of structuralism was “world- 
system analysis”. Like Waltz, world-system analysts regarded the international system 
as a totality greater than its parts. The major proponent of this approach is LWallerstein. 
For Wallerstein, the behaviour of states in the international system is determined by the 
world-system structure and its processes. In this perspective, the world-economy is the 
most important structure in determining the behaviours of states. In other words, there 
is one single economy in the world-system, and the foreign policies of states are 
determined by the way the states are involved in this economic structure. In order to 
understand the foreign policy of any state, one should not only look at the position of
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the state in the world-economy but also at the point of time where this economic 
structure is standing in the cyclical process in which it continuously circulates.
In fact, since the phenomenon of foreign policy stands at the crossroads of 
many academic disciplines it seems impossible to reach a single clear cut explanation 
of it. What influences and what explains foreign policy depends, on the one hand on the 
situation at hand, and on how the researcher perceives and formulates his explanatory 
framework on the other hand. In other words, different approaches and variables 
explain the phenomena best in different contexts because what determines foreign 
policy behaviour is a complex set of variables and only one or some of them can 
become dominant in different situations.
7. Conclusion
Having looked briefly at the evolution of foreign policy analysis it is time now to focus 
on the world-system analysis of Wallerstein which I shall use in this study. Although 
the world- system school does not directly consider the foreign policy analysis, it 
presents foreign policy analysts with an interesting and valuable framework in the field 
of the political economy of foreign policy.
From the perspective of foreign policy analysis, my contention is that 
Wallerstein's world-system analysis subsumed many of the different contributions to 
the study of foreign policy described above. Hence, it incorporated the importance of 
power and external environment from Realism; like Behavioralism it emphasised 
generalisations and looking for patterns and regularities in the behaviours of states. It 
took from the Level of Analysis Issue, the importance of the system level and systemic 
determinants. Like CFP, it concentrates on comparative analysis that can allow relevant 
generalisations, identifying similarities and differences in the foreign policy behaviour 
of more than one state, the classification of states (creating typologies), and sees foreign 
policy as a composite of national and international politics, emphasising the multi­
disciplinary study of foreign policy. It also recognises, as the Complex 
Interdependence School does, the importance of economics and transnational actors.
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And, the world-system school itself contributed to the study of foreign policy through 
emphasising the importance of the system level component, namely the structure, 
particularly economic structure, and its processes and operations and the way they 
affect the foreign policy behaviours of states. Furthermore, it emphasised the 
interdependence and interaction between power and production in the modem world- 
system, and hence its reflection on the external behaviours of states.
In the next chapter, therefore I shall first, focus briefly on the systemic- 
structural approaches to the study of foreign policy. I shall then turn to world-system 
analysis and its relevance for the study of Greek and Spanish foreign policies.
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Notes to Chapter One
(1) On Foreign policy analysis, see Hill and Light, 1985 and Light, 1994.
(2) This definition of foreign policy was made by Prof.Christopher Hill in his Foreign 
Policy Analysis lectures at the LSE.
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CHAPTER II
SYSTEMIC-STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY
1. Introduction
In order to evaluate world-system analysis better it may be helpful to give an account of 
systemic-structural approaches to international relations in relation to the study of 
foreign policy. In this context I shall discuss the level of analysis problem in 
international relations, systems approaches, Waltz's systemic-structural approach, and 
the “world system analysis” of both Modelski and Wallerstein.
1.1. The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations
Since the publication of Singer's well-known article in 1961 (Singer, 1961), the level of 
analysis problem has been one of the major issues in the study of international relations. 
Originally, it was concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of two levels in 
analysing international relations: the international system and the national state as 
levels of analysis. The central concern was the level at which one can best describe, 
explain and predict international phenomena. In fact, since each level has merits as well 
as disadvantages, the problem was to clarify the issue of whether a researcher should 
interpret reality in terms of the whole or in terms of parts of the whole in the study of 
international relations. This differentiation between the levels of analysis corresponds 
to the classical division of the field of International Relations into the main subfields of 
International Politics and Foreign Policy.
It is widely accepted that while international politics focuses on the structures, 
processes, and working of the international system, the subject matter of foreign policy 
focuses on the external relations of individual states. Hence, it becomes important for 
students of international relations to differentiate between the analysis of the 
international system and the analysis of the foreign policy of individual states.
The International System as Level of Analysis: Since it covers all the 
interactions within the system, the system level of analysis is considered the most 
comprehensive level. It encompasses all the international actors (mainly nation states)
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and focuses on the patterns of interactions among the actors in the system. Accordingly, 
it studies, the forming and dissolving of alliances in the international system, the 
maintenance of stability, crisis, war, balance of power, international organisations, etc., 
and makes generalisations about these phenomena. In this way it allows us to study 
international relations in a totality. Yet this encompassing character of system level 
analysis leads the researcher to overemphasise the impact of the system on the state 
actors, on the one hand, and to undervalue the autonomy of states in the international 
system on the other. Moreover, while the notions of national autonomy and freedom of 
choice are ignored at the systemic level, a strong deterministic orientation often 
becomes dominant. A kind of “invisible hand” which determines the behaviour of 
states appears as one of the main characteristics of system level analysis. Furthermore, 
in relation to foreign policy it leads to the understanding that there exists a high degree 
of uniformity in the foreign policy behaviours of state actors. This level of analysis, 
therefore, allows little room for divergence in the behaviours of states, and hence 
conveys a homogenised picture of states in the international system.
The National State as Level of Analysis: This particular level of analysis in 
international relations focuses on the primary actors of the international system, namely 
the nation state. In contrast to the international system level, the national state level of 
analysis allows the researcher to study the differences between state actors. An 
emphasis on the different foreign policy goals of different nations permits detailed 
examination of individual states, and accordingly leads to significant differentiation 
among the behaviours of the actors, in contrast to the similarity-seeking nature of 
system level analysis. State level analysis stresses the primacy of internal factors in the 
formulation of national foreign policies; hence, rather than the international interaction 
and its systemic outcomes, the influences of decision makers, pressure groups, classes, 
public opinion etc., are considered as the determinants of the behaviours of state actors. 
The problem is, however, that the focus on differences at the national level leads to an 
underestimation of the role of systemic outcomes on the behaviours of the actors.
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Moreover, there is a further problem. The level of analysis in international 
relations cannot be limited only to two levels. For instance, R.Yalem argues the 
possibility of an additional level of analysis as a result of the increasing regionalisation 
of world politics (Yalem, 1977). Accordingly, he proposes the regional subsystem as a 
third level of analysis between the international and national levels.
I do not intend here to focus on the merits or demerits of different formulations 
of levels of analysis in international relations. However, I do not agree that the national 
state level of analysis should only examine the internal determinants of the foreign 
policies of nation states and should not employ system level analysis. The foreign 
policies of national states are by no means determined only by factors internal to that 
society. On the contrary, foreign policy is a mixture of both internal and external 
factors, and it might well be explained in relation to its larger environment - that is, in 
relation to the international system and its structures. Hence, the study of the external 
influences on the foreign policy of state actors is by no means a systemic level study, 
but a national one. In other words, it is one thing to carry out an entirely systemic study, 
and it is another to incorporate a system level perspective into the analysis and to study 
the external influences on foreign policy. The latter might still be considered a national 
state level study, since what the researcher proposes to do is to explain the foreign 
policy of one or more states in relation to the larger world context rather than restricting 
him- or herself to the explanation of, or theorising on, the international system and/or 
its structures.
Accordingly, in this study of Greek and Spanish foreign policy I shall use the 
national state level of analysis although I shall incorporate the perspectives of world- 
system studies and borrow concepts from them. In other words, I shall use 
systemic/structural approaches and their concepts and vocabulary as well as national 
ones in explaining the foreign policies of Greece and Spain.
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1.2. Identifying the External and Internal Sources of Foreign Policy Behaviour
One of the central concerns of students of foreign policy has been to identify the 
external and internal sources of state behaviour. The division between the two sources 
of foreign policy behaviour is known as the division between the external/systemic and 
internal/societal factors affecting foreign policy. Although the answer to the question of 
which one of these two factors has generally become dominant in the formulation of 
the foreign policy is an open one, or at least depends on the situation at hand, most 
foreign policy studies have been dominated by the internal/societal factors approach, 
while the use of external/systemic factors has remained marginal.(McGowan and 
Kegley, 1983:7).
Studies which search for the role of internal/societal factors on foreign policy 
focuses on the variables that are internal to the societies. In other words, they focus on 
the effects of the individual characteristics of leaders and decision makers, on decision 
making processes, governmental and political structures, pressure groups, classes, 
national history and so on. Changes in the general foreign policy orientation are 
attributed to forces internal to society, without paying sufficient attention either to the 
restrictive or to the facilitative nature of the world context on the internal sources of 
change. Accordingly, it becomes difficult to establish connections between foreign 
policy behaviour and the world context. System studies, on the contrary, give priority to 
external/systemic factors in the explanation of foreign policy behaviours and 
orientations, emphasising the determining role of the world context on foreign policy. 
Changes in the international system or in the political and economic structures of the 
international system are considered the primary sources of change in foreign policy 
behaviours and orientations.
In comparing the two approaches it is clear that since the internal/societal 
approach focuses on internal variables, the inevitable differences between states cannot 
lead to generalisations and theoretical studies. Hence, the use of internal/societal 
variables leads to the detailed case studies of the foreign policies of individual states. 
The external/systemic approach, on the other hand, provides more opportunity to make
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generalisations about the foreign policy behaviours of the states and makes theoretical 
studies possible. In contrast to the rather particularistic and discriminating 
characteristics of the internal/societal approach, the highly deterministic nature of 
external/systemic variables on foreign policy results in the probability of similar foreign 
policy behaviours and orientations of at least similar types of states. In other words, the 
impact of external/systemic influences on national states leads to similar foreign policy 
orientations and behaviours, and the degree of this similarity increases as the 
resemblance of individual states' internal organisations and positions in the 
international system increases.
Bearing these points in mind, I shall classify Greece and Spain in a category 
called “semiperiphery” which I borrow from the world-system approach of Wallerstein, 
and I shall investigate whether the structural characteristics of semiperipherality might 
lead to similar orientations and policies. Hence, I shall primarily seek to establish 
whether external/systemic influences play similar roles on the foreign policies of 
Greece and Spain. In other words, I shall examine the influences of the economic and 
political structures of the international system on the foreign policy orientations and 
behaviours of these countries. But this does not mean that the internal/societal 
influences will be ignored or that the study will not cover the particular characteristics 
of the foreign policies of Greece and Spain. I believe that the foreign policy of any 
country is a mixture of unique and general factors. In other words, while the foreign 
policies of semiperipherial states display some general characteristics, there are also 
features which are unique to Greek and Spanish foreign policies. Hence, I shall attempt 
to show both the general characteristics in their foreign policies which they share with 
other semiperipheral countries, and the unique aspects of each state's individual foreign 
policy. This means that I shall examine the internal/societal influences on the foreign 
policy of each country, and accordingly not ignore the intermingled nature of domestic 
and foreign issues.
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2. Systemic/Structural Approaches
2.1. The Systemic Approach
One of the most important issues in foreign policy studies which seek for explanations 
to the behaviours and orientations of states in the external environment is to 
conceptualise that external environment. In other words a picture of that environment 
must be given in order to understand the relationship between the foreign policy and its 
larger setting.
One of the consequences of Singer's article was the emergence of systems 
analysis which emphasised the importance of identifying various interaction patterns in 
the international system. The systems approach was a new way of looking at the 
relations among the actors of the international system. The primary aim of the early 
systems theorists was to explain system-wide phenomena rather than to study the 
foreign policy of individual states. Accordingly, the conditions and patterns of 
international stability and instability, conflicts, alliance building, and the concepts of 
balance of power, bipolarity and multipolarity became a central concern. The new 
understanding was “...that interaction sequences (among the states) have a logic of 
their own and that their outcomes can thus be explained - and perhaps even anticipated 
- by examining the patterns they form rather than the actors who sustain them” 
(Rosenau, 1969:289).
However, scholars referred to the internal forces of individual states which 
could affect the international system in their attempts to explain the international 
interaction patterns and their outcomes. In other words, the foreign policies of 
individual states which reflect their internal attributes were seen as the causes of those 
system-wide phenomena that the early system theorists claimed to explain (Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraf, 1981:134-80 and Rosenau, 1969:289-335). For instance, according to 
McCleland, conditions and events in the international system were generated within the 
nation states by interest groups, political parties, public opinion, etc. In a similar 
manner, Rosecrance emphasised the determinant role of domestic elites for the
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establishment of international stability. Furthermore, according to Kaplan, international 
patterns of behaviour were related to the characteristics of states. In all these examples, 
internal forces within states were thought to exert major effects on the functioning of 
the international system. The impact of the systemic understanding of international 
relations on the foreign policy studies of individual states appeared as the study of the 
influences of different domestic factors on international systems and/or international 
interaction patterns, rather than vice versa. For instance, since there were differences in 
the interaction patterns and workings of balance of power, bipolar, and multipolar 
international systems etc., early system theories tried to explain the impact of internal 
forces on the formation of different international interaction patterns and system-wide 
phenomena rather than the influences of those different international systems and 
interaction patterns on foreign policy orientations and behaviours.
The main contribution of systems studies to international relations is that it 
shifted the attention of scholars from studying the actions of individual states to the 
study of interaction among states. However, these early systems approaches defined a 
system as a totality composed of its parts. In other words, the international system was 
composed of nation states and only their interactions were central to systems studies. 
Furthermore, the interactions between great powers were considered important rather 
than the interactions among all states - great, medium or small powers - in the 
international system.
If we turn back to the original concern of giving a picture of the external 
environment in order to explain the foreign policies of states in relation to their larger 
environment, the early systems approach's conceptualisation of that environment can be 
summarised as follows; a. The main actors of the international system are nation states, 
and the international system is the aggregate of these nation states and their 
interactions, b. There are regularities and patterns in the interactions of states, c. There 
are different types of international systems and they are characterised by hypothesised 
patterns of interactions. Thus, each system has its own interaction patterns, d. 
Interaction patterns and outcomes are greatly affected by the domestic forces within
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states. Accordingly, the foreign policies of national political units are to be studied in 
order to understand and explain international systems. In other words, they are the 
causes rather than the effects of the systems, e. Superpower and/or great powers, rather 
than small states are central to the interactions in these systems. Hence, there has 
always been an implicit hierarchy among states.
2.2. The Systemic-Structural Approach of K.Waltz
The conceptualisation of the external environment by the early systemic school was 
somewhat simplistic and blurred, primarily because the system was defined through its 
constituent units and their interactions without including any system level component. 
However, it paved the way for more advanced contending attempts at theorising the 
external environment.
According to Waltz (1979), theories of international politics examine 
international phenomena through one of two major avenues which he defines as 
reductionist and systemic approaches. Reductionist theories of international politics 
concentrate on the individual or national level, while systemic theories conceive of 
causes operating at the international level. According to Waltz, the early systems 
theories fall into the reductionist category. Reductionist theories are not really national 
level analysis since they do not necessarily explain national level influences on the 
foreign policy behaviour of a particular state, but try to explain the totality of 
international politics through examining the properties and the interconnections of 
states. Thus, reductionist approaches have holistic characteristics in the sense that they 
claim to explain international events rather than foreign policies. In reductionist 
approaches the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its 
parts. Accordingly, international politics are explained in terms of individual leaders, 
decision makers, national bureaucracies or national political and economic 
characteristics etc., and their interactions. Hence, from the systemic standpoint the 
reductionist explanation of international events can only become meaningful when 
system level effects are absent.
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In fact, international events are affected not only by the properties and 
interactions of states but also by the way in which they are organised. In other words, a 
system is defined as a set of interacting units, but it also consists of a structure which 
is the system level component. Structure is not something that can be seen. It is an 
abstraction. However, it is defined only through the arrangements of the system's parts. 
It is this structure which makes us think that a system is more than a collection of its 
parts. Accordingly, “any approach or theory if its rightly termed systemic, must show 
how the system level, or structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units” (Waltz, 
1979:40). Early system theories, which were based on national attributes and the 
interaction of states but failed to show systemic properties that could effect 
international outcomes, cannot thus be considered true systemic theories. Reductionists 
fail to differentiate the interactions of states from the arrangements of that interaction.
The primary task of a system theory is to conceive of an international system's 
structure, and to show how it affects the actions and the interactions of the states. Its 
emphasis is on the forces that operate at the system level rather than at the level of the 
nations. The structure, being the system level component, is a constraining and 
disposing force on the behaviours of its parts. In other words structures belong to the 
organisational realm of the system and are considered the forces to which states are 
subjected.
Structural/systemic theories seek for recurrent patterns and features of 
international politics. Because of this regularity- seeking characteristic, structural 
approaches lack detailed analysis. Instead they explain broader patterns of international 
political life. In other words in such theories what is to be explained is “why different 
units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within 
expected ranges?” rather than “why different units behave differently despite their 
similar placement in the system?” (Waltz, 1979:72).
In order to reach generalisations, structural approaches observe big regularities 
and patterns and ignore differences at the national level. The national system level is
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taken for granted, in the sense that change at the national level has nothing to do with 
the changes at the system level. In relation to the foreign policies of individual states 
they can only emphasise how structural/systemic conditions generally play a role in the 
formulation of similar national policies. Another aspect of structural/systemic theories 
is their emphasis on the primacy of great powers in the international system. The 
assumption is that the structures of the system are generated by the interactions of its 
principal actors, in other words, the great powers of the system set the environment for 
the lesser actors (other medium or small powers) as well as for themselves.
In Waltz's theory the structure appears as the central concept to be explained 
(Waltz, 1979:101). But Waltz distinguishes between structures and is concerned with 
one particular type of international system. In the neorealist approach the international 
political system is considered as a distinct system from the economic, social, or other 
international systems. Moreover neorealist theories confine themselves to the political 
realm, and thus focus on international political structures.
In relation to the foreign policies of individual states the picture of the external 
environment presented Waltz's structuralist approach appears highly deterministic. The 
structure of the international system limits the varying aims of states and shows them 
the ways to be followed that would lead to common qualities in the outcomes. In other 
words, the orientations and behaviours of states are to a great extent determined by the 
political structure of the international system. Accordingly, the foremost aim of every 
state appears to be survival in the centuries-long anarchic arrangement of the 
international system. The organising principle of self help and the need for security 
direct the efforts of different states towards national policies that ensure their survival 
in the system. The structure of the system forces all states in the system to cope with 
this structural principle.
3. World Sytem Analysis
Two other structuralist conceptualisations of the international system or world context 
come under the heading of “world system approach”. Like Waltz, the leading figures
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of the “world system perspective”, Modelski and Wallerstein, also emphasise the 
structuralist motto that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”. According to 
world system theorists international phenomena should be studied in terms of the 
determining nature of world system structures. In this way Modelski and Wallerstein 
conceptualise the external environment around the global political and economic 
structures respectively. Now let us turn tathese two approaches.
3.1. Modelski's Political Structure and Conceptualisation of the World Context
Modelski's aim is to establish a systemic understanding of world politics based on 
observable recurrences in long cycles (Modelski, 1978, 1987a, 1987b). The study of 
long cycles is the study of world politics on the basis of the relationship between the 
recurrence of world wars and the emergence of world leaders. One of Modelski's major 
contentions is that there are repeating patterns in the relationship between great wars 
and world leadership, and further that these patterns are related to major trends of 
global development. Hence the long cycles become more than repetitions in the sense 
that they embrace evolutionary development in the global political system.
According to Modelski, world systems are “social systems constituted by states 
and processes of social interaction among acting units” and “... the world system is a 
device for viewing the world's social arrangements as a totality, and for investigating 
the relationship between world-wide interactions and social arrangements at the 
regional, national and sub-system levels” (Modelski, 1987a:20). He distinguishes 
different world systems throughout history and considers that the modem world system 
was bom around 1500.
The global system is the most comprehensive level of interaction among 
vertically differentiated global, regional, national and local levels. In the context of the 
global system (as at the other levels) there are also horizontally differentiated functional 
sub-systems of polity, economy, societal, community and pattern maintenance. In the 
framework of these vertical and horizontal differentiation at the level of world system, 
the global polity, or the global political system, appears as the most important political
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structure of the world system and becomes the focus of Modelski's approach to the 
study of international phenomena. The global political system is the topmost structure 
of the world system, and the organisation of the world - the definition and the 
clarification of all global problems and of action in relation to them - takes place at this 
level (Modelski, 1978:214). However, although its functioning is dominated by all the 
major powers of the time, the most crucial interaction in the global polity is the 
interaction between the world leader and its challenger.
The study of the global political system considers the whole world as one non­
territorial political unit and focuses on intercontinental, oceanic patterns of 
interdependence and on global reach (Modelski, 1978:214). Yet it is a political system 
and it must be separated from global economic networks whose functions are basically 
differentiated.
At the heart of Modelski's politics dominated world system approach there lies 
the question of authority. In other words the question of who governs that non­
territorial but supposedly unified global political system and how, becomes a critical 
issue. Indeed, a striking feature of the global political system is the lack of a central 
authority that would dominate it. There is no world empire or world state in a 
superordinate position to enforce rules and give orders to be obeyed. The system is 
politically decentralised. However, for Modelski the lack of an overriding authority 
does not necessarily mean that there is no order or authority at all. Although there is no 
formal authority, the global political system is governed by a global leader, and its very 
existence provides order and stability in the international system. Global leaders are 
‘those units monopolising (that is controlling more than one half of) the market for (or 
the supply of) order-keeping in the global layer of interdependence’ (Modelski, 
1978:216).
Modelski confines his study of the world system to global politics, and he 
defines and explains how it works through long cycles. Long cycles are the recurrent 
patterns in the life of the global political system: at certain periods of time the system
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passes through the same stages that it has pass through before. It describes periodicities 
of a social system; the patterns of global wars and the rise and the decline of world 
powers in relation to one another. According to Modelski ‘long cycles are sequences of 
events that repeat in regular pattern’ (Modelski, 1987b:3).
The global powers are the dominant units in the system. They are those powers 
whose patterns of interactions structure the global polity. They supply order to the 
global system through organising and maintaining alliances and deploying forces in all 
parts of the world. The state of politics at the global level is determined by their actions 
and interactions. There are three categories of global powers; the world power 
(historically, Portugal, Netherlands, Britain and the United States), the challenger 
(historically, Spain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union) and the other global 
powers.
The world power is the leading unit in global politics. It is the most powerful 
political unit at the global level and accordingly has the superior position in terms of 
global reach. The ascendancy of a world power begins at the end of a global war and it 
organises the global political system and co-ordinates it with other global sub-systems. 
Global leadership not only corresponds to superiority in power but also to the 
accomplishment of global services. These services are basically the political services 
which make the global system work. For instance, a global leader defines the global 
problems and analyses them according to their priorities; it creates coalitions as the 
basic infrastructure of world order; and it puts a world order into practice that mainly 
administers the international economic order. In sum, it can be said that the global 
leader produces order and the other units (from nation states to individuals) consume it. 
On the other hand, the challenger is a global power aiming at global leadership. It is 
thus the major source of tension and destabilisation in the system, and its most dramatic 
challenge comes in the phase of global war. Historical experience shows that no 
challenger has managed to attain the status of world power. The new leader has 
emerged among the coalition allies of the former world power.
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Temporally, each long cycle is divided into four distinct successive systemic 
phases. A long cycle starts with the phase of global war where an intense conflict in the 
form of a major war prevails. As a result of the weak organisation of the global political 
system, that the strengths of the global powers are put to the test in order to determine 
who will shape the new organisation of the world order. The next phase is called the 
phase of world power. At the end of a global war, a powerful nation state emerges as 
the new global leader and establishes the new order. In the third phase, called the 
delegitimation phase, the power and authority of the world power begins to erode and 
signs of weakness and decline appear in the orderly working of the system. Challengers 
appear and the authority of the global leader begins to be questioned. The final phase of 
the long cycle is the deconcentration phase. Here, increasing competition among the 
world powers leads to the building of rival coalitions, and consequently the order of the 
system totally collapses. Hence, the cycle moves towards its initial position of global 
war, and with the outbreak of war another long cycle begins.
The cyclical processes of the global political system do not mean that the long 
cycles are static. On the contrary although the phases remain the same, the contexts are 
fundamentally differentiated in each long cycle. The dynamism of the long cycles 
basically corresponds to the ways that the global powers organise the system and their 
specific innovations. Accordingly, the long cycle is not only a replacement of world 
power but at the same time it is the major source of political and social development in 
the system (Modelski, 1987a:34).
Modelski also argues that the linkage between politics and economics is strong 
and important (Modelski, 1983:134-135 and Kumon, 1987:61-63). The most advanced 
and active sectors of the world economy are located in the world power's domain and 
the world political leader is, at the same time, the world economic leader. Moreover, 
the organisation of the international economy is realised to a great extent by the world 
powers which play a decisive role in setting the rules of international trade, investment 
and finance. Hence changes in the positions of the global power in different phases of 
long cycles can easily be associated with changes in global economic relations.
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When it comes to the question of ‘how Modelski conceptualises the world 
context?’, for him there is a world system functioning on the political structure and it is 
more of a product of world powers (Modelski, 1978:216). Although the world powers 
are subject to the structural/systemic processes of long cycles, they have the power to 
determine their context and their quality.
However, Modelski's conceptualisation of world context does not make clear 
cut statements about the foreign policies of individual states. At best, since only great 
power actions and interactions structure the global political system, one cannot study 
the foreign policies of nation states directly except for those of the great powers in 
Modelski's world system analysis. However, he provides us with a regional level of 
interaction where one might study the foreign policies of lesser states, but he does not 
give us any clue about how to study politics at the regional level (or at the national and 
local levels). In other words, if you want to study the foreign policies of individual 
states Modelski has little to say about the regional level other than that regional powers 
have powerful land armies which might indeed also be characteristic of a global power. 
Furthermore, he does not specify whether all small states without exception are to be 
included in the regional level of interaction.
As a result, Modelski's world system approach does not provide an easy 
framework for foreign policy studies, especially for studying the foreign policies of 
medium or small states. It is primarily a framework for the study of great power 
politics. Yet this does not necessarily mean that we cannot study the foreign policies of 
medium or small states in this framework. Indeed we can. First, for Modelski “In as 
much as the long cycle also affects politics at the regional, national and local levels... its 
role might be studied in the broader context of world politics” (Modelski, 1987a:9). 
Secondly, one can also employ foreign policy studies of medium or small states in the 
framework of Modelski's approach by examining the behaviours of these states besides 
the behaviours of great powers in the different phases of long cycles.
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I shall not directly incorporate Modelski's world system approach in my 
analysis of Greek and Spanish foreign policies. Yet it is necessary to know the basic 
assumptions of his 'world political structure' in order to understand the systemic- 
structural (holistic) understanding to international relations better, and to see the 
similarities and differences between his and Wallerstein's approach which will be 
employed in this study. Now, let us turn to Wallerstein's world-system analysis which, 
in the framework of world economic structure, presents a more complex analysis of 
interstate relations.
3.2. Wallerstein's Economic Structure and Conceptualisation of the World 
Context
Wallerstein's world-system analysis is the most advanced challenge to the theories of 
modernisation which focus on the nation state and their developments. According to 
modernisation theory, the world consists of autonomous national societies each 
following a similar developmental pattern on the evolutionary ladder from tradition to 
modernity, although they started this process at different times and speeds. 
Modernisation theorists argue that every state must pass through the same stages that 
today's advanced (Western) societies once experienced in order to reach a position of 
relative well-being.
The first challenge to the developmentalist view of modernisation theory came 
from the dependency school. Dependency theorists argued that there is no such thing as 
a linear developmental pattern through which every society should pass in order to 
become an advanced society. On the contrary, they claimed that a capitalist world- 
economy exist, and that the present backward position of many countries is due to the 
disadvantageous relations they have had with advanced countries within the capitalist 
world-economy rather than a question of internal structures or starting late. In other 
words, they focused on the theme of the development of underdevelopment and 
emphasised that the historical development of advanced societies and the 
underdevelopment of backward ones are two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, they
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used this framework in order to analyse patterns of underdevelopment in the Third 
World (especially in Latin America) countries in which they were primarily interested.
Wallerstein's challenge came as a major step forward on the path opened by the 
dependency school. Wallerstein's modem world-system analysis is one of the most 
comprehensive approaches to social phenomena in the social sciences. It also 
establishes links between historical sociology, large-scale historical change and 
complex web of international relations (Little, 1994:12-14). In general terms, the 
central understanding of Wallerstein's approach is that any social phenomena can only 
be understood properly through examining the totality called “social system” rather 
than by investigating arbitrarily constituted units of that totality. In fact, there are two 
kinds of totalities; “mini-systems” and “world-systems”, but since the mini-systems no 
longer exist, the world-system is the only social system to be studied. For Wallerstein 
the phenomena in this world-system that should be analysed are the development and 
the functioning of the system itself, rather than the development of its major constituent 
units called nation states (Wallerstein, 1974:390). Accordingly, world-system analysis 
contends that there is something happening beyond the individual societal level and 
hence there exists a collective reality at the world level of analysis. However, this does 
not include the study of international relations in the sense of multiple sovereign states 
interacting with each other. The world level collective reality is somewhat exogenous 
to the nation states; it has its own laws of motions which determine the social, 
economic and political phenomena in the national societies it encompasses. The 
modem world-system has structures such as core-periphery relations, the division of 
labour, unequal exchange and cyclical motions of expansion and stagnation, and the 
rise and fall of hegemonic powers. These properties can be studied in their own right or 
in terms of their effects on the development of national societies. Modem world-system 
analysis is basically synchronic; it investigates the structural relations among different 
societies in the same time periods (Bergersen, 1980:6). In this way, it tries to 
understand the question of how nations are interrelated with each other in the world- 
economy. The concepts of core-periphery relations, the division of labour and unequal 
exchange etc., are the main concern of the modem world-system analysis in explaining
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the interconnections among nations, and long-term social changes in the capitalist 
world-system. In Wallerstein's words “if there is one thing which distinguishes a world- 
system perspective from any other, it is its insistence that the unit of analysis is a world- 
system defined in terms of economic processes and links, and not any units defined in 
terms of judicial, political, cultural, geological etc., criteria” (Hopkins, 1977 quoted in 
Bergersen, 1980:8).
Nevertheless, the world-system perspective claims that economics and politics 
are not separate phenomena. A social system can only be understood by analysing how 
both power and production are organised. In this context, it looks at the political 
economy of the modem world-system which focuses on the interaction and 
interdependence between economic and political activities. In other words, the world- 
system school investigates the ‘specific ways in which economic and political action 
are intertwined within the capitalist world-economy’ (Chase-Dunn, 1989:107). 
Accordingly, it argues that the interstate system which is composed of unequally 
powerful and competing states is the political body of the capitalist world-economy, 
and the capitalist institutions of this system are central to the maintenance and 
reproduction of the interstate system, as well as vice versa (Chase-Dunn, 1989:107).
One of the most important structural characteristics of world social systems is 
the existence of a division of labour within them. This means that different 
geographical areas in the system specialise in the production of different goods, and 
consequently each region becomes dependent upon economic exchange with others in 
order to supply the continuing needs of that region. However, there are two kinds of 
world-systems where this economic exchange operates in different frameworks: world 
empires with a common political structure, and world economies without a common 
political structure. In the first case the economy is basically a redistributive one. This 
means that the whole economy is administered by a central political authority, and the 
economic benefits are redistributed from this centre to different regions. In other words, 
political structures dominate the functioning of the system. The second kind of world- 
system, which is known as the capitalist economic system or the modem world-system,
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is an historical system which came into existence in the 16th century in north-west 
Europe through a series of historical, geographical and ecological accidents and which 
developed into a world-economy in the 19th and 20th centuries. In it the capitalist 
economic structure determines the operation of the system. The world-economy is 
defined without a common political structure; there are multiple political structures. 
Since the primary structure of this world- system is the economy, politics takes place 
primarily within and through state structures whose boundaries are much smaller than 
the economy. In the modem world-system it is not the political-military competition but 
the interaction between states and capitalist commodity production which occupies the 
central place (Chase-Dunn, 1989:111).
However, a world-economy does not mean an international economy. The 
theory of international economy assumes that separate national economies exist and 
that they trade with each other under certain circumstances. The sum of all these 
interstate economic contacts is called the international economy. The concept of world- 
economy, on the other hand, means “...an ongoing extensive and relatively complete 
social division of labour within an integrated set of production processes which relate 
to each other through a market which has been instituted or created in some complex 
way” (Wallerstein, 1984:13). Today we call this the capitalist world- economy, and its 
boundaries are far larger than any political unit. There is no common authoritative 
political body encompassing the whole area but within it there are multiple political 
structures known as states. Within this system, there is a single division of labour 
among core and peripheral zones .
The division of labour within the world-system implies that different 
geographical areas in the system specialise in different productive tasks. These 
productive specialisations may change over time, but it is always the case that different 
specialisations receive unequal economic rewards. Whatever the goods produced, the 
core area has always specialised in relatively highly mechanised, high profit, high 
wage, highly skilled labour activities in contrast to the totally opposite specialisations in
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the periphery. In other words, in the world capitalist economy the division of labour 
and complementarity goes along with inequality.
According to Wallerstein, the defining characteristic of the capitalist world- 
economy is production for maximum profit in the market. Production is based on the 
capitalist principle of maximising capital accumulation, which means reducing costs to 
the minimum and raising sales prices to the maximum feasible. The reduction of costs 
is maintained mainly through reducing the income of direct producers to a minimum 
and allowing the capitalist to appropriate the remaining value. In order to reduce the 
costs, a legal system based on unequal contractual property rights becomes an essential 
element, and the state plays the most important role in the enforcement of these laws. 
On the other hand, the second principle of accumulation, the expansion of sale prices, is 
ensured through creating quasi-monopolies in the world market. In the absence of a 
common political structure, only quasi-monopolies can utilise state power in order to 
constrain potential competitors in the world market. This means the intervention of the 
state in the normal functioning of the market in order to create favourable conditions of 
profit for some economic actors.
In the world-economy production is organised in a cross-cutting network of 
interlinked processes called commodity chains. This means that in the production 
process there are multiple product entry points. For instance, as Wallerstein 
oversimplifies this process, “there is a commodity chain that goes from cotton 
production to thread production, to textile production to clothing production ...[and] at 
each of these production points there is an input of other productive materials” 
(Wallerstein, 1984a:4). On the other hand, almost all commodity chains cross national 
boundaries at some point. The most important point here is that “at each point that there 
is a labourer, there is state pressure on the labourer's income...[and also] at each point 
that there is an exchange of product, there is state pressure on the price” (Wallerstein, 
1984a:4). These two kinds of state pressure regulate the relationship between the 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the relationship between the different kinds of 
bourgeoisie respectively. This means that while the state ensures the appropriation of
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value by the bourgeoisie, it might favour some kind of bourgeoisie more than others in 
this process. The crucial role played by the state leads to two kinds of politics in the 
capitalist world-economy: a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat; and 
political struggles between different bourgeoisies. In the world-economy various groups 
of bourgeoisie compete within a single world market in order to get the largest possible 
proportion of the world-economy's economic surplus. And since states are the most 
effective expression of power and political organisation of the world-economy, 
different bourgeoisie located in different states use their state's power in order to 
influence the market for their own benefit. In other words, the world bourgeoisie 
compete with each other and try to distort the normal functioning of the world market 
through state mechanisms. Accordingly the relative strength of the states becomes very 
important in this task.
In Wallerstein's modem world-system approach states are classified according 
to two overlapping criteria. First, they are divided according to their relative strengths 
into strong or weak and secondly, they are categorised according to their structural 
positions in the world-economy as core, periphery and semiperiphery. A state is defined 
as strong or weak in relation to its relative strength vis-a-vis other domestic centres of 
power, other states and external non-state forces (Wallerstein, 1984:20). The power of a 
state can be measured by the amount of resources it can mobilise relative to the amount 
of resources which can be mobilised against it during a crisis period (Chase-Dunn, 
1989:113). Here, the crucial elements that determine the power of a state are two fold: 
the magnitude of resources, and the relative unity within and among classes (Chase- 
Dunn, 1989:114). In order to gain the highest possible competitive advantage in the 
world market, the bourgeoisie want to increase the importance of the state's political 
structures, and hence its constraining power in the world market.
This drive to increase the power of states is greatest in states where core-like 
production is dominant. A strong state mechanism is the primary tool with which the 
bourgeoisie of core states can control the internal labour force and manipulate and 
distort the world market in their own favour vis-a-vis the competing bourgeoisie of
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other states. Thus, strong states are strongly supported by an alliance of their economic 
elites with large resources, because the state supplies sufficient protection for 
successful capitalist accumulation (Chase-Dunn, 1989:114). In a competitive world 
market, state protection becomes an important component for the profits of the 
economic elites. On the other hand, state power is also crucial for protecting domestic 
infant industries from foreign competition, especially during the industrialisation of 
semiperipheral states. Consequently, while strong states fall into the core state category, 
the periphery contains weak states. Thus the strength of states can be explained through 
the structural role that they play in the world economy at any moment in time. 
However, the initial structural position of a state is often decided by historical accident 
or by the geography of a particular country. Yet once it is decided, the market forces 
operating in the world-economy emphasise structural differences and make them 
almost impossible to overcome in the short term.
There is a hierarchy in the structural positions of states in the world-economy, 
and at the top of this hierarchy are core states. Core states are those in which production 
is most efficient and other economic activities are most complex. Politically, they have 
strong state machineries which provide them with the power to accumulate greater 
amounts of capital and to receive the lion's share of the surplus produced in the world- 
economy. At the bottom of the hierarchy are peripheral states. In a sharp contrast to 
core states production in the periphery is the least efficient, and it specialises in much 
less rewarded goods.
Since states play an important role in the process of capital accumulation (e.g., 
through providing external and internal protection and distorting the world market, etc.) 
economic elites wish to institutionalise their interests within the state structures. 
However, the relative power of the states and the nature of the demands that the 
capitalists make on the state are determined by the nature of the dominant economic 
elite in a country. Accordingly, “ (t)he [dominance of] industrial-commercial-financial 
block in core countries produces strong states, while export-oriented block in peripheral 
states produces weaker states” (Chase-Dunn, 1989:240). In strong/core states where
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industrial-commercial interests are dominant, economic elites demand an aggressive 
foreign policy (commercial and military) in order to gain access to foreign markets both 
for raw materials and for the selling of both capital and consumption goods, and in turn 
they support increasing the strength of the state. On the other hand, in peripheral 
countries in which the dominant economic elite are producing and exporting primary 
products there will be no such demands for an aggressive foreign policy because it is 
not easy to increase the demand for such primary goods by state action. Thus, since 
there is less interest in an aggressive foreign policy peripheral states be less strong.
Production processes are also grouped according to geographical location into 
core and periphery-like production activities (Chase-Dunn, 1980:191). These 
production processes are defined according to the degree to which they incorporate 
labour value, are mechanised, and are highly profitable. In other words, while core-like 
production employs relatively capital intensive techniques and utilises skilled and 
highly paid labour, periphery-like production employs labour intensive techniques and 
utilises coerced low wage labour. However, the defining characteristics of any core or 
peripheral products may change over time because of product cycles. For instance, 
while textile manufacturing was a core activity in the 19th century, it became a 
peripheral activity in the 20th century. Similarly, wheat production in the late 20th 
century is a core-like production in contrast to its peripheral position in the past. This 
means that it is not the product itself which is core-like or peripheral: the nature of the 
production process determines their core or periphery-like qualities.
According to the world-system approach, the structural positions of both core 
and periphery are the result of a relationship based on unequal exchange. The 
appropriation by core states of the surplus produced in the periphery is called unequal 
exchange in the modem world-system approach. Without a periphery it is impossible to 
talk about a core and without either there would not be capitalist development. Once 
we establish a difference in the strengths of states and the operation of unequal 
exchange between them, we come to the conclusion that capitalism involves not only 
the appropriation of surplus value by the owner from the direct producer, but also the
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appropriation of the surplus of the world-economy by the strong (core) states from the 
weak (peripheral) ones. This also explains the advantageous position of the bourgeoisie 
of core area not only over the work force of its own area, but also over the bourgeoisie 
of peripheral area. According to Wallerstein, the phenomenon of unequal exchange has 
been a constant feature of the world-economy since its beginning. In other words, core­
periphery relations have always been characterised by the mechanism of unequal 
exchange. As a process, unequal exchange has operated through different historical 
arrangements and institutions such as colonial trade monopolies, multinational 
corporations, or bi- or multilateral agreements among states. But whatever the form it 
employs, the crucial thing is that it has always reproduced the basic core-periphery 
division of labour and integration despite the continual shifts in the areas and processes 
constituting the core, periphery and semiperiphery (Hopkins, 1982a:21).
However, there is an intermediate semiperipheral category between core and 
periphery. The production activity in these semiperipheral zones of the world-economy 
constitutes a mixture of core and periphery-like production. This category, being both 
exploited and exploiter, plays an important political role in balancing and reducing the 
amount of opposition directed towards the core by the periphery. Unlike core and 
periphery, it is much more of a political category than an economic one. I shall deal 
separately with this semiperipheral category later in this section.
Membership in these three categories is by no means constant. Mobility in 
structural position is possible; states in each category might become upwardly or 
downwardly mobile. In world-system analysis national development is defined as 
upward mobility in the hierarchical divisions between core and periphery. And this 
upward mobility refers to the reorganisation of the relationship of the ascending state 
with the world-economy. Nevertheless, the world-system approach views upward 
mobility in the hierarchy as exceptional.
The growth and the development of the world-system has occurred in a process 
of ups and downs called expansion and stagnation (Wallerstein, 1984a:6-8 and
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1984b;16-17). According to world-system analysts there are recurring bottlenecks in 
the capitalist world-economy when the total amount of production exceeds the 
effective demand resulting from the existing distribution of world income. Periods of 
stagnation restructure the previous order in the world-economy. The volume of overall 
production decreases and an intensified class struggle leads to the redistribution of 
world income to the lower classes in the core zones and to the bourgeoisie in the 
semiperiphery and the periphery. This redistribution process revitalises the effective 
demand and consequently expands the market. Yet, this is achieved through the 
incorporation of new peripheral zones in the world economy where workers receive 
wages below the cost of production. For Wallerstein the important thing in this process 
is to understand that while the workers in the core countries strengthen their political 
positions and increase their standard of living, the incorporation of new lower strata in 
the peripheralized countries keeps the real overall distribution of income in the world- 
economy almost the same as in the previous periods.
The periods of stagnation and expansion also lead to other changes in the 
world-economy. For instance, the production costs of pre-stagnation core products are 
reduced either through advanced mechanisation or shifting these activities to lower 
wage regions. Furthermore, at the end of stagnation periods new core-like activities 
which create high rates of profits are invented. In this process of restructuring, 
inefficient producers are eliminated. Wallerstein argues that those old enterprises and 
the states in which they operate are faced with steadily rising costs because of the cost 
of amortising older capital investment and rising labour costs resulting from the 
increasing political strength of the labour unions. As a result, newly emerged 
enterprises and the states in which they operate replace the old ones in the competitive 
quasi-monopolistic world market. Wallerstein calls this process a game of musical 
chairs at the top. In other words, together with changes in the production process, the 
positions of the core states in the world-economy may change. But the game of musical 
chairs is not only played by core states but also by semiperipheral and peripheral states. 
I shall return to this issue later in the discussion of semiperipheral states. However, the 
crucial point is that whether the game of musical chairs is played at the top or the
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middle of the hierarchy, the number of states in each category (core, semiperiphery and 
periphery) has remained proportionally constant throughout the history of the world- 
economy (Wallerstein, 1984a: 7).
As an historical system the capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical 
movements. One of the most striking cycles in the inter-state system of the world- 
economy is the rise and decline of hegemonic powers. This is the most critical mobility 
which takes place within the core area. There is a balance of power in the inter-state 
system which primarily regulates the power relations among the core states. This means 
that no individual state ever acquires sufficient capacity to transform the world- 
economy into a world empire. However, states have repeatedly attempted to achieve a 
hegemonic position in the world state system. In three instances they managed to do so 
for relatively brief periods: United Provinces (The Netherlands), 1620-1650; United 
Kingdom, 1815-1873; and United States, 1945-67 (Wallerstein, 1984d).
Hegemony differs from imperium in that its functioning is primarily based on 
the market, although there are always politico-military and cultural dimensions. 
Hegemony means that for a brief period of time one of the core states appears as the 
dominant state in the interstate system and can impose its rules in the economic, 
political, military, diplomatic and even cultural areas. Hegemony over the system is 
established when a core state demonstrates its superiority in productive, commercial 
and financial spheres.
Supremacy in the productive field means that the most advanced 
industrial production for a given period is preponderantly located in 
the state in question, and that it is capable of exporting such 
production competitively to other core states, as well as to the 
periphery and semiperiphery. Commercial supremacy means that the 
value of external and carrying trade is the highest in comparison with 
that of other core states, and that its services are used by other core 
states. Financial supremacy means that the value of capital being 
saved, lent or exported across state boundaries is the highest in 
comparison with others, and that it performs banking operations for 
other core states (Hopkins et al., 1982:62).
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Supremacy in those three fields constitutes hegemony and is reflected in 
political-military advantage in the interstate system. Hegemonic military power has 
primarily been sea and air power. According to Wallerstein, political hegemony refers 
to critical periods when allied core powers are client states and the opposing major 
powers are in a defensive position. However, fulfilling a hegemonic role is very costly 
and hegemonic states begin to lose their competitive advantages shortly after they 
acquire them. They lose them for two reasons: (a) other core and even semiperipheral 
states improve their efficiency in production to the level of that of hegemonic power by 
exploiting the advantage of latecomers in acquiring the latest technology; (b) the costs 
of production in the hegemonic state become vulnerable to wage demands coming from 
a well organised labour force (Hopkins et al., 1982:62).
In all three historical cases of hegemony, hegemonic position was acquired by a 
very destructive thirty year land-based world war in which all the major military powers 
of the era participated: the Thirty Years War; the Napoleonic Wars; and the German 
Wars. Each of these World Wars led to a major restructuring of the inter-state system 
and the establishment of new alliances under the supervision of the new hegemonic 
power: Westphalia; Concert of Europe; and the UN and Bretton Woods. However as 
soon as hegemonic position or advantage in the production sphere begins to erode, the 
alliances established by the hegemonic power also begin to erode and reshuffle.
The ideology and the policy of the hegemonic powers have always promoted 
global liberalism. The free flow of goods, capital and labour (production factors) in the 
world-economy is the central concern of the hegemonic powers. They advocate free 
trade and open door policies in the economic sphere. Hence, the strength of a 
hegemonic power can be measured by its ability to minimise all the quasi-monopolies 
in the world market (Wallerstein, 1984a:5). Furthermore, hegemonic powers extend 
this liberalism to the political sphere and become the defenders of liberal parliamentary 
institutions and civil liberties, while condemning political change through violent 
means. But Wallerstein also reminds us that the economic and political liberalism of 
hegemonic powers should not be exaggerated: they may make exceptions to their anti-
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restrictive principles, they may interfere in the political processes in other states, and 
further they may become repressive at home when their interests so dictate 
(Wallerstein, 1984d:41).
During the long period that follows hegemonic decline two contending powers 
seem to emerge as the candidates for the next hegemonic cycle (Wallerstein, 1984d:43). 
Historically, these two contending pairs were England and France after Dutch 
hegemony, the US and Germany after British, and now Japan and Western Europe after 
US hegemony. According to Wallerstein another historical tendency of newly emerged 
hegemonic powers is their strategy of co-operating with the old hegemon as the 
principal partner in the new world order; for example Britain co-operated with the 
Dutch; the US co-operated with Great Britain; and perhaps, Western Europe will co­
operate with the US in the future.
In world-system analysis the creation of the state is considered to be an effect of 
the development of the capitalist world-economy (Walllerstein, 1984:Ch.3). The state 
is the political expression of this world economic structure. The relative power of the 
state is its most important property and, as I implied earlier, it more or less determines 
the structural position of the state in the system. Different groups exist within and 
outside of the state which try to increase or decrease the power of any given state or 
states. Their aim in seeking to change the power of the state is to create favourable 
conditions in the world market for their interests since the state is considered to be the 
most convenient institution to distort the normal operation of the world market in 
favour of certain groups. In this process of increasing state strength, strong and weak 
states are created and hence a hierarchy appears in the inter-state system.
The key issues of state policy that occupy the attention of different groups are 
the mles that affect the allocation of surplus and the price structure of markets because 
the relative competitivity of particular producers and their profit levels can be changed 
through playing with these two critical issues. It is states that make those rules in the 
world-economy and strong states intervene in relatively weaker states when they try to
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establish their own rules. In the capitalist world market strong entrepreneurs do not 
need state aid to create quasi-monopolies but they do need it to prevent others from 
creating monopoly privileges at the expense of their interests. Accordingly, in world- 
system analysis, states are defined as “...created institutions reflecting the needs of class 
forces operating in the world-economy. They are not however created in a void but in 
the framework of an interstate system” (Wallerstein, 1984c:33).
Classes (mainly proletariat and bourgeoisie) are defined as the classes of the 
world-economy because they are formed in the world-economy and their interests are 
determined by their collective relationship to the world-economy (Wallerstein, 
1984c:34). However, when the bourgeoisie felt that their interests vis-a-vis the working 
class and their competitors in the world market were best served through creating and 
using state machineries, they began to define themselves as national bourgeoisies. 
Moreover, since class consciousness is a political rather than an economic 
phenomenon, and since the most effective political structure of the world-system is the 
state, in practical terms classes are considered as national classes. In the capitalist 
world-economy since the state is defined as the expression of power, it becomes the 
most appropriate instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie for the appropriation of 
surplus from the working class of their country to the extent that they are not restrained 
by the organised resistance of the proletariat. Furthermore, the power of the state also 
ensures the appropriation of surplus by one kind of bourgeoisie rather than another 
kind. If different kinds of bourgeoisie control different state structures, the fight for the 
appropriation of surplus may take the form of an interstate struggle. Working classes, 
through their organisations, may also attempt to influence the power of the state for 
their own ends. Since states are an integral part of the production relations in the world- 
economy, the nature and the degree of the relationship between various kinds of groups 
and state are an important phenomenon.
On the other hand, world-system analysis argues that states may act both to 
control markets and to create them (Chase-Dunn, 1989:120). Those states which 
successfully promote capitalist development not only supply social order but also create
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necessary structures that promote profitable enterprises. Accordingly, state capitalism, 
instead of waiting for entrepreneurs, create opportunities for them and furthermore, it 
sometimes takes the entrepreneurial role itself.
Although states came into existence to promote the needs of certain groups in 
the world market, they are by no means the mere puppets of their creators. Once created 
any social organisation has a life of its own and acquires a certain autonomy, in the 
sense that various groups exploit it for various and contradictory ends. Moreover, all 
social organisations generate a permanent staff (bureaucracy/state managers) whose 
interests lie in the further strengthening of the organisation independent of the varying 
interests of their creators (Wallerstein, 1974:402 and 1984c:30-31). In this sense states 
may promote the interests of different types of groups, and for this reason those 
different groups fight to influence state policies.
One of the interesting characteristics of world-system analysis is that a category 
of states exist known as the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery is a structural position in 
the world-economy between core and periphery (1). Earlier, I defined the core as 
characterised by high profit, high technology and high wage production, and the 
periphery as characterised by low profit, low technology, and low wage production. In 
fact, these are categories defined in terms of economic activities. There is no sui generis 
semiperipheral economic activity as such, but there are semiperipheral states where 
economic activities reveal an even mix of core and peripheral types of production 
(Chase-Dunn, 1980:191). In other words, there is a rough balance between core and 
peripheral production processes in semiperipherial states. According to Wallerstein, 
semiperiphery is a fruitless concept unless it refers to certain political processes. The 
relationship between economics and politics here is directly attributed to the relation 
between state policies and the accumulation of capital. The state is more important and 
the struggle to control it is more intense in the semiperiphery than in the core or 
periphery because of the roughly equal distribution and the contradictory interests of 
core and periphery-like producers. Hence, within the semiperiphery to effect and 
transform state policies becomes the vital concern of various groups whose interests lie
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in the semiperiphery. On the other hand, since different kinds of economic elites tend to 
have opposing interests in the semiperiphery, it is often the case that the state becomes 
the dominant element in forming power blocks and shaping political coalitions among 
economic groups (Chase-Dunn, 1989:241). Moreover, another important characteristic 
of semiperipheral states is that in those which have potential for upward mobility, state 
mobilisation of economic development is an important feature (Chase-Dunn, 
1989:241).
Wallerstein also argues that the semiperiphery ensures the smooth functioning 
of the capitalist world-economy. As I indicated earlier, there has always been unequal 
distribution of rewards among regions in the world-economy. If this is the case, how 
does the world-system manage to survive politically ? In other words why does the 
exploited majority not revolt against the exploiting minority ? According to Wallerstein 
there are mechanisms in the system which prevent the likelihood of such a possibility 
(Wallerstein, 1974:403-5). First, the military strength concentrated in core zones plays 
an important role in maintaining political stability. Second, the cadres of the system 
feeling that their well being is closely related with the smooth functioning of the 
system, attach a pervasive ideological commitment to its survival. However, these 
mechanisms are not enough. For the political stability of the system we need a third key 
mechanism that is the semiperiphery. The world-system could function economically 
without having a semiperipheral zone, but it would not be politically stable, since it 
would be a polarised system. The existence of the semiperiphery, being both exploited 
and exploiter, decreases the possibility of unified non-core opposition against the core. 
In other words, the semiperiphery tends to depolarise and stabilise core/periphery 
relations. Consequently it is a zone of political analysis rather than economic.
The game of musical chairs is also played by the semiperiphery. In the 
semiperiphery some groups try to strengthen the state mechanism in order to change the 
composition of production, and accordingly to change the relative position of the 
country in the world-system hierarchy (Wallerstein, 1984e:50). But, this is not an easy 
task and there are counter pressures from both internal and external groups. In times of
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expansion semiperipheral states find themselves as satellites of core powers, and they 
play the role of economic transmission belts and political agents of the hegemonic 
power (Wallerstein, 1984a:7). However, periods of stagnation in the world-economy 
give the semiperiphery the opportunity to move upwards since the competition between 
core powers intensifies in these periods while their grip on satellites decreases. 
However, one should not ignore the other side of the coin; during these periods of 
difficulty the flow of income, capital and technology from the core to the semiperiphery 
is cut off. That means that while a few semiperipheral states (those which are relatively 
strong) may manage to push themselves towards the core (2), relatively weak 
semiperipheral states do not manage to do so. In the upwardly mobile semiperipheral 
states the core producers are in ascendance. But there is also the danger of downward 
mobility for semiperipheral states if they are dominated by peripheral producers or 
former core producers who were inefficient and were pushed out of the market (Chase- 
Dunn, 1980:191).
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, if we compare the frameworks of Waltz, Modelski, and Wallerstein we 
see that; (1) All three focus on the global level and investigate the characteristics of this 
level which are supposed to be different from the characteristics of its constituent units, 
namely states. (2) All three argue that behaviour in the international system is explained 
through global level structures. However, while Waltz and Modelski see these global 
level structures as political structures, Wallerstein presents an economic structure. In 
fact, both kinds of global structure are the main determinants of the behaviour of nation 
states. (3) In contrast to Waltz's ahistorical model Modelski and Wallerstein provide 
frameworks which contain historical analysis. (4) In contrast to the horizontal (non- 
hierarchic) organisation of the international system in Waltz's account, Modelski and 
Wallerstein consider the international system as hierarchic.
Now, if we turn back to the world-system analysis which I use in this study, one 
of the major criticisms directed against it is that Wallerstein undervalues political 
structures and processes, and reduces state structures and politics to determination by
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economic conditions and dominant class interests. Consequently in world-system 
analysis states are treated as economic rather than political actors (Skocpol, 1977 and 
Zolberg, 1981). In this context what sort of external environment does world-system 
analysis present us for the study of foreign policy? In general, Wallerstein's framework 
focuses on the impact of the external environment (modem world-system) on 
individual states as the determinant of their behaviours and accordingly, as a system- 
oriented model, it postulates a high degree of uniformity in the behaviours of the states. 
In particular, Wallerstein offers an economics dominated external structure. This means 
that in conventional terms we can hardly study foreign policy using his model because 
his external environment for the study of foreign policy is the capitalist world- 
economy.
Does that mean that one cannot employ this approach for the study of foreign 
policy? According to Ray (1983) although the foreign policies of states are not central 
to Wallerstein's approach, one can pick out the relevant points on foreign policy in his 
work and apply them to the study of foreign policy. As Ray argues economic, rather 
than political interaction is the driving force among states. However, foreign policy also 
comes to the surface when Wallerstein discusses the advantages enjoyed by the core 
states. Here what is relevant for foreign policy is the concept of power and, more 
specifically, the use of power by core states in order to distort the normal operation of 
world market forces. According to Ray, this is the principal foreign policy goal of the 
core states (Ray, 1983:16). It follows that world-system analysis becomes relevant in 
this way for the foreign policy study of core states or great powers.
However, I wonder whether it is proper to employ Wallerstein's framework for 
the study of foreign policy by simply picking out what is relevant for it. As Ray is 
aware, world-system analysis is an integrated whole and it cannot be studied by 
dividing it into the various disciplines of the social sciences and extracting the relevant 
points. If it is studied in this way, world-system analysis will most likely lose its 
paradigm and researches will probably end up with misleading conclusions. An 
alternative way to employ world-system analysis in foreign policy studies might be to
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perceive the foreign policies of individual states as an integral part of that system, and 
to investigate to what extent in practice they are in conformity with, or diverge from the 
premises of the framework proposed by Wallerstein. In other words, it seems sound to 
me to study the foreign policies of individual states in a totality composed of economic 
and political history, political science, sociology, geography, etc. (in other words those 
disciplines incorporated by world-system analysis) and to investigate the impact of this 
whole on the phenomenon of foreign policy.
World-system analysis provides a very good starting point for this task. First, it 
divides states into three main categories of core (plus hegemonic power), 
semiperiphery, and periphery. States in each category have more or less the same 
characteristics, and consequently behave in a similar way in the system. Second, world- 
system analysis provides us with cyclical rhythms of “the rise and decline of the 
hegemonic powers” and “expansion and contraction” periods in the world-economy. 
These processes reveal similar characteristics in each cycle. Furthermore, each category 
of state behaves in a similar manner during the different phases of these cycles of the 
modem world-system. Accordingly, it would not be unrealistic to employ world-system 
analysis in a study of foreign policy. The first task would be to determine the structural 
category of those states whose foreign policies are to be analysed. Then, the second task 
would be to determine the time in the cyclical rhythm, for instance, is it an expansion or 
contraction period ? Or is it an ascending or declining phase of the hegemonic power ? 
These basic questions need to be clarified before examining the foreign policies of 
individual states in the framework of world-system analysis.
However, it might not be easy to give clear answers to some of those questions, 
since Wallerstein is also criticised for not giving clear cut definitions and accounts of 
those three structural categories (Snyder and Kick, 1979). Hence the main task for the 
researcher must include further clarification of those concepts and their applicability to 
the states in question. In order to examine the foreign policies of Greece and Spain, 
therefore the next task will accordingly be the further clarification of the concept 
semiperiphery, and its relevance to those two states.
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Notes to Chapter Two
(1) The term semiperiphery is used by other scholars in different contexts. For example, 
Nicos Mouzelis, who does not identify himself with the world-system school, uses the 
concept “semi-periphery” (1986, pp.xiv-xv) “as a kind of shorthand for referring to a 
number of societies all of which, unlike most other third-world countries, have 
experienced both advanced industrialisation and a long history of parliamentary rule”.
(2) Fred Halliday (1994, pp. 120-21) calls this upward move in the hierarchy of states as 
“semi-peripheral escape”
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONCEPT OF SEMIPERIPHERY
1. Understanding Semiperiphery
Categorisation is one of the techniques used in science in order to make generalisations 
about a set whose membership is determined by defining characteristics. Accordingly, 
in Wallerstein's world-system analysis semiperiphery is the categorisation of a set of 
countries revealing similar structural, historical and behavioural characteristics. As I 
mentioned earlier semiperiphery is not an isolated concept. It is an intermediate 
category which is generally associated with the categories of core and periphery.
However, one might well be sceptical about such a three-modal categorisation 
(core-semiperiphery-periphery) of states and ask ‘why do we have three rather than 
four, five or more categories of states’? On the one hand, it is not an easy task to give 
satisfactory answers to such questions because it is almost impossible to create a few, 
mutually exhaustive, categories of states. In other words, unless you create the same 
number of categories equal to the actual number of existing units (here states), you 
might not totally satisfy others. But if you do this, the ability to generalise is lost. On 
the other hand, the aim of categorisation is to bring together those units whose general 
characteristics reveal significant similarities. Hence, generalisation, by nature, leads to 
the creation of as limited a number of categories as possible. Since the primary goal of 
categorisation is to reach generalisations, the number of categories have always been 
limited. This is the underlying logic behind categorisation. Accordingly, in political 
science and international relations, depending on a criterion such as political, economic, 
military, etc., the tendency has always been to divide the states/countries of the modem 
world into two or three set categories; e.g. developed-developing states; first- second - 
third world; developed - underdeveloped countries; super-powers -great powers - small 
powers; north - south; democratic - authoritarian states, and so forth. This does not 
imply that the states within a particular category are copies of one another. On the 
contrary, they are considered similar in relation to a predetermined broader criterion 
(political, military, economic, etc.). Consequently, it follows that categorisation is, to a 
certain extent, an arbitrary but practical way of grouping a number of states. Moreover, 
it is a plausible way to reach generalisations.
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In fact, categorisation is not an easy task. Once you engage in such a task, it is 
expected that all the units in your study should be located clearly in one of the 
categories defined in accordance with a predetermined criterion or criteria. However, as 
Wallerstein indicates (Wallerstein, 1985:32), there are often borderline cases/units that 
you cannot locate easily in any one of your existing categories. And whenever the 
number of such cases is considerable, a general tendency has been to create an 
intermediate or an in-between category in which to locate difficult cases. It is in this 
sense that the category of semiperiphery is an intermediate conceptual category 
between the two other conceptual categories of core and periphery in world-system 
analysis.
The concepts of core and periphery are relational concepts. The relation 
between the two is unequal in that the “coreness” of one region or set of states depends 
on the "peripherality" of another region or another set of states. In other words, it refers 
to the unequal distribution of the rewards of the world-economy resulting from the 
nature of core and periphery-like production processes dominant in the two regions. 
Semiperiphery, however, is not a relational concept since there are no semiperiphery­
like production processes. On the contrary, the production processes in the 
semiperiphery reveal an even mix of both core and periphery-like processes. In other 
words, in world-system analysis semiperiphery refers to the balance between core and 
periphery-like activities within the boundaries of a given state. Being semiperipheral 
corresponds to a fairly even overall mix of the two types of activity (Wallerstein, 
1985:34). However, unless it is also an indicator of certain political processes the above 
definition of semiperiphery might not be fruitful.
For Wallerstein, political rather than economic processes are important in 
analysing the concept semiperiphery. A roughly even mix of core and periphery-like 
activities and, accordingly, a roughly equal distribution of core and periphery-like 
producers (whose interests are conflicting) leads to intense competition over control of 
state structures. This is because state policies in the semiperiphery can immediately and 
directly affect the accumulation of capital by controlling flows of goods and capital
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across frontiers, controlling the internal work force, taxation, redistributive 
expenditures and expenditures on social overheads etc. Thus in the semiperiphery, the 
main internal and external economic actors (owner-producers, work force, state 
bureaucracy, multinational corporations) focus on state-oriented political activity in 
order to accumulate capital for their own interests. Accordingly,
... the closer the overall mix of core-peripheral activities is to an even one 
in a given state -that is the more semiperipheral the state - the more will 
the complex calculus tilt towards rewarding efforts to secure economic 
advantage via effecting (transforming) the state structure. This is because 
the nearer to some median is the economic mix, the more immediately 
and directly can state policies affect the accumulation of capital 
(Wallerstein, 1985:35).
Furthermore, since different kinds of economic elites tend to have opposing interests in 
the semiperiphery, the state usually becomes the dominant element in forming the 
power blocks and political coalitions among economic groups (Chase-Dunn, 
1989:241).
On the other hand, another world-system scholar, Chase-Dunn, redefines core 
and peripheral activities as a continuum of relatively capital intensive/labour intensive 
forms of production (Chase-Dunn, 1989:211). In other words, he focuses on relative 
levels of the capital intensity of commodity production. In this context, he argues that 
semiperipheral areas contain intermediate level of production. According to Chase- 
Dunn, there are two kinds of semiperipheries; first, states in which there is a balanced 
mix of core and peripheral activities, and second, states in which there is a 
predominance of activities which are intermediate in terms of the relative level of 
capital intensity/labour intensity (Chase-Dunn, 1989:211-212). Thus, he emphasises 
that in the semiperiphery there is a preponderance of intermediate levels of capital 
intensive production (Chase-Dunn, 1990:3).
In semiperipheral countries the state may attempt to change the mix of activities 
in favour of core or periphery-like production processes, and it may easily affect the
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direction of internal redistribution of rewards. But this does not mean that core and 
peripheral states cannot do the same. Wallerstein believes that they can. However, there 
are two reasons which make the pay-off bigger for semiperipheral states than for the 
other two. First, it can be assumed that such state policies are more likely to succeed in 
semiperipheral than in peripheral states because in the periphery the opportunities for 
upward mobility are much more limited. Second, one can assumed that there are 
alternative market mechanisms for core producers to achieve the same objectives 
without concentrating on state-oriented political activity (Wallerstein, 1985:35). Hence, 
upwardly mobile semiperipheral countries have tended to employ more state-directed 
and state-mobilised development policies than have core countries (Chase-Dunn, 
1989:241).
A very important characteristic of semiperipheral states is related to the possible 
improvement of their status in the world-economy during contraction periods. As 
mentioned previously, periods of expansion and contraction in the world-economy are 
one of the critical issues of world-system analysis. These cyclical shifts of the world- 
economy, in broader terms, are the function of the relationship between supply and 
effective demand in the world market. Contraction periods are periods of over-supply 
in the world economy leading to changes in the production process and production 
relations in order to reach an equilibrium point. During expansion periods, on the other 
hand, world wide effective demand is maintained as a result of shifts in the production 
process and relations. The direction of the surplus of the world-economy also changes 
during these periods. During expansion phases the largest proportion of the surplus is 
extracted by the core areas, while in contraction periods part of the surplus goes to the 
semiperipheral states at the expense of the core states. According to Wallerstein, during 
contraction periods semiperipheral states can effectively control their internal markets 
and, furthermore they can penetrate into peripheral markets at the expense of core 
producers (Wallerstein, 1976:464). This is because intense intra-core competition takes 
place over the world market shares of core products during these over-supply periods. 
This gives semiperipheral countries the option of choosing among core producers when 
selling their products, purchasing core products, and inviting core investments. In sum,
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during contraction periods semiperipheral states expand their national product, improve 
their terms of trade and may shift their position upwards in the world-economy. 
Changes in the economic sphere are reflected in the politics of semiperipheral countries 
(Wallerstein, 1976:464). Internally, political regimes may change, since the old 
structures can no longer cope with the changing nature of international politics. 
Externally, semiperipherial states may change the pattern of their international 
diplomatic alliances. And, as a result of the economic and political changes the degree 
of direct intervention in the internal affairs of semiperipheral states by the core powers 
decreases.
However, the upward mobility of individual states is considered exceptional 
(Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:42). First, semiperipheral states which take off into a core 
position are expected to experience extremely high rates of growth for a considerable 
time (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:52). Moreover, although all semiperipheral states can 
benefit from a contraction period in the capitalist world-economy, only a few of them 
succeed in shifting their positions in the world-system. The reason is straight forward. 
Among other things, the problem is intra-semiperiphery fighting. For “... a 
semiperipheral country rising to core status does so, not merely at the expense of some 
or all core powers, but at the expense of other semiperipheral powers” (Wallerstein, 
1976:466). On the other hand, in times of expansion semiperipheral countries tend to 
become clients of core countries “...seeking their aid to obtain a part of the world 
market against the other semiperipheral countries” (Wallerstein, 1979;83). In this way 
they become agents of core states, and some of them play sub-imperial roles in relation 
to some peripheral areas. Furthermore, these states are often turned into ideological and 
political appendages of world powers.
Broadly speaking, in semiperipheral states the bourgeoisie divides into two 
groups: the indigenous and the external bourgeoisie (Wallerstein, 1976:469). The 
indigenous bourgeoisie is the national bourgeoisie whose activities are concentrated in 
certain sectors. They are small in number and weaker than the national bourgeoisies of 
core countries. However their striking feature is their strong structural links with
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corporations in the core areas. For Wallerstein, this is one of the defining structural 
characteristics of semiperipheral countries. The external bourgeoisie, on the other hand, 
belongs to multinational corporations (MNCs). The critical point for MNCs is to 
remain profitable in the location in which they operate. Accordingly they are primarily 
interested in the policies of state.
Wallerstein argues that wage levels are one of the indicators of the position of a 
state in the world-economy (Wallerstein, 1979:71 and 84-85). In other words, while 
low wage levels correspond to peripherality, high and medium wage levels indicate 
coreness and semiperipherality respectively. According to Wallerstein one of the basic 
structural characteristics of the world-economy is the unequal exchange which takes 
place among core, peripheral and semiperipheral areas. It is a constant of the system; 
without unequal exchange there would not be a capitalist world-economy. The kinds of 
products exchanged in this process might not be proof of the structural position of any 
country in the system, because core or peripheral-like products are the functions of 
ever-changing world technology. Accordingly one should look at the wage patterns and 
profit margins of particular products at particular moments of time in order to identify 
the positions of different states in the capitalist world-economy. And, in this system 
semiperipheral countries are defined through their medium level of wages and profit 
margins in comparison to core and periphery.
The picture of semiperiphery that I have presented so far is a theoretical 
exposition of the concept and it draws predominantly on the original views of its 
creator Wallerstein. It is clear that Wallerstein's understanding of the concept of 
semiperiphery is rather complex. Moreover, it is difficult to operationalise. However, if 
semiperiphery, as a conceptual category, has some merits, there must be reasonable and 
manageable criteria (however arbitrary) to operationalise it. Let us turn to the problem 
of operationalising of semiperiphery.
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2. How to Operationalise the Concept of Semiperiphery ?
In general, there are major criticisms directed to Wallerstein's elaboration of the 
semiperiphery. First, Wallerstein is both vague and formal, according to Arrighi, in 
defining the concept (Arrighi, 1985:243). He is vague because he emphasises two 
things in his definition. He points to “a fairly even mix” of core and periphery-like 
economic activities in the semiperiphery, and he emphasises the intermediate 
semiperipheral position in the world- system. However, he does not indicate which of 
these criteria is important in identifying semiperipheral countries. On the other hand, 
Wallerstein is formal because he does not substantiate his hypothesis for how to 
identify core or periphery-like activities in the various commodity chains, and how 
these two types of activities change over time.
Aymard also points to a dichotomy resulting from ambiguous usage of the 
concept (Aymard, 1985:40). According to Aymard, semiperiphery is defined on 
economic grounds, on the one hand, referring to those regions where the coming in and 
going out surpluses equal to zero. On the other hand, a semiperipheral state is defined 
on political grounds as a state pursuing a “catching up with the core” policy in order to 
improve its position in the interstate system. For Aymard these two definitions are 
hardly reconcilable.
Another major criticism directed to the Wallersteinian concept of semiperiphery 
focuses on its empirical applicability. According to Arrighi, Aymard and Lange (Lange, 
1985:181) all three terms, semiperiphery, core and periphery, cannot easily be 
measured operationally in the writings of Wallerstein. For instance, Wallerstein does 
not tell us how to measure the overall “fairly even mix of activities” nor to quantify 
them.
The aim of this study is not to get involved in the debate on the semiperiphery. 
However, I need to present and perhaps to clarify the meaning of semiperiphery in the 
context of this examination of Spain and Greece. Accordingly, although I tend to agree 
with the second line of criticism, I do not agree with some of the implications of the
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first group of criticism. First, it is fairly clear in Wallerstein's writings that the 
international position of any country is a function of the dominant type of economic 
activity that falls within its boundaries rather than vice versa. In other words, what 
makes a state core or peripheral is the type of economic activities (core or periphery- 
like) that dominate the production process. A state is core (or peripheral) primarily 
because its production processes are highly profitable (or less profitable) and dominated 
by capital intensive techniques, skilled and highly paid labour (or low profit, labour 
intensive techniques and coerced low wage labour). Accordingly, a state is 
semiperipheral, first because a “fairly even mix” of core and periphery-like activities 
fall within its borders. Yet, in contrast to core and periphery, this is not enough to 
define a country as semiperipheral. It must be supported by certain political processes at 
the national political economy level. The relationship between state policies and the 
direction of capital accumulation is the second important criteria in identifying 
semiperipheral states.
In an economy dominated by a “fairly even mix” of economic activities, state 
policies, compared to core and peripheral states, can relatively easily affect the 
direction of capital accumulation. This is because none of the economic actors 
significantly dominate the state structures. Accordingly there is a precarious political 
balance of power between the economic actors of semiperipheral states. As a result of 
this, the state acquires and maintains a relative degree of independence from all the 
economic groups. It follows that the different actors (fractions of bourgeoisie, workers, 
external economic actors) engage in a political struggle to affect the state structures and 
policies in favour of their respective economic interests. Hence, in order to label a 
country as semiperipheral one should also look at the intensity of state- oriented 
activities of national and international actors. Thus, Wallerstein proposes two criteria 
(economic and political) for the identification of semiperiphery. These two criteria 
together (not separately) determine the international position of a semiperipheral state. 
The economic criterion (a fairly even mix) is the precondition of being semiperipheral. 
The political criterion, on the other hand, indicates to which international position a 
semiperipheral state is moving or is likely to move, or whether it will move.
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On the other hand, it must be admitted that Wallerstein does not provide us 
with good yard sticks to operationalise the concept. Indeed, it seems that he himself is 
not clear about what operational criteria are to be employed in identifying a 
semiperipherial state. Accordingly he classifies a vast number of states as 
semiperipheral;
The semiperiphery includes a wide range of countries in terms of 
economic strength and political background. It includes the economically 
stronger countries of Latin America; Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, 
Venezuela, possibly Chile and Cuba. It includes the outer rim of Europe; 
the southern tier of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece; most of Eastern 
Europe; parts of the northern tier such as Norway and Finland. It includes 
a series of Arab states; Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia; and also Israel.. It 
includes in Africa at least Nigeria and Zaire and in Asia; Turkey, Iran, 
India, Indonesia, China, Korea, and Vietnam. And it includes the old 
white Commonwealth; Canada, Australia, South Africa, possibly New 
Zealand (Wallerstein, 1976:465).
As Arrighi rightly points out, the concept semiperiphery, introduced to solve the 
problem of border cases, has itself become the main problem here. The difficulty of 
clearly operationalising the concept thus leads Wallerstein to include vastly different 
countries in the semiperipheral category.
There have been other attempts to the clarify and operationalise the concept. 
P.Lange, for example, in an article discussing Italy's special position in the world- 
system (Lange, 1985) proposes a sub-group of core states called the “perimeter of the 
core”. A country located at the perimeter of the core is one which has recently shifted 
from periphery to core. In other words he posits a sub-core-region where 
semiperipheral and core characteristics might coexist. One of his critical argument is 
that domestic politics plays a role in changing the world-system position of countries. 
Indeed, one of the criticisms of world-system analysis is its neglect of internal politics. 
Wallerstein rarely refers to the importance of internal politics. For instance, in one 
article he maintains that ‘Both their [semiperipheral countries'] internal politics and 
their social structures are distinctive, and it turns out that their ability to take advantage
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of the flexibility offered by the downturns of economic activity is in general greater 
than that of either core or peripheral countries’ (Wallerstein, 1976:463). Furthermore, 
as Lange himself points out, Wallerstein remarks on the importance of the relationship 
between the national political economy and the world-economy in moving from one 
position to another (p. 183). However, Lange argues that these remarks can only be 
useful at the macro level; they do not assist individual or country level studies. Lange 
considers that the major domestic actors play a critical role in the process of shifting 
from semiperiphery to core. In other words, it is important to observe the struggles (if 
any) among the domestic actors over the distribution of economic shares and political 
power during the positional shift. According to Lange, in such instances domestic 
actors choose strategies in order to promote their interests; thus they act intentionally. It 
is at this point that the position in the world-system intervenes in the picture. Lange 
maintains that although this position strongly affects the opportunity structure for states 
“it cannot determine the specific form of the opportunity structure for any individual 
country, much less the specific strategies that will be adopted by the relevant actors, nor 
can it explain which specific combination of strategies adopted will result in an 
alteration of that country's position in the world-system” (p. 184).
A second critical factor that Lange points us is the behaviour of a country 
whose position has recently shifted from semiperiphery to the core. For Lange, those 
states (in his case Italy) first arrive at the “perimeter of the core” and experience an 
"adaptation" period there, during which major domestic actors and the state try to 
formulate their new strategies. Accordingly, their behaviour reveals a mixture of core 
and semiperipheral characteristics. An important point here is that the behaviours of the 
actors and the adaptation period as a whole are significantly influenced by the past 
history and the national characteristics of individual states. Furthermore, there is always 
the possibility of falling back to a semiperipheral position.
In operationalising these and other points in the Italian case, Lange takes wage 
structure (wage levels and their rate of increase) as his main criterion. In fact, in his 
various writings Wallerstein proposes six indicators by which the world-system
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position of individual countries can be assessed (Lange, 1985:186): Gross National 
Product per capita; the structure of national production; the structure of trade; the class 
structure; the wage structure; patterns of development and political response under 
conditions of economic crisis. According to Lange, in the postwar period the wage 
structure is an important indicator of a shift from semiperiphery to core because a 
change in wage levels is mainly a function of changes in terms and patterns of trade of 
a country with the world-system and requires an upgrading of the average technological 
level of domestic production.
Lange's study focuses on a particular case (Italy) at a particular time (postwar 
period). On the other hand, Arrighi presents a more comprehensive operationalisation 
not only of semiperiphery, but also of core and periphery (Arrighi, 1985 and Arrighi 
and Drangel, 1986). According to Arrighi and Drangel “there is no [direct] operational 
way of empirically distinguishing between peripheral and core-like activities and 
therefore classifying states according to the mix of core-peripheral activities that fall 
under their jurisdiction”. Furthermore “[in] order to classify activities as core and 
periphery-like one should minimally need a complete map of all commodity chains of 
the world- economy as well as an assessment of the relative competitive pressure at 
each of their nodes, and this is in itself an impossible task” (Arrighi and Drangel, 
1986:30). Arrighi, therefore, proposes an indirect measurement of the stratification of 
the world-economy. Referring to the ambiguous usage of the concept semiperiphery, he 
argues that there is a desperate need for a standard that could reflect a meaning of the 
concept as close as possible to its original purpose. Furthermore, the standard should 
also give the maximum possible clarity in categorising states into the three zones of the 
world-economy. He proposes GNP per capita as such a standard operational criterion 
that could satisfy these expectations.
Arrighi's starting point is the original writings of Wallerstein (Arrighi, 1985 and 
Arrighi and Drangel, 1986). According to Wallerstein while core activities appropriate 
a large share of the total surplus produced in the world-economy, peripheral activities 
receive the remaining small amount. Arrighi believes that this disproportional
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distribution of the world-economy's surplus must be reflected in the GNP per capita 
differentials of the residents of the two types of states. In other words, since core 
activities command aggregate rewards that incorporate most of the overall benefits of 
the world division of labour while peripheral activities command aggregate rewards 
that incorporate few of those benefits, the differences in command over the total 
benefits of the world division of labour must necessarily be reflected in commensurate 
differences in the GNP per capita of the states (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:31). Since 
semiperipheral states have a fairly even mix of core and peripheral activities, they 
receive a more or less average share of the world-economy's surplus and accordingly 
their GNP per capita income reflect an intermediate level between core and periphery.
But what is an intermediate level of per capita GNP ? At what level should we 
set the lower and upper boundaries of the semiperipheral zone? Arrighi refers to 
Wallerstein, for whom semiperiphery is neither a residual nor a transitional part, but a 
stable and permanent feature of the world-economy. It is easily differentiated both from 
core and periphery. Hence if the world- economy is composed of three permanent 
categories of states, 'we should be able to set the boundaries of the semiperiphery 
simply by inspecting the distribution of states (presumably weighted by population) 
according to their per capita GNP' (Arrighi, 1985:245). Here, one must look at the 
relative rather than the absolute differences between states, and at differences in 
command over world economic resources rather than at differences in actual standards 
of living (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:31). Referring to 1983 World Bank data, Arrighi 
claims that Wallerstein's three modal distribution of states is consistent with the 
distribution of world GNP per capita. Leaving aside states with a population of less 
than one million he reclassifies the states into five categories of per capita GNP 
(Arrighi, 1985), arguing that this regrouping demonstrates the coincidence between 
three modal distribution of states and the distribution of GNP per capita levels in 
relation to population in each category (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:32-52).
However, there appear to be two relatively depopulated, new categories. Let us 
look at Arrighi's table (Arrighi, 1985).
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CLASS GNP PER CAPITA, 1981 
(in dollars)
NUMBER 
OF STATES
PERCENTAGE OF 
WORLD POPULATION
I less than 800 50 58
I /I I 800- 1500 19 5
I I 1500 - 4500 31 20
I I / I I I 4500 - 9000 10 3
I I I more than 9000 19 14
Class I : Periphery. Class I I : Semiperiphery. Class I I I : Core. Class I / I I : “Perimeter 
of Periphery”. Class I I /I I I : “Perimeter of Core” .
Arrighi points out that his “perimeter of the core” (Class D/Ill) and by analogy 
“perimeter of periphery” (Class 1/E) have nothing to do with Lange's understanding of 
“perimeter of the core”. Arrighi's perimeters are intermediate zones rather than lines 
demarcating two zones.
Let us examine now at what Arrighi offers that is new. His criterion (GNP per 
capita) for operationalising the concept semiperiphery seems plausible and manageable. 
It would not be unrealistic to think first, that the distribution of the world- economy's 
surplus among different countries is a function of a country's position in the production 
activities and second, that the distribution of GNP per capita income in a country is the 
function of the amount of (+) (-) surplus appropriated by that country. Hence, GNP per 
capita might indeed easily be a good indicator for identifying any country's position in 
the world- economy.
Arrighi's table is important. It brings us, although roughly and in a modified 
way, a representative picture of the position in the world-economy in terms of GNP per 
capita. In other words, unless we develop a more sensitive and more reflective method 
of establishing groupings, Arrighi's table might be used by testing its reliability with 
other indicators of each category. In fact, it is not easy to locate every state at a clear-
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cut world-system position with precision. Thus if we need to identify these positions, 
we have to rely on some rough measures. Perhaps this is the main characteristic that 
one should take into consideration in the process of identifying not only world-system 
positions, but also the other comprehensive, macro classifications that we use 
frequently in the social sciences, for example, First World, Third World; South, North; 
Developing Countries, etc. In other words, there are no clear-cut indicators and 
measures for the demarcation lines between, say, South and North other than rough and 
arbitrary ones.
On the other hand, when it comes to the modifications that Arrighi introduced 
as classes I / n  and E/EH, one can say that as a borderline case, semiperiphery is not an 
adequate category unless it is a broad one. As I pointed out earlier, in Wallerstein's 
categorisation semiperiphery consists of a vast number of states, ranging from Zaire to 
Canada. This means that semiperiphery is not a homogenised category. Accordingly, 
there is enough reason for Arrighi to create two more categories for the further 
clarification of the semiperipheral zone. Arrighi and Drangel propose that (1986:51) the 
semiperipheral zone of the world-economy, at any given time, includes not only its 
organic members but also some states that have been more or less temporarily demoted 
from the core (or promoted from periphery) by one of the systematic shocks through 
which the world-economy operates. Thus Arrighi's table can be used with reservations 
and through testing with other indicators, to operationalise the concept semiperiphery.
In Arrighi and Drangel's classification of the position of states in the world- 
economy in terms of GNP per capita in the three periods 1938-50, 1960-70 and 1975- 
83 (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:60-71), they classify organic members of the three 
zones of the world-system as follows; Organic Members of the Core zone: Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, 
W.Germany. Organic Members of the Semiperipheral zone: Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica, GREECE, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Portugal, Romania, S. Africa, SPAIN, Turkey, Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia. Organic Members of the Peripheral zone: Afghanistan, Angola,
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Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Thus in this classification of states according to their GNP per capita, the case 
studies examined in this research, namely Greece and Spain, appear clearly as organic 
members of the semiperipheral zone. More specifically, in Arrighi and Drangel's study 
the world-system positions of Greece and Spain in the three periods appear as follows:
Period Greece Spain
1938-50 Semiperiphery Semiperiphery
1960-70 Semiperiphery Semiperiphery
1975-83 Semiperiphery Perimeter of Core
Another important point is related to the unique position of the world-system's 
semiperipheral zone. As Arrighi and Drangel rightly put it (1986:59-60), neither of the 
two other competing theories of Modernisation and Dependency establish an 
intermediate and persistent zone/group of states which is relatively large in number. 
The addition of an in-between zone, in turn, implies the inadequacy of classifying of 
states as developed/developing; developed/underdeveloped; or core/periphery, and 
emphasises the necessity to differentiate an intermediate group of states from other 
groupings. A further contention of world-system analyst is that the semiperiphery has 
been a zone of political turbulence (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986:60). Thus, the world- 
system school provides a more comprehensive conceptualisation and categorisation of 
the states of the international system.
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Nemeth and Smith (1985) also attempted to determine empirically the structural 
positions of states in the world-system according to their patterns of commodity trade. 
Referring to the contention of world-system theory that position in the world- economy 
is related to the types of commodities a state trades, Nemeth and Smith analyse the 
trade patterns of 86 non-centrally planned countries in terms of five types of 
commodities: Heavy Manufacturing/High Technology; Intermediate Manufactures; 
Light Manufactures; Food Products and Raw Materials. They use data from UN 
Commodity Trade Statistics for the year 1970. On the basis of their findings they group 
countries into blocs depending upon their structural similarities in relation to trade flows 
of various commodity types. In other words, they classify countries into discrete, 
mutually exclusive, and exhaustive categories based on their trade of all five 
commodity group. The general decomposition patterns, and the direction and the 
magnitude of trade of each commodity type between blocs resulted in an eight-group 
division of countries which can be characterised as representing four structural 
positions in the world economy: core, periphery, strong semipexiphery and weak 
semiperiphery. This regrouping is made according to commodity-trades and import 
and export destinations. In this context, they characterise the groups as follows:
Core: For the Heavy Manufacturing/High Technology commodity type, core states are 
the chief exporter to all other blocks as well as the leading importer from each other 
block, and core countries send much greater values of this type of product to other 
blocks than they receive from them. For Intermediate Manufacturing, there is a similar 
pattern of trade between core and the other groups with one exception: the core imports 
more of this type of commodity from the strong semiperiphery than it exports to the 
same group. On the other hand, the core generally receives more raw materials from the 
other groups than it exports. For the Light Manufacture commodities, the amount of 
core exports is greater than the amount received except for large imports from the 
strong semiperiphery. Finally, core countries import food products far more than it 
exports to other groups.
Members: (Bloc A) Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, United States, Germany.
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Strong Semiperiphery: For the Heavy Manufacturing/High Technology commodity 
type, Strong Semiperiphery states have importing and exporting ties with core and the 
other semiperipheral block. They trade most heavily with the core, then with 
themselves and the Weak Semiperiphery, and finally with the Periphery. They trade 
greater amounts of this type of commodity than either Weak Semiperiphery or 
Periphery. For Intermediate Manufactures, they export large amounts to Core and all 
Semiperipheral blocks. In the Strong Semiperiphery trade patterns for Intermediate 
Manufactures centre mainly on the core, next on the semiperiphery, and then on the 
peripheral blocks. For Raw Materials, in terms of value, they export more to the core 
than they receive from this zone. For Light Manufacturing, Strong Semiperiphery has 
importing and exporting ties with the Core and other Semiperipheral blocks, but their 
exports to the Core are much greater than their imports from the Core. They also export 
to, but do not import this type of commodity from the Periphery. On the other hand, the 
pattern of trade in food products is that the Strong Semiperiphery has import and export 
ties with other Core and other Semiperipheral blocks and it does not have any large 
trade ties with the periphery.
Members: (Bloc B) Australia, Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Mexico, Nigeria, SPAIN, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Venezuela. (Group C) Argentina, Hong Kong, India, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea. (Group D) Finland, GREECE, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Libya, 
Norway.
Weak Semiperiphery: Those states have import and export ties with the Core and 
Strong semiperiphery, but engage in little trade with either Periphery or other countries 
in their own block. However, there is a sparseness of trade to any non-core blocks in 
their trade patterns. Their trade volume is much greater with Core.
Members: (Group F) Chile, Columbia, Ghana, Pakistan, Thailand. (Group G) Egypt, 
Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal, Zaire, Zambia.
Periphery: Peripheral states' trade links are almost exclusively with the core nations. 
This group does not import many Heavy Manufacturing/High-Technology goods but is 
dependent on the Core for such commodity imports. They import all types of
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manufactured goods and exports, raw materials and food products. They are dependent 
on the Core countries.
Members: (Group E) Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia. 
(Group H) Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Equador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey, 
Uganda, Upper Volta, Uruguay.
Hence, Nemeth and Smith's analysis of 86 countries' patterns of commodity 
trade support World-System Approach. They find that, core countries trade with 
nations located in all the strata of the world-economy. Their strength is reflected in the 
type, diversity and quantity of their export. Peripheral countries trade mainly with core 
and some semiperipheral countries; and they specialise in the export of a few 
commodities; Finally, the semiperiphery forms a middle category in terms of 
commodity mixes and flows. On the basis of their findings Nemeth and Smith argue 
that the international economic system is hierarchically ordered, and the eight strata 
derived from their model can be conceptualised as fulfilling four distinct roles in the 
world-economy which conform well to the world-system categorisation of states as 
core, periphery and semiperiphery. In other words, they emphasise that the structure of 
commodity exchange in the international system conforms to the expectations of the 
World System Approach. Another important point is that in Nemeth and Smith's study 
both Greece and Spain appear ia the (Strong) Semiperipheral zone of the world- 
economy, although the criteria for determining their world-system position are 
different.
3. Conclusion
It seems clear that the semiperipheral zone of the world economy is a heterogeneous 
zone composed of rather different states. This is the major point that leads to problems 
for the semiperiphery. An alternative way to reduce these problems to some extent is 
perhaps to regroup and study the most similar semiperipheral states. This method,
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however, decreases the generalising power of the concept while increasing its 
practicality and operationalisibility. Yet if the concept of semiperiphery is to become a 
fruitful concept, it is necessary to study relatively more similar cases, rather than the 
whole range of semiperipherality. To d o  this, one needs to take into account a 
number of indicators of semiperipherality in order to apply them to the states under 
consideration.
Having argued the basic tenets of the world-system analysis and the concept of 
semiperiphery, let me now explain how I shall utilise them in the framework of this 
study. First of all, I must emphasise that although world-system analysis focuses on the 
study of the external environment and systemic-structural conditions and processes, this 
study investigates the effects of that environment and those conditions and processes on 
national development, and examines consequences of occupying a given structural 
position in the world-economy. In other words, the main concern of this study is the 
effects of the structures and the operation of the capitalist world-economy on the 
national development and foreign policies of two (semiperipheral) countries (Greece 
and Spain) in the period between 1945-1990s. A common misunderstanding in relation 
to World-System Analysis is that it can only investigate the systemic/structural or 
international levels. However, the study of other levels of analysis, such as zones, 
states, organisations, etc., is, also, possible in World-System Analysis (Chase-Dunn, 
1989:310). In fact, as a holistic structure the world-system contains all those levels, and 
the processes operating at the international and national levels. This study accordingly, 
attempts to analyse the foreign policies of the two semiperipheral countries in relation 
to their economic position in the world-economy. In this context, I shall look at how 
both power and production are organised, and investigate the interaction and 
interdependence between economic and political activities.
In this study both Greece and Spain are considered to be semiperipheral states. 
They are provisionally considered semiperipheral, first, because, neither country fits in 
either the core or the peripheral end of the world-system hierarchy. Hence they are in 
the intermediate category of the semiperiphery. Moreover, using the operationalisation
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of both Arrighi and Drangel and of Nemeth and Smith these two states are clearly 
located in the semiperipheral category. In the next chapters, I shall investigate whether 
my findings accord with the location of Greece and Spain in the semiperiphery and 
whether other economic and political indicators support this categorisation.
I shall begin by looking at the economic and political histories of Greece and 
Spain, in order to investigate their semiperipheral characteristics in the periods between 
1945 and the mid-1970s and between the mid-1970s and the 1990s which correspond 
roughly both the rise and decline of American hegemony and to expansion and 
contraction periods of the world-economy. In both periods I shall look first, at the 
economic environment to see the production patterns, the role of the state in the 
economy, the nature of the dominant economic elite, the nature of the relationship 
between the state and the economic elites, and among the economic elites themselves, 
and the nature of the relationship between foreign capital (of hegemonic USA) and 
other core (EEC/EC/EU) powers and the Greek and Spanish states and their domestic 
economic elites. Furthermore, in the second period (mid-1970s to 1990s), I shall also 
investigate whether both Greece and Spain experienced upward mobility towards the 
core zone in the world-system hierarchy.
Second, I shall turn to the political environment to investigate the interactions 
between economic development and domestic politics and political structures, and to 
see whether the two states displayed semiperipheral characteristics. The World-System 
Analysis proposes that in expansion periods of the world- economy semiperipheral 
states experiences high degrees of intervention in their domestic affairs by the 
core/hegemonic powers. Furthermore, in these periods semiperipheral states turn into 
satellites, and become political and ideological agents of hegemonic/ core powers. 
Thus, in the first period (1945 to mid-1970s) I shall look at whether either state was 
subjected to such experiences. On the other hand, according to the world-system 
school, in contraction periods of the world economy in (upwardly mobile) 
semiperipheral states the old political structures collapse and the interventions of
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hegemonic/core powers come to an end. Accordingly, I shall investigate whether this 
holds true for Greece and Spain in the period between the mid-1970s and the 1990s.
The World-System Approach implies that the foreign policies of semiperipheral 
states go hand in hand with developments in the economic and political spheres. It is 
argued that, during expansion periods, the foreign policies of semiperipheral states are 
directed towards the accomplishment of the global objectives of hegemonic/ core 
powers. Furthermore, the policies to be followed may be dictated to semiperipheral 
states. In other words, they become satellites of the hegemonic/core powers, and their 
national interests and national sovereignty may be subordinated to the global/regional 
interests of the hegemonic/core powers. Thus, in the first period (1945 to mid-1970s) I 
shall examine whether Greece and Spain displayed such foreign policy behaviours.
Similarly, in contraction periods, in parallel to the changes in the economic and 
political spheres, the foreign policies of semiperipheral states may change. According 
to World-System Analysis semiperipheral states change their international alliances in 
these periods. They give up their satellite-like foreign policies and pursue a relatively 
independent foreign policy. Some upwardly mobile semiperipheral countries compete 
with other semiperipheral states for more economic and political gains. Furthermore, I 
also propose that, in their foreign policy orientations, these upwardly mobile 
semiperipheral states may also fulfil an intermediary/bridge role between the core zones 
and those areas which they are geographically proximate and/or with which they have 
cultural and historical ties. They also seek to become involved in the management of 
international problems. I shall therefore, examine whether Greek and Spanish foreign 
policies followed such a course in the period between the mid-1970s and the 1990s. 
However, before examining their development patterns and individual foreign policies, 
it may be useful to understand why Greece and Spain (and, most of the time, Portugal) 
are taken together and considered as a coherent group of countries by a number of 
researchers. In this way, I shall also be able to examine various perspectives on the 
study of Greece and Spain (and Portugal) and, at the same time, emphasise the 
difference between this study and previous studies of these countries.
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CHAPTER IV 
UNDERSTANDING GREECE AND SPAIN
1. Introduction
The 1970s were one of the most eventful decades in the history of the modem world. 
The Bretton Woods system which had governed the international economic order since 
the end of the Second World War began to collapse. In August 1971 the Americans 
abolished the fixed exchange rate system which had established the dollar as the 
international currency. In 1973 a war broke out in the Middle East and it led to the first 
oil-price shock and a world-wide inflation and recession. In 1974 Greece and Turkey 
came near to an all out war over Cyprus. European Political Co-operation (EPC) came 
into being as a result of diverging European and American interests in the Middle East. 
Towards the end of the decade a revolution occurred in Iran which ended with the 
establishment of a radical Islamic state and soon another oil-price shock hit the world. 
Finally, the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
Among these major events the developments which occurred in three southern 
European countries, namely Greece, Spain and Portugal (GSP), were by no means of 
secondary importance. The 1970s witnessed the collapse of the dictatorships and the 
establishment of democratic regimes in the GSP countries. The long standing 
authoritarian regimes of Salazar in Portugal (1926-74), and of Franco in Spain (1936- 
76) came to an end together with the seven year (1967-74) dictatorship of the Greek 
colonels. The successive overthrow of the dictatorships and the establishment of 
democratic structures in the southern Europe did not take long to arouse the interest of 
social scientists. In 1975, even before the death of Franco, the publication of Nicos 
Poulantas', La Crise des Dictatures, which emphasised the similarity of the political 
and economic developments which led to social change in these countries, took the lead 
of the studies on the region and thus opened the way for comparative studies of GSP 
countries. Social scientists' interests in the issue increased when, in the 1980s, they all 
become full-members of the European Community (EC), and socialist-led governments 
came to power in all three countries. As the convergences in the political and economic 
histories of the trio proliferated, scholars, in order to explain the phenomenon, began to
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seek similarities in the underlying causes and patterns that might govern social change 
in GSP countries.
2. Common Characteristics of GSP Countries
The geographical factor has played an important role in the political and economic 
developments of GSP countries. Their physical proximity to Western Europe on the 
one hand and, on the other, the fact that they border strategically important points of the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean have had important consequences on both the 
shared and the unique national experiences of these countries. Moreover, political and 
economic developments in Western Europe have usually created both constraints and 
opportunities for national developments in the south. To put it differently, their 
geographical locations have provided them with different paths to follow compared to 
the geographical locations of other semiperipheral states of Latin America and East 
Asia.
In this context, historically, the 19th Century liberal-conservative (or modem- 
traditional) struggles in southern Europe reflect the political and social debates on 
liberalism, parliamentarism and constitutionalism then taking place in the West. 
Similarly, the destruction of both political and economic ideas and institutions during 
the First World War and in its aftermath led to the emergence of authoritarian and 
autarkic regimes in Western Europe and the GSP countries followed suit immediately. 
Finally, after the Second World War establishment of a new international order under 
American hegemony, the advent of Cold War and the division of Europe into two 
hostile blocs and the reign of anti-Communist ideology played decisive roles in the 
continuation of authoritarian and restrictive parliamentary regimes in GSP. However, 
the emergence of Europe as an economic and political power in the late 1960s and early 
1970s significantly contributed to the democratisation of the political structures and 
further liberalisation of the economies of southern Europe. The existence of the EC and 
the eventual incorporation of GSP into the organisation indicate that the fortunes of 
these three countries are linked to developments in their Western neighbours.
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Most of the studies of GSP have tended to identify these countries in a distinct 
category both from “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries. In each case the 
classification implies that they occupy a peculiar position in the international system. 
For instance, apart from the concept “semiperiphery” , the terms “Underdeveloped 
Europe”, “Periphery of Europe” (Seers, 1979a), “European Periphery” (Seddon, 
n.d. and Selwyn, 1979) have been used interchangeably to identify the GSP countries. 
The terms “underdeveloped” and “periphery” imply that the GSP countries have similar 
and shared characteristics with ‘Third World” countries. However, the terms 
“Europe/European” refer both to the significance of their geographical location and, to 
their core-like characteristics and distinct peripheral/underdeveloped positions 
(relatively better-off positions) in comparison to Third World countries. Accordingly, 
another common characteristic of most of the studies is their focus on the political 
economy of these three states. In other words, the relationship between the state, 
politics and economics, both at the national and international level, and the role of 
national and international actors in political and economic changes in relation to this 
interaction are common themes (though to varying degrees and in different explanatory 
frameworks) of most comparative studies of GSP countries.
Indeed, there are some common points in the political economies of the three 
countries. One of them is the dependent position of their economies in relation to the 
core, despite their relatively better-off positions compared to the periphery. The lack of 
technological capacity and capital goods industries, little control over the ownership of 
local manufacturing (Seers, 1979b:3) and over the use of resources, the inability to 
participate effectively in major economic decisions (for example, what to produce and 
where and how to produce) and lack of innovation (Selwyn, 1979:37) are the main 
characteristics of the dependency of GSP economies on core countries, mainly the US 
and the EC. Even the new international division of labour which corresponds to the 
upward shift of GSP in the world-economy has not altered the main characteristics of 
this dependency, such as the control of technology by the core and the location of 
management and research centres from core to these countries (Williams, 1984:15).
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Another common characteristic is the flow of migrant workers to core countries and the 
flow of tourists from core to GSP countries. Especially in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
emigrant remittances and tourism revenues contributed significantly to the balance-of- 
payments accounts of GSP. A third similarity is the existence of few big and a plethora 
of small firms side by side in the economies of the three countries. Thus, while the big 
companies which are owned by private, foreign or state capital are run on capitalist 
principles, uncompetitive small firms represent an inefficient part of the GSP 
economies. Finally, a large parasitic service sector, mostly created through clientelistic 
networks, constitutes another common characteristic.
One of the most striking features of GSP countries in relation to this study is, 
perhaps, the existence of significant divisions among their social and political forces up 
to recent times and their implications for political and economic development 
(Diamandouros, 1986a:548-49). The introduction of liberalism and parliamentarism 
into these countries before industrialisation caused contradictions among existing social 
forces and led to long-lasting legitimacy crises in GSP. None of the forces was 
powerful enough to establish hegemony and this resulted in either restricted 
parliamentary or authoritarian regimes up to the mid-1970s. Hence, unlike in the 
developed West, in the absence of hegemonic bourgeoisies, the states began to play a 
crucial role in the economy through public enterprises and in this way became the 
central actor in both economics and politics. It was only towards the middle of the 
1970s that these cleavages between antagonistic forces began to dissolve for the first 
time through reconciliation and the legitimacy of the internationalist capitalist system 
was established. In other words, old-style conservatives were either eliminated or 
incorporated by the pro-capitalist forces, and left wing forces were allowed to 
participate in the competitive politics through democratisation. Theoretically speaking, 
these are what I emphasised as the characteristics of semiperipheral states: a roughly 
equal distribution of core-and periphery-like producers; their struggle over state 
structures in order to control them and establish their hegemony; and the central 
position of the state. Furthermore, the political and economic transformations which 
took place in the mid-1970s, namely the democratisation of the political regimes and
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the further interaction of the economies with international markets and their accession 
to the EC in the 1980s, implied the victory of liberal-democratic and pro-capitalist over 
the authoritarian-conservative and statist forces. This, in turn, indicated an attempt to 
shift the semiperipheral position of GSP towards the core in the world-economy at a 
time of the relative hegemonic decline of the US and the ascendancy of the EC.
Now let us turn to the main economic and political developments in GSP 
countries in the postwar period. Postwar economic and political developments in GSP 
fall naturally into two main periods: the period from 1945 to the mid-1970s, and the 
period after the mid-1970s. In order to consolidate American hegemony, US policy 
makers concentrated on two things in the immediate postwar years: the establishment 
of a free market economy throughout the world, and the containment of the Soviet 
Union and communism. In this task the Americans were particularly sensitive about 
Western Europe. For this reason the immediate effects of the new hegemonic order in 
southern Europe were somewhat different from those in Western Europe. Since the 
economic structures of the south were not as developed as those of the north, the 
process of economic reconstruction in the south was directed towards the establishment 
of market integrated national economies through building roads and communication 
networks and the development and modernisation of the agricultural sector in the 1950s 
(Seddon, n.d.:4-5).
On the other hand, in spite of the US rhetoric of democracy, the authoritarian 
regimes in GSP countries remained in power in exchange for their commitment to the 
market economy. In fact, in the immediate postwar years these authoritarian regimes 
briefly opted for autarkic economic policies: protective tariffs and quotas and import 
substitution were put into practice, and the state began to control the economy again. 
However, three factors contributed to the opening and internationalisation of these 
economies. The first was the structure and the rationale of the new international 
economic order established by the US which was hostile to autarkic tendencies. The 
second was that these autarkic policies themselves began to restrict economic growth at 
a certain point (Williams, 1984 :10). Finally there were pressures from the newly
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established international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the opening up 
of the GSP economies in order to ease their balance-of-payments deficits. Accordingly, 
Greece devalued the drachma a hundred percent in 1953 and opened its economy to 
foreign investments. Spain became a member of the World Bank and the IMF in 1958, 
started to implement a stabilisation programme and devalued the peseta in 1959, while 
Portugal joined European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1959.
In the 1960s, however, the situation in GSP began to change. Between 1960 and 
1973 they achieved growth rates of about 6 to 8 percent (Tovias, 1984:159 and 
Williams, 1984:8) and entered into industrialisation processes. Massive labour shifts 
occurred from the agricultural to the industrial and service sectors (Williams, 1984:8- 
9). The existence of low cost and surplus labour, together with the absence of labour 
unions, contributed significantly to the rapid industrialisation of these countries in this 
period. The internationalisation of their economies intensified and, accordingly, they 
signed special trade agreements with the EC: Greece in 1962, Spain in 1970 and 
Portugal in 1972.
Three main factors played an important role in the process of 
internationalisation: foreign investment and technological transfer, emigration and 
tourism (Williams, 1984:10). In relation to foreign investment, Hudson and Lewis 
(1984) enumerate four factors for the flow of private foreign investment capital into 
GSP: the availability of natural resources, the absence of anti-pollution measures, 
access for domestic and third country markets, and the availability of low cost flexible 
labour. Of these four factors market access was the most important because in addition 
to penetrating GSP's domestic markets, foreign capital gained better access to the 
markets of third countries. Between 1950 and the mid-1970s, the largest share of 
foreign investment capital in the GSP economies was American (Hudson and 
Lewis, 1984:188). By investing in GSP, foreign industrial capital aimed at penetrating 
domestic markets and also at establishing platforms for export to North Africa and the
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Middle East (Williams, 1984:15). Furthermore US and Japan-dominated multinationals 
gained better access to EC markets (Hudson and Lewis, 1984:188).
The second important element of the internationalisation of the GSP economies 
was the emigration of southern European peasants to Western Europe where there was 
a demand for low-wage labour during the 1950s and 1960s. The remittances of these 
emigrant workers reached significant amounts in the early 1970s and, although they 
spent on consumption rather than production, they made important positive 
contributions to the balance-of-payment deficits of these countries. Like workers' 
remittances, the third factor of internationalisation, namely tourism, contributed 
significantly to the balance-of-payments accounts. Increasing living standards in 
Western Europe as a result of the postwar economic boom and the geographical 
proximity and climatic characteristics of GSP led Western Europeans to spend their 
leisure time and excess money in their relatively poor southern neighbours.
Between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1970s the GSP 
dictatorships tried to adapt their economies to the requirements of new hegemonic 
structures and in this way they remained in power until the mid-1970s. However, the 
gradual liberalisation and expansion of their economies without a concomitant political 
liberalisation paved the way for their eventual collapse in the mid-1970s. In fact, by the 
early 1970s the GSP dictatorships had almost totally lost their social bases. Hence even 
their attempts to liberalise the political system could not prevent their collapse. On the 
other hand, apart from being incorporated into the new world economic structures, on 
the strategic front they had become faithful followers of American anti-Soviet, anti- 
Communist policies. Accordingly, while Greece and Portugal were incorporated into 
NATO, Spain was attached to the Western alliance through bilateral agreements with 
the US in the early 1950s.
The developments in the world-economy in the early 1970s slowed down the 
economic growth in GSP countries. The abolition of the fixed exchange rate principle 
by the Americans and the collapse of the monetary system established at Bretton
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Woods, recession in the OECD economies and the two oil-price shocks, the first in 
1973 and the second in 1979, led to difficulties in the GSP economies. Moreover, the 
decline in tourism revenues and in the demand for emigrant workers, and the sharp rise 
in energy costs hit the energy dependent economies of the three countries. As a result 
investment fell, inflation rose and unemployment increased (Williams, 1984:11). All 
these developments in the world and national economies contributed significantly to the 
collapse of their authoritarian regimes.
However, after the collapse of the dictatorships, the newly established 
democracies mostly paid attention to political stability and the consolidation of 
democracy against a possible authoritarian counter-revolution and they postponed 
dealing with the economic difficulties caused by the dramatic developments in the 
world-economy (Diamandouros, 1986a:551-56). On the strategic front, the oil crises 
increased the importance of the Mediterranean region and thus the necessity of pro- 
western stability in GSP countries which, in turn, contributed to the democratisation 
processes and to increasing support from the West.
In order to strengthen their democratic structures and to neutralise any attempt 
to revitalise the old structures, the new or renewed political and economic elites of GSP 
undertook both domestic and external measures. Domestically, they focused on creating 
a consensus among social and political forces on the terms of the transition to 
democracy. Internationally, they sought economic, political and ideological support 
from international actors, especially from the EC. I shall focus on this period later in the 
chapters on individual countries. Suffice it to say here that in the domestic sphere, 
dramatic shifts in the stances of both conservative and left-wing forces from extremist 
to moderate positions made consensus possible not only on the terms of transition but 
on the consolidation of democracy. The advent to power of democratic socialist parties 
in the three countries in the 1980s proved the success of the democratisation processes 
started in the mid-1970s. The measures taken in the international sphere for a peaceful 
transition to, and the consolidation of, democracy also proved fruitful. Accordingly, in 
the 1980s GSP became full members of the EC. However, it should be emphasised that
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although at first primarily political and ideological support was sought in the external 
sphere, in the face of severe economic disturbances it did not take long before decisive 
international support was extended to the GSP countries to neutralise the negative 
effects of the world economic disturbances on the process of democratisation (Tovias, 
1984:169).
These are the major points which gave every GSP researcher the inspiration to 
employ a comparative perspective in studying the region. However, although the 
convergences provided their starting points each individual researcher refined and 
redefined them in accordance with their respective frameworks.
3. Main Approaches to the Study of GSP
One can identify some general characteristics of the diverse approaches to the change in 
the GSP and classify them. First, they can be classified according to the time span that 
they investigate. In other words, some studies analyse the change either in a long or in 
specific time periods, with or without a historical perspective. Second, GSP studies can 
be divided into two according to the type of environment in which they analyse the 
change and/or according to the type of actors that carry the real burden in the process. 
In other words, some studies give priority to the domestic environment and/or domestic 
actors while others emphasise the role of the external environment and/or external 
actors in the process of social change. In the former, the domestic environment mainly 
comprises of political parties, bourgeoisies, middle classes, working classes and labour 
unions, military, government, bureaucracy and individual leaders. In the latter, the 
external environment and external actors mainly include the international system and 
its structure, the US, the EC, the USSR, NATO, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) 
and other international/ intergovernmental organisations. This does not mean that every 
GSP study falls necessarily and exclusively into one of these categories. GSP studies 
also incorporate other approaches and variables in their own frameworks. In other 
words, there is a complex interaction between different variables that effect change in 
GSP and, as a result of this, it is possible to create different compositions. In discussing
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existing frameworks of GSP change, priority should be given to Poulantzas' work The 
Crisis of the Dictatorships (1976).
3.1. Nicos Poulantzas
Poulantzas' book was first published in French at the height of the changes in GSP: the 
Greek and Portuguese dictatorships had recently collapsed. Despite its early appearance 
a number of points raised by Poulantzas have provided the stimulus for GSP 
researchers. In general, Poulantzas analyses social and political change in GSP on the 
basis of two phenomena: first, the nature of the relationship between the US and 
Europe in the new world context and, second, the complex interrelationships among 
social classes and institutions in GSP countries. The result of the interaction between 
these two phenomena was the crisis and later collapse of the dictatorships and regime 
changes in these countries.
According to Poulantzas, GSP countries are in a dependent relationship with 
the imperialist metropoles (the US and the EC being the dominant ones) and are 
characterised by their experiences of exceptional capitalist regimes (of fascism, 
bonapartism, military dictatorship). However, their dependent positions are of a special 
kind: on the one hand, they are not underdeveloped in the sense that the term 
traditionally connotes (their economic and social structures, compared to those of the 
Third World countries, are in a relatively better-off position). On the other hand, their 
specific form of dependence is a function of their particular histories and is 
characterised by two contrasting developments. First, an old-established primitive 
capital accumulation differentiates GSP from other underdeveloped countries. Second, 
the blockage of the endogenous accumulation of capital at the right time put GSP in a 
similar position to other dependent countries.
The changes that took place in GSP in the middle of the 1970s can only be 
understood in terms of the new phase of imperialism and its effects on European 
countries. In the early phases of imperialism, when metropolitan countries exported 
capital to and extracted raw materials from, dependent countries, the dividing line
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between metropoles and dependent countries corresponded to industry and agriculture. 
The capitalist mode of production had not yet incorporated and dominated the relations 
of production in the dependent countries; feudal modes of production and a form of 
petty commodity production were in a symbiotic interaction with capitalist practices. 
The effects of that early form of imperialism on the socio-economic and political 
structures of GSP are multiple. As a result of delayed industrialisation, their working 
classes remained weak compared to their large and precapitalist peasantry. Second, a 
significant traditional petty-bourgeois class in manufacture, handicrafts and commerce, 
and a state petty- bourgeoisie which increased in number as a result of the parasitic 
growth of the state bureaucracy became the characteristic feature of these societies. 
Third, their dependent situation led to the emergence of an oligarchic power bloc which 
was composed of big land owners and comprador big bourgeoisie who acted as the 
commercial and financial intermediary of foreign imperialist capital.
However, the situation changed immediately after the Second World War. A 
new phase of imperialism was put into practice which was consolidated in the 1960s. 
Capital was exported from the metropoles to control raw materials and extend markets. 
But it was also now directed to the exploitation of labour on a world scale as a result of 
the falling rate of profit. Thus foreign capital, in the form of direct investment, began to 
enter into the industrial sphere of a number of dependent countries where production 
costs were relatively low. One of the consequences of this internationalisation of capital 
was the socialisation of labour processes in the capitalist rationale on the world scale. 
According to Poulantzas, the socio-economic structures of the GSP countries were 
substantially affected as a result of this reorganisation of imperialism. The form of their 
dependence on the imperialist metropoles shifted from an industry/agriculture division 
to a type of dependence which involved their industrialisation through foreign capital. 
The result was the reproduction of capitalist relations of production in these countries 
through subordinating labour power and dissolving pre-capitalist relations. Poulantzas 
called this new form of domination and dependence “dependent industrialisation”. It 
was put into practice not only in GSP, but also in Latin America.
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One of the striking points in Poulantzas' argument about the transformation in 
the GSP countries is the important role of changing US-European relations. He points 
to GSP's increasing economic ties with the EC at the expense of the US at a time of 
inter-imperialist contradictions between the US and the EC. The increasing level of 
both foreign capital investment in GSP, and the volume of foreign trade between GSP 
and the US and Europe in favour of the EC provides empirical evidence of this 
tendency. Here Poulantzas raises the question of whether the contradictions between 
the US and the EC played a role in the decline and fall of the dictatorships. In order to 
answer the question, he first analyses the nature of the relationship between the US and 
the EC. For him there is no such thing as the inevitable decline of the US and the 
emergence of Europe as a counter-imperialist force. He argues that American direct 
investments still play a very important role in the economies of West European 
countries. As a consequence, there is no unification of capital among Europeans, and 
hence individual West European countries' relations with the US have an important 
effect on the relations among Western Europeans themselves. These characteristics of 
US-European relations have affected the EC's attitude vis-a-vis the GSP dictatorships. 
Yet at the same time there are inter-imperialist contradictions between the US and the 
EC, for example for the conquest of protected territories, for capital export, for export 
of commodities and the control of raw materials. Furthermore, there are intense 
struggles over the control of the intermediate countries which serve as a staging post for 
the further expansion of imperialist capital. Portugal and Greece are characteristic cases 
in this respect because of their position between foreign capital and its penetration into 
African markets. As far as the southern Europe was concerned the contradiction 
between the US and the EC was expressed by the independent strategy pursued by the 
Community in the Mediterranean region in the 1970s.
When it comes to the relationship between US-Europe contradictions and the 
collapse of the GSP dictatorships, Poulantzas maintains that although the contradiction 
played an important role in the process, it was not direct or immediate. US-Europe 
contradictions were reflected in the divisions among the endogenous bourgeoisie of 
GSP countries (in parallel with their lines of dependence) into American- or European-
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oriented bourgeoisie. In other words, the contradiction between the US and Europe at a 
global level led to intra-bourgeoisie contradictions in GSP countries. The fall of the 
dictatorial regimes in GSP was significantly affected by the redistribution of power 
between the two fractions of the bourgeoisie in favour of the European-oriented 
section. From a political point of view, while the American-oriented bourgeoisie was 
identified with the military dictatorships, the European-oriented fraction was identified 
with democratic regimes. However, the victory of European-oriented capital over 
American-oriented did not necessarily mean the total elimination of the latter. 
Accordingly, it was not a radical challenge to American capital.
European-oriented capital (which Poulantzas also called the domestic 
bourgeoisie) was the product of the process of dependent industrialisation which 
commenced in the 1960s. It was chiefly involved in light industry in the consumer 
goods field, although occasionally it was involved in heavy industry (consumer 
durables, textiles, engineering, steel, and chemicals) and the construction industries 
(cement etc.). Furthermore, the domestic bourgeoisie invested in the fields of transport, 
distribution (commercial capital) and services of various kinds (particularly tourism). 
On the other hand, American-oriented capital (which Poulantzas also called the 
comprador bourgeoisie or the oligarchy) was the representative of foreign capital. Its 
interests were totally subordinated to foreign capital, and it was involved in speculative 
activities in the financial, banking and commercial sectors. However, it also existed in 
some sectors of industry, but totally dependent and subordinated to foreign capital.
The contradictions between the fractions of the bourgeoisie in GSP originated 
from the distribution of surplus value; although both fractions were dependent on 
foreign capital, American capital and its agent, the comprador bourgeoisie, seized the 
largest slice of the surplus at the expense of the domestic bourgeoisie. Furthermore, 
there were striking differences in the nature of their relationship with foreign capital. In 
contrast to the totally subordinated position of the comprador bourgeoisie to foreign 
capital, the domestic bourgeoisie, aiming at industrial development, was sensitive 
towards the degree of exploitation of the country by foreign capital. It favoured state
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intervention for the protection of home markets and tried to make it more competitive 
vis-a-vis foreign capital. It also promoted the extension and development of the home 
market by increasing the purchasing power of the masses and it demanded state 
contributions to the promotion of exports. In this context, the political contradiction 
between the two fractions of the bourgeoisie was the under-representation of the 
domestic bourgeoisie in the state structures which were dominated by representatives of 
comprador interests during the dictatorships. In the struggle for power against its 
comprador counterpart, the domestic bourgeoisie claimed the support of the popular 
masses and working classes in exchange for promises of democratisation. Yet the 
struggle was more about the rearrangement of the balance of forces between the two 
fractions for the extraction of surplus than it was inspired by democratisation.
In the ideological sphere Poulantzas argues that a progressive nationalist 
ideology played an important role for the incorporation of the urban petty-bourgeoisie 
and a part of the army into the struggle against the dictatorships. This neo-nationalist 
ideology was based upon the promotion of national independence and the revival of 
popular culture. In this context, the introduction of the themes of “'Europeanization”, 
“development,” “modernisation” and the notions of “independence” and 
“sovereignty”, themes to which the petty-bourgeoisie and the army were very sensitive, 
played an important role in the decline and fall of the dictatorships.
Using this framework, Poulantzas introduces a striking study of the internal and 
international political economy, drawing attention to the interaction between the two 
and the impact of the interaction on social and political change. Although he 
emphasises the primacy of internal factors in his work (p.22), he argues that in the 
present phase of imperialism a mechanistic distinction between external and internal 
factors no longer exists: “...there is really no such thing as external factors acting purely 
from outside” (p.22). In other words, he suggest that “those coordinates of the 
imperialist chain that are external to a country - the global balance of forces, the role of 
a particular great power, etc. - only act on the country in question by way of their 
internalisation, i.e., by their articulation to its own specific contradictions” (p.22).
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Poulantzas' work is an important contribution to the theoretical and comparative study 
of change. As Chilcote put it “Whatever his faults Poulantzas demonstrated that theory 
can lead to a basis for comparison as well as insights and understandings beyond 
descriptive accounts that characterise most studies of the region” (Chilcote, 1991:7).
3.2. Salvador Giner
In an article (1986) on social and political change in southern Europe S.Giner, presents 
an historical perspective for GSP studies by focusing on national factors. He also 
describes southern European countries as a distinct category between advanced 
capitalist industrial centres and those countries which are called the Third World. In 
other words, southern European countries cannot be located in any of the traditional 
pair-classifications of countries such as backward/modem, preindustrial capitalist/ 
advanced capitalist, etc. He uses the Wallersteinian concept of 'semiperiphery' and 
stresses their incomplete passage into a far more central position in the world-economy.
For Giner, contradictory trends and the uneven development prevailing in these 
countries give way to ambiguities and strains: dependent industrialisation through 
foreign capitalist investment, and a substantial degree of national capitalism, exist side 
by side in southern European countries. These contradictory processes which led to 
undemocratic solutions at the political level, when combined with certain historical 
continuities and a common geographical location, provide Giner with a distinct region 
to study and to reach generalisations, however cautious and limited.
His work is built upon class and power structures in the region. In this respect 
there are four common historical periods, separated by three modes of transition in the 
development of capitalism in the GSP countries since the 19th century. They are; 
Oligarchic Rule and Extreme Popular Exclusion; Bourgeoisie Consolidation and 
Continued Popular Exclusion; Fascist and Fascistoid Military Dictatorships; 
Constitutional Order within Advanced Capitalist Corporatism.
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The first phase of Oligarchic Rule was established shortly after the popular 
wars of liberation and independence against the ancien regimes. After a very short 
period when liberals were in power, the oligarchy came to power and reigned through 
restricted franchise and military intervention. The reasons for this oligarchic 
domination were the small size of local industrial bourgeoisie, the penetration of 
international capitalism through dealing with state officials and foreign loans, and the 
large and scattered position of rural population. During the phase of Bourgeoisie 
Consolidation, the parliamentary institutions established in the previous phase were 
revitalised by the rising commercial, rural and industrial bourgeoisies in alliance with 
the middle classes. Yet the exclusion of the masses from political participation 
continued, and rotating conservative and liberal governments allowed a very limited 
space for legitimate political activity. However, these monarchist, parliamentary and 
bourgeoisie orders came to an end when it became evident that they were not able to 
incorporate or control the growing radical extra-parliamentary opposition and failed to 
implant an imperial state. The phase of Fascist Dictatorships was the result of the 
serious challenges posed by the newly mobilised groups (the excluded and persecuted 
radical bourgeoisie and its allies). In response to the establishment of quasi­
revolutionary regimes by these new groups, reactionary, law-and-order militaristic 
coalitions came to power in the region. They promoted private capital accumulation 
through state intervention. Under these fascist regimes modernisation from above 
continued but the civil rights and freedoms of the previous phase were eliminated. 
Changes occurred in social life such as the continued rise of middle classes, 
urbanisation and depeasantisation, secularisation, the emergence of working class 
opposition, and an increasing international penetration of the economy, leading to the 
decline and fall of the dictatorships. The fourth phase, Constitutional Order within 
Advanced Capitalist Corporatism, began when the authoritarian regimes eventually 
disappeared as a result of military adventurism, military defeat and the renewed 
upsurge of popular and democratic forces. In this phase, the left wing was incorporated 
into the system in exchange for deradicalization and a consensus was reached between 
governments, employers, and trade unions as a result of the evolving contemporary
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corporatism in the economy. Moderation became dominant in the southern European 
countries in relation to the demands of the radicals and conservatives.
For Giner, apart from the sequential and episodic similarities among southern 
European countries, there are structural convergences in the development of capitalism 
in the region. When the industrial revolution was gaining momentum in Western 
Europe, it was defeated in GSP and capitalism was confined to commerce and property 
without capital accumulation. Later in the 19th century modernising efforts were 
obstructed by the precapitalist oligarchic components of the time. The development of 
capitalism was carried out by the weak liberal bourgeoisies slowly, and only by making 
coalitions with backward-looking elements of the society. The lack of private capital 
and the weak financial situation of the states led to the penetration of foreign capital 
regardless of the specific needs of the countries. In creating national capital investment 
Spain was more successful than the other two countries since while Greece possessed 
an absentee merchant bourgeoisie, Portugal lacked one. According to Giner, the lack of 
national capital and consequent chronic dependence on foreign investment paved the 
way for the fascistic autarky of the next phase. However, before the rise of fascism, in 
the phase of Bourgeoisie Consolidation, a kind of liberal bourgeoisie order was 
established in each country in contrast to its backward socio-economic environment; in 
Greece the Venizelos period after 1910, the restoration period in Spain between 1876- 
1923, and a long period of Portuguese republicanism between 1822-1926. This early 
liberal era was unlike West European liberalism. Its characteristics were restrictive 
parliamentarism, a liberal creed with divisions and with southern European 
conservative tones, societal dualism and the utopian elements of national 
aggrandisement and belligerent expansionism. Giner believes that the contradictions of 
this liberal phase led to fascist solutions when the existing political order could no 
longer cope with the social transformation. A new political solution was needed to 
legitimise the system of inequality, to foster the aim of national aggrandisement and 
capitalist industrialisation, and to destroy the rising revolutionary movements.
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Fascism was established in GSP in the interwar period and was identified with 
their leaders; the Metaxas regime in Greece (1936-40), Francoism in Spain (1936-76) 
and Salazarism in Portugal (1926-74). In fact, in southern Europe, according to Giner, 
fascism is a long-wave social and political phenomenon. In order to understand it one 
must take into account other dictatorial periods in GSP that precede or succeed the 
main fascist periods; the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in Spain (1923-31) and the 
Colonels' dictatorship in Greece (1967-74). These two periods can be analysed as parts 
of the historical era either starting or completing it. It is in this sense that fascism in the 
GSP countries is a unified and long-wave phenomenon rather than a scattered one.
With the establishment of fascism the political and economic roles of the state 
in GSP changed dramatically. Although the fascist state promoted populist nationalism 
in the sense that it represented everybody's interests, it was primarily dominated by the 
interests of a right wing reactionary coalition composed of land owners, industrialists 
and financiers. The general aim of the fascist state was to create favourable conditions 
for the accumulation of capital. To this end it suppressed working class movements and 
neutralised dissident intellectuals and students. On the other hand, the reactionary 
coalition controlled the state through the army. The ideological spectrum was also 
occupied by the ideologies of the members of the ruling coalition. The ideologies of 
other classes or groups - especially the ideologies of the subordinate classes - were 
almost totally excluded from the 'legal' sphere. Communism was considered as the first 
and foremost danger threatening society. It soon became the scapegoat of the coalition 
and, was used to accuse democratic opponents of the regime, as well as socialists and 
separatists.
The collapse of the dictatorships and the establishment of democratic structures 
were caused first, by the exhaustion of fascist ideology and second, by the 
transformation of the structure of the economy. The state of the fascist regime had 
functioned as the major source of capital accumulation, industrialisation and 
urbanisation. However, after the massive influx of foreign investment in the 1960s, its 
economic role began to change. It now became the general coordinator of the economy,
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guaranteeing its smooth functioning, the easy repatriation of foreign capital, and its 
close integration into the capitalist core. The change in the international environment 
forced GSP to open their economies to foreign investments and to provide stability and 
low-wage labour. In this way liberal economic policies began to be implemented under 
the authoritarian regimes. However, these changes which started after the Second 
World War gradually undermined the political and economic basis of the regimes and 
ended with their collapse in the middle of the 1970s.
According to Giner the concept of “dependent development” cannot entirely be 
applied to GSP because it is not clear whether all the national industries and enterprises 
are subordinated to foreign capital. He tries to substantiate this argument by pointing to 
some internationally competitive GSP industries (without giving examples) and to the 
foreign trade expansion of these countries. At this point he considers that these changes 
in GSP mark their final entry into core areas from the semiperiphery, which in turn can 
lead to significant changes in the international division of labour in southern Europe. 
Clear indications of this mobilisation are the declining labour migration from GSP 
since 1973 and the establishment of factories in these countries mainly by German, 
French and American industries as a result of cheap skilled labour and the existence of 
satisfactory infrastructure such as motorways and telecommunications. Hence, he also 
maintains that the GSP's shift to the core means greater subordination to the 
international corporate economy but not necessarily economic independence.
On the other hand, in this period concomitant changes occurred in the political 
sphere. Pluralistic politics flourished and new pressure groups, parties, unions and other 
organisations which had been excluded from participation in political life were 
incorporated into the newly emerging system. A striking feature of the new politics was 
the transformation of the old reactionary political classes into right-wing democratic 
parties; Karamanlis's Nea Democratia in Greece, Suarez's Union de Centro 
Democratico in Spain, and Sa Cameiro's conservative coalition in Portugal. Moreover, 
the advent of the 'socialist' parties of Papandreou in Greece, Gonzales in Spain and 
Soarez in Portugal (those forces which were once excluded from political participation)
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to power after the conservative governments marked the evolution of the new system 
towards maturity.
3.3. Immanuel Wallerstein
In the context of world-system analysis Wallerstein also provides us with an historical 
interpretation of the events in the GSP (Wallerstein, 1985) which he considered to be 
situated in the semiperiphery of the world-economy. Between the Congress of Vienna 
and the outbreak of the First World War, these countries were subjected to 
peripherialisation by core countries, and accordingly played the role of low-cost 
producers in the world-economy's division of labour. Modernised but weak states with 
adequate bureaucracies were established to maintain optimal flows of the factors of 
production. The primary tasks of these states were to create an economic infrastructure, 
personnel training systems and, to maintain order against potential labour unrest. The 
liberal constitutional state was the model for GSP in this period. The local capitalist 
classes, large land owners and the new bureaucratic and cultural intelligentsia often 
gave political support to the system.
However, there were two lines of resistance to these developments; a) 
resistance coming from the beneficiaries of the previous order that caused conservative- 
liberal tensions and, b) a very small group of resistant local capitalist strata - which 
Wallerstein called the partisans of the semiperipheral state - who wanted to use the 
state in favour of their interests rather than in the interests of core states and core 
capitalists. However, their social base was very weak. On the other hand, there was no 
need for intermediaries to play sub-imperial roles for core states in this period and 
hence no need to strengthen the GSP states. Accordingly, in the last quarter of the 19th 
century core states penetrated into Africa, Southeast Asia and the Pacific directly rather 
than through intermediaries.
Wallerstein defines the political developments in the interwar period “as one 
grand response to the sense and reality of having been left behind” by core powers 
which scored political and economic successes between 1815 and 1914 (p.37).
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However, economic difficulties also contributed to the establishment of authoritarian 
regimes in GSP. Fascism and corporatism, political and economic nationalism, the cult 
of the state and the revival of ancient glories were the characteristic features of this 
“grand response”. Fascism in the GSP meant three things; a rejection of Anglo- 
American economic and cultural imperialism, a mode of catching up with core 
countries, and the repudiation of the Third International alternative (socialism). In 
contrast to the previous period, internal forces “seeking to benefit from a strong state 
were much stronger sociologically and the efficacy of outside counter pressure much 
weaker because of the world economic difficulties” (p.38). Fascism was also an 
efficient means to contain the workers and their demands.
In the postwar period, the formerly autarkic GSP economies were forced by the 
US economy to reopen themselves to core interests. However, this time reopening also 
meant economic “development” and “modernisation” and this process, slow at the 
beginning, had gained momentum by the 1960s. According to Wallerstein, at this time 
the core zone needed an intermediate sector in the system because as the world- 
economy further expanded and became integrated, many countries appeared which 
could play peripheral roles. The intermediary zone was required to balance the 
demographic weight in the system. That is why GSP were given the semiperipheral 
role. The development and modernisation process which started in this period in GSP 
and which had intensified by the 1960s, and the efforts to link them politically and 
ideologically to the core through NATO and the EC, were expressions of this tendency. 
For Wallerstein semiperipheral states have a different structural content according to 
time and place, and a different social meaning. They can act as both anti-systemic 
thrusts as in the interwar years, and also as stabilisers in the system as exemplified in 
the postwar period. Thus, they become a critical device in the functioning of the world- 
economy.
Wallerstein interprets the recent efforts of GSP governments (both on the right 
and left) to strengthen the state and to improve their relative position in the world- 
economy as attempts to gain secondary (but considerable) economic gains rather to
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block farther core gains for the establishment of a new economic structure at a time of 
interstate core rivalry.
3.4. Giovanni Arrighi
G.Arrighi (Arrighi, 1985) is another scholar who questions the developments in GSP in 
a theoretical and comparative way. He focuses on the patterns of political and economic 
convergences in GSP in the interwar and postwar periods. Arrighi argues that although 
Wallerstein's interpretation of fascism in GSP in the interwar years as “one grand 
response to the sense and reality of having been left behind” has its merits, it does not 
explain the similarities and differences between the experiences of the individual 
countries. He sees fascism in the GSP as more than a response to the sense of having 
been left behind. Specifically, it was a “response to the acute conflicts among and 
within states” which appeared as a result of the eventual collapse of the 19th century 
liberal world order under British hegemony (p.255). Moreover, it was a reaction to the 
Marxist alternative of creating a socialist world order. On the other hand, these 
authoritarian regimes were established and functioned on the characteristic features of 
the interwar years: ‘the failure to establish free trade in the 1920s; the subsequent break 
up of the world market and the resurgence of inter imperialist rivalries in the 1930s; 
and the outbreak of the Second World War’. These developments at the global level 
created a favourable environment for the promotion of both fascist and communist 
ideologies. As semiperipheral countries where social dislocation and extreme dualism 
were prevalent as a result of early industrialisation, GSP countries were the most 
affected ones.
Arrighi emphasises the importance of the extreme dualism in the semiperiphery 
for the rise of fascism. In an environment where a (developing) modem, large scale 
industry existed side by side with a backward social environment full of large reserves 
of pre-industrial wage-labour, the power of labour movements, although potentially 
able to interrupt capital accumulation, was not strong enough to meet counter attacks in 
the work place or in the political arena. The economic mobilisation of a large labour 
army and the political mobilisation and support of other social groups for anti-labour
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policies neutralised the mobilisation of labour movements. The support for fascism 
came from a variety of social groups. However, its main supporters were the urban and 
rural middle classes ‘whose livelihood, security and status were directly or indirectly 
threatened by the combination of workers' power, break down of law and order, and 
intensifying market competition’ (p.256-7). These groups (i.e., small and medium 
entrepreneurs and property holders, white collar employees, unemployed veterans and 
army officers, students and displaced intellectuals) were in favour of a strong state 
independent of both organised labour and capital and, since they had diversified 
interests, the autonomy of the state was easily ensured. However, the success of each 
individual case was largely determined by the kind of relationship between the fascist 
regimes and historically rooted capitalist interests prevailing in the individual country. 
When it comes to the critical question of ‘why fascist regimes emerged in southern 
European semiperipherial countries in the interwar years? ’, Arrighi points out the 
geographical proximity of the region to central and north- western Europe as the 
epicentre of anarchy and the peculiarities of state formation in the GSP countries.
The fascist regimes aimed at internal social harmony through a strong 
corporatist state. Their similar economic policies comprised of a strong currency, 
protectionism/mercantilism, labour repressive corporatism and direct state regulation of 
developmental process. In this context, market rule, liberal democracy and class 
conflict were considered threats to internal social harmony. Furthermore, apart from 
replacing the market through regulating key economic processes, the fascist state in 
some instances provided support and stimulus to the weak capitalist classes.
Arrighi argues that although the Spanish fascist experience was started by the 
Primo de Riveria dictatorship in 1923, it was reversed for a short period in 1931. 
However, in 1936 Franco re-established fascism in Spain through the decisive 
interventions of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and also with the support of peasants 
who were organised by the Catholic Church. In relation to capitalist development, 
Arrighi points to the early anti-developmentalist characteristic of Spanish fascism, but 
also emphasises its eventual shift to a developmentalist line later in the process.
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In the Greek case fascism was not able to consolidate itself in the interwar years 
because of the absence of an industrial structure and a significant labour movement. 
Early Greek capital had been accumulated under the Ottoman administration. Later, 
after the establishment of the Greek state, the Greek Diaspora bourgeoisie living 
elsewhere in Europe constantly improved its position through its formidable sea 
transport fleet. The Diaspora bourgeoisie channelled considerable resources to the 
mainland for the education of necessary human resources and for the development of 
sectors to support Greek mercantile and financial capital. However, in this way the 
Greek state developed a kind of bourgeoisie without having control over it. As a result, 
Greek political elites were not able to create a long lasting fascist regime for political 
and economic regulation.
According to Arrighi, the postwar transitions in GSP also occurred in response 
to acute conflict. These conflicts originated from defeat or quasi-defeat in the war and 
from social movements of protest and of resistance to exploitation. Although a military 
defeat never occurred in Spain, the latter phenomenon played a role in all three 
countries. The common point in the transitions of GSP in the postwar period was the 
resurgence of labour movements in such a way that the existing elites could only 
contain them in social democratic forms of political-economic regulation. (Here, 
Arrighi draws attention to the relatively weak position of the Greek labour movement). 
In fact, Arrighi's main concern is to find answers to the question of ‘why the social 
conflicts of the interwar and postwar periods called forth opposite forms of conflict 
resolution ?’(p.265). In other words, he is interested in ‘why social democratic regimes 
became the form of conflict resolution in the postwar period, in contrast to the fascist 
forms of conflict resolution in the previous period ?’ (p.265). According to Arrighi, the 
answer can be found in the changed patterns of world hegemony and in the 
concomitant transformations in the social structures of southern Europe. To put it 
differently, the establishment of US hegemony with its new world order, and the impact 
of this new hegemonic structure on the social structures of GSP are the causes of 
declining fascist and emerging social democratic tendencies of conflict resolution in the 
region in the postwar era.
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The establishment of US hegemony put an end to the prevailing anarchy in the 
interstate system. In response to the bilateralism of the interwar years, American 
hegemony established the principle of multilateral exchanges and payments between, 
within and, across boundaries. The new liberal world order was significantly different 
from the 19th century liberalism of British hegemony. These differences were reflected 
in the ideological, political and economic spheres. Ideologically, the old liberal 
understanding of a self-regulating market was abolished; the market was now 
considered to be incapable of regulating itself. Instead, the market was perceived as an 
essential instrument to be used against fascism and communism. Accordingly, the state 
began to play a crucial role in the market economy through ‘creating and reproducing 
global, regional and national institutional arrangements’ (p.266). Moreover, it was also 
given the authority of “setting developmental objectives, and of supplementing, 
regulating or even partially displacing market mechanisms” (p.266) for the smooth 
functioning of the market economy. At the political level, Americans established 
multiple interstate organisations; military organisations like NATO, SEATO etc.; 
economic and financial institutions like IMF, GATT, EEC etc., were established for the 
swift consolidation of the principle of multilateral exchanges and payments. In the 
economic sphere, direct investment became the main characteristic of US hegemony. 
Indeed, it was a revolution in the functioning of world economic processes in the sense 
that through direct investment, restrictions on penetration into national markets, the 
exploitation of national resources, and quotas and tariffs were all de facto abolished. As 
long as foreign investment was allowed to operate in national locales and to transfer 
certain amounts of profit out of the country in which it operates, trade restrictions were 
acceptable. Hence, in contrast to the “free-trade” principle of British hegemony, 
Americans established the primacy of “free-enterprise”.
Naturally, these dramatic changes in the global environment led to 
transformations in the policy options of GSP. In the short run US hegemony followed a 
conservative line in the region as a result of its policy of suppressing communist tactics 
and strategies in the US sphere of influence. In other words, the outbreak of the Cold 
War decisively contributed to the survival of the Spanish and Portuguese fascist, and
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the Greek authoritarian regimes. However, in the medium term the new hegemonic 
structure played a reformist role in the region by transforming and undermining the 
pillars of the fascist regimes through market mechanisms. The anarchy in the interstate 
system and the world- economy through which these fascist regimes legitimised their 
nationalist and protectionist policies was over. Thus the reconstruction of the world 
market lost them their ideological and practical strongholds. Their incorporation into 
the new system of multilateral exchanges and payments and the operations of the 
market forces in these fascist regimes which now abandoned their anti-market stance in 
exchange for survival, paved the way for their eventual collapse in the mid-1970s.
The introduction of capitalist rationalisation in these societies radically changed 
the social structures and balance of forces that the fascist regimes rested upon. 
According to Arrighi, US' activities in Europe contributed to the economic and social 
transformation in southern Europe in two ways. First, the US extended aid to the region 
(redistributive measures) in order to relax the balance-of-payments constraints in the 
industrialisation process. Second, the reconstruction, integration and rationalisation of 
central and north-west European economies, which was realised through deliberate US 
policies, generated spread effects in the geographically proximate regions of southern 
Europe. The practice of direct investment further contributed to this process through 
inter-enterprise relations; direct investment, which penetrated the economies of the 
fascist regimes of southern Europe as a result of economic liberalisation, accelerated 
the spread of the most advanced techniques of capitalist production from core to 
semiperipheral countries.
In this new competitive world market characterised by direct investment, West 
European countries took advantage of the low-wage labour supplies of southern 
European peasants. The economic expansion of both Western and southern European 
economies relied heavily on this phenomenon. The peasants became migrant workers 
in the industrial towns of Europe or at home. According to Arrighi, the European 
economies would not have become competitively advantageous in industrial production 
if they had not employed southern European peasants in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs.
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However, these developments led to significant changes in labour-capital relations. As 
the peasant labour reserves in the southern European countries diminished as a result of 
proleterianisation (or through changes in the outlooks and expectations) the power of 
labour increased vis-a-vis the power of capital. This process was experienced in 
southern Europe between the 1950s and 1970s. As market mechanisms further operated 
and the bargaining power of labour consolidated on the basis of capitalist labour 
movement processes after the mid-1970s, the forms of labour control shifted towards 
democratic socialist forms in the region. Accordingly, the political elites of southern 
Europe were also pushed to converge in social democratic regimes. Yet, this 
convergence presents different formulations of democratic socialism depending on the 
different political histories of the GSP countries and their different locations in the 
semiperipheral zone of the world-economy.
3.5. £aglar Keyder
Keyder's approach to the role of the US and Europe in GSP political and economic 
developments in the period between 1945-1974 (Keyder, 1985) is also worth 
mentioning. Like Arrighi, Keyder emphasises US-European relations in the immediate 
postwar years and their spill-over effects on GSP countries. After the Second World 
War one of the important problems of the US economy was industrial overproduction 
resulting from the limits of the market. Hence, the reconstitution of the European 
market in harmony with the spirit of the newly emerging institutionalisation of the 
world-economy seemed to Americans to be the only immediately viable solution for the 
market problems of US goods. However, the European economies were not in a 
position to generate their own means of payment for US exports in the immediate 
future. In other words, while the US had the capacity to export and the ability to import, 
Europeans were not able to import because of their lack of capacity to produce for 
export. The Americans resolved the problem by transferring dollar funds (which was 
the international currency) to Europeans on condition that they would purchase US 
goods in return. This would enable the Americans to solve their market problem, and 
Europeans would start to reconstruct their economies. In time they would be able to 
reach a production capacity to export and generate their own foreign exchange for
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imports. This plan would also serve to consolidate the new hegemonic world order 
which envisaged the supremacy of a multilateral world market free of political control. 
Moreover, through creating internal support in the individual countries, the plan would 
legitimise American hegemony as well.
Accordingly, the Marshall Plan was put into practice and dollar funds became 
available to governments. They were redistributed by the local governments to local 
investors so that capital goods and technology would be purchased from the US. In fact 
the nature of the imports was determined by the 'absorption capacity' of, and the 
'international specialisation' expected from, recipient countries. For instance, while 
German imports were composed of machine goods and foods, Turkish imports 
included capital goods for the establishment of an infrastructure. In this way local 
bourgeoisies first became dependent on the new state managers and legitimised the 
political authorities and second, gave their support to American policies and the 
underlying ideology.
In a relatively short period of time the implementation of this plan led to the 
emancipation of the West European economies from reliance on American funds. In 
other words, they began to reconstruct their economies and to generate their own 
foreign exchange. While none of the GSP countries reached this point, they increased 
the volume of their imports in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Keyder, although 
American aid (official transfer of funds) significantly contributed to close the gap in the 
trade (import-export) deficits of these countries in the 1950s, after the early 1960s 
tourism revenues and workers remittances provided additional foreign exchange (for 
figures see, pp. 142-43). The introduction of tourism revenues and workers' remittances 
as an additional source of foreign exchange reduced the degree of politicisation of the 
economies by the state and freed the local bourgeoisies from dependence on the 
political authority. Here Keyder draws attention to the relationship between the state 
and the economy, and the positions of the local bourgeoisie in the case of Latin 
America, where American aid remained the only source of foreign exchange for 
imports for relatively longer periods of time. In southern Europe, however, additional
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foreign exchange, obtained both from emigrant workers remittances living in Western 
Europe and from the Western European tourists spending their leisure time and money 
in geographically proximate GSP countries, led to the decreasing role of the state in 
redistributing foreign exchange. This, in turn, significantly contributed to the 
autonomous working of the economies. According to Keyder, the advantages of 
geographical proximity to Western Europe did not stop there. The existence of EFTA 
and the EC promoted trade between Western and southern Europe and West European 
capital started to invest in its southern neighbours. As a result, at the end of the 1960s 
the orientation of the GSP economies began to shift from the US to Europe.
At this point Keyder emphasises the spill-over effects on the GSP economies of 
the reconstruction of the north European economies by the Americans. In other words, 
when the West European economies were able to stand on their own feet and hence, 
when they began to run trade surpluses, new sources of foreign exchange became 
available to GSP in the form of tourism revenues and workers remittances to fill the 
gap in their trade deficits (balance-of- payment deficits). Subsequently, Western Europe 
asserted its primacy over neighbouring GSP and this led to the collapse of the support 
given to US policies and local political authorities in GSP countries. In fact, these 
developments coincided with the relative decline of US hegemony and the emergence 
of Europe as a rival seat of power in the world-economy.
Like Poulantzas, Keyder distinguishes between economic elites as European- 
and American-oriented bourgeoisies in GSP countries in parallel with the 
differentiation in the source of foreign exchange funds in the late 1960s. As European- 
oriented bourgeoisie became strengthened, the conflicts with the US-oriented fraction 
over political and economic orientation entered the agendas of GSP and it resulted in 
the collapse of the authoritarian structures (suitable for the US hegemony) and the 
establishment of democratic structures (similar to the West European model) in the 
mid-1970s. Accordingly for Keyder the political histories of GSP in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s can be interpreted as the restructuring of the conflict between these two 
fractions of the bourgeoisie over the state structures.
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3.6. Geoffrey Pridham
G.Pridham is another scholar who studies social change, and more specifically, the 
transition to democracy in the GSP countries (Pridham, 1984). He builds his non- 
theoretical but comparative framework on the question of ‘whether there is a 
Mediterranean model of liberal democracy’. His area of comparison is not limited to 
comparisons between the GSP countries but also extends to a comparison between 
southern European and West European types of democracies. In other words, Pridham 
establishes Western Europe as the yardstick to evaluate the GSP democracies. In this 
way, he introduces a distinction between parliamentary states and liberal democracies, 
emphasising the point that while liberal democracies are characterised by popular 
participation, the articulation of pluralism and existence of political parties (the latter 
performing a vital societal role of mobilisation and expression of demands), 
parliamentary states correspond only to limited and responsible governments. To put it 
differently, liberal democracies include both political culture and political-institutional 
structure.
The formulation of political-institutional and political-cultural spheres 
represents the backbone of Pridham's comparative approach to the study of GSP. In this 
respect the GSP countries, according to Pridham, have successfully established their 
political-institutional structures, such as political parties, democratic elections and - 
albeit with some restrictions- interest groups and other organisations. However, the 
political cultural sphere, which is the other main component of liberal democracy, is 
still in its infancy in GSP. This is mainly because political culture cannot easily be 
revolutionalised in a short time but it transforms itself in an evolutionary way. Thus, 
transformations in the political cultures of GSP, and accordingly the transformations to 
a Western type of political democracy becomes, ceteris paribus, a matter of time.
Apart from these similarities in the internal aspects of regime transition in GSP, 
an important external factor, namely Europe, is also emphasised in Pridham's work. 
The existence of both EC with an integrative framework, and established liberal 
democracies throughout Europe has contributed positively to the transformation of the
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GSP countries - an element which is missing in other parts of the world like Latin 
America. On the basis of these similarities and some other historical convergences, 
Pridham concludes that a 'Mediterranean model' of political development can be 
considered a distinct category to be studied.
In a recent work Pridham has focused on the international context of regime 
transition from dictatorship to democracy in GSP (Pridham, 1991). Pointing to the fact 
that the role of external influences on regime transition has always remained marginal, 
he draws attention to the relevance of studying three regional examples of southern 
Europe, Latin America and eastern Europe in this context. His main concern is to 
examine the linkage between external factors and internal developments comparatively 
in five southern European countries. In order to be systematic and to make his 
framework clear and manageable he confines himself to the 'issue-area' of regime 
change.
3.7. Conclusion
Although these models emphasise the different aspects of the social and political 
changes in the GSP they do not explain the specific interactions between the external 
and internal variables. More importantly, they do not emphasise the specific actions 
taken by the domestic actors of each country in response to the opportunities provided 
and constraints imposed by the systemic-structural changes in the world-economy. 
Furthermore, these studies do not analyse the foreign policy consequences of these 
developments. Accordingly, taking these various models into consideration, in the 
context of world-system analysis, the following country chapters will specifically 
examine the impact of structural change in the postwar world-system on the economic 
and political structures of semiperipheral Greece and Spain. In doing this, I shall 
examine the individual actions taken by the Greek and Spanish economic and political 
elites vis-a-vis the observed changes, and the impact of these actions on the foreign 
policy developments.
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CHAPTER V 
GREECE: 1945-1974
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I shall analyse Greece's semiperipheral development and foreign policy 
in the framework of world-system analysis in the period between the end of WW II and 
the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. In the next chapter I shall turn to the post 
dictatorship period, i.e., from the establishment of democratic rule to the 1990s. These 
two periods of Greek history overlap with the expansion and contraction periods of the 
world-economy respectively. Accordingly, I shall try to show various semiperipheral 
characteristics in relation to these different periods.
In world-system analysis the general foreign policy orientations of 
semiperipheral states in expansion and contraction periods may take different forms. In 
expansion periods they tend to become satellites of a hegemonic power. In other words, 
the foreign policies of semiperipheral states are designed by the hegemonic power and 
their national interests are mostly subordinated to the global and local interests of the 
hegemonic/core powers. However, in contraction periods semiperipheral states may 
change their international alliances, ceasing to be satellites of the hegemonic power. 
Their margin of independence in pursuing their national interests increases. Upwardly 
mobile semiperipheral states may also increase their influence on the management of 
international problems. On the other hand, in both expansion and contraction periods 
intra-semiperiphery rivalries will probably occur for favours from hegemonic and/or 
core powers. When rivalries occur the foreign policies of semiperipheral states are 
either directed toward curbing the inflow of benefits from hegemonic power or core 
states to rival state(s) or, conversely, toward encouraging similar types of favours for 
themselves. Another characteristic foreign policy orientation of (upwardly mobile) 
semiperipheral states is to attempt to play a kind of sub-imperial role in geographically 
and culturally contiguous areas through emphasising their bridge-like positions 
between these and core areas.
In world-system analysis there is a close relationship between the world- 
economy (expansion or contraction phases), the state of the national economy, and the
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politics and foreign policy of a semiperipheral state. In other words, world-system 
analysis provides the global and national economic environments where the main 
directions of the foreign policies of individual states are to be analysed. The world- 
system perspective examines system-wide dynamics as well as national processes. 
Accordingly, developments in these environments are the main source of change in the 
foreign policy direction of semiperipheral states.
In analysing Greek foreign policy in the general framework of world-system 
analysis I shall also refer to Poulantzas' arguments about the internalisation of the 
changing conditions of international economic environment (see chapter 4). Hence, I 
shall use Poulantzas' formulation of the American and European oriented economic 
elites and their struggle for power in relation to US-Europe rivalry. This point is 
important because the US and Europe oriented bourgeoisie can also be identified as 
peripheral and core-like producers respectively in world-system analysis.
Let us begin by defining the national economic environment in Greece in the 
1945-1974 period when the world economic environment was in an expansionary 
phase. This period will be considered the Atlanticist years of Greek foreign policy. 
However, in order to show the correlation between changes in the economic 
environment and changes in foreign policy I shall divide the period into three sub­
periods.
2. The Economic Environment
The state has a central place in the semiperipheral zone of the world-economy. In 
world-system analysis the study of a semiperipheral country essentially means the study 
of its state because the political processes in relation to the economy, i.e., the relations 
between state policies and the accumulation of capital, are the key to observing 
developments in other spheres of activity in semiperipheral countries. The state is more 
important in the semiperiphery than in the core or periphery since it is the main locus in 
which the central economic actors can effectively promote their interests. Thus the 
struggle to control and/or transform state policies is the main activity of semiperipheral
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economic actors: owner-producers (both core- and periphery-like), work force, and 
multinationals, etc.
Nevertheless the process of capital accumulation in the semiperiphery is not a 
one-way phenomenon. In other words, the direction of capital accumulation is not only 
determined through the state oriented activities of different economic actors, but also 
through state policies as well. First of all, the state is not a passive recipient of the 
policies of different economic interests. It may favour the interests of different groups 
which is why different groups fight for influence over state policies. Perhaps a more 
important point is that the state itself may take steps to create opportunities for 
entrepreneurs, and it sometimes takes on an entrepreneurial role itself (Chase-Dunn, 
1989:120). Thus, the state has often become the pioneer of the development process in 
semiperipheral countries with potential upward mobility (Chase-Dunn, 1989:241). In 
the semiperiphery, therefore capital accumulation is a process where both “state- 
oriented” and “state-originated” policies may play important roles.
A cursory glance at the Greek political economy in the 1950s and first half of 
the 1960s reveals that the Greek state intervened in the domestic market in favour of 
the interests of financial and industrial monopoly capital which could be considered the 
periphery-like producers of the country. They were periphery-like in the sense that the 
capital equipment of even large scale industrial units was old or inferior in quality 
(Coutsoumaris, 1963:309) which led to high cost and inefficient production, and hence, 
an unwillingness to compete with foreign and potential new domestic firms (Ellis, 
1964:180).
In this period, one of the main characteristics of Greek industry, which was 
composed of many small and few large firms, was its monopolistic and oligopolistic 
structure (Ellis, 1964:175-79). Almost all the monopolistic and oligopolistic sectors 
were protected against newcomers by the state regulation known as the Expediency 
Licence Law. State intervention was realised primarily through an extensive system of 
permits which were needed for establishing and locating business, and also for making
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changes, such as expanding, merging or moving, etc. (Ellis, 1964:181). The stated aim 
of this policy was to prevent the entry of new firms into saturated fields, but under 
pressure from existing monopolistic firms to retain their privileged positions it was 
misused (Ellis, 1964:180). This is a very good example of how a group of economic 
actors used state mechanisms to control or transform a specific state policy in favour of 
their own interests through political pressure. A striking characteristic of the 
Expediency Licence Law was that it gave related ministers the right to issue the permits 
which in turn led ministers to exercise subjective judgements and considerations based 
on political pressures and personal relations rather than economic criteria (1). Another 
type of state intervention which favoured “peripheral producers” was the tariff system 
and import policy which provided a powerful shelter to inefficient Greek firms against 
competitive foreign products. The protectionist devices used by the Greek state were 
import licensing, import payment controls, preference for domestic producers in 
government purchases, tariffs, and quotas (Ellis, 1964:333).
Although the Greek state provided both internal and external protection to 
domestic monopoly and oligopoly capital this did not lead to increasing investment or 
to the introduction of new industrial technologies which might be considered the 
logical consequence of such protectionist policies. On the contrary, it led to a 
decreasing propensity to invest and a further strengthening of the monopolistic 
structure. More seriously, it discouraged potential investors who could promote core­
like production patterns through using advanced technology.
Another striking feature of the Greek economy was the bilateral monopolistic 
relationship between industrial capital and powerful finance capital. Greek finance 
capital, which was dominated by two commercial banks (The National and 
Commercial Banks) controlling more than 90 percent of all assets and the insurance 
market in the country (Psilos, 1964:186), was the most significant source of private 
finance for entrepreneurs. The relationship between these large financial groups 
(especially the two commercial banking groups) and large scale industrial monopolies 
and oligopolies was turned into a concentration of peripheral interests with the
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participation of the commercial banks' capital in the share capital of many industrial 
firms (Ellis, 1964:197 and Psilos, 1964:189). This intimate relationship between 
finance and industrial capital was consolidated by the dependence of firms upon the 
banks' working capital, the direct or indirect participation of high level bank officers in 
the board of directors of these large firms, and also by the bank's preferential treatment 
in granting loans to these firms, and refusing them to potential rival industrialists (Ellis, 
1964:197).
The relationship between the state and finance capital also revealed interesting 
features. Throughout this period the state exercised considerable authority over the 
banking system by controlling the credit market and maintaining the rules for extending 
credits. Furthermore, the commercial banks for a long time depended on the state's 
central bank for the funds made available by American aid (Halikas, 1978:3-10). 
Moreover, the governor of the National Bank, whose views on economic policies had 
decisive influence, was appointed by the government (Psilos, 1964: 193). It is also 
worth mentioning the influence of finance capital on state policies. Their continuous 
pressure on the state not to allow foreign banks to establish branches in the country so 
that they retained their oligopolistic privileges in the finance market (Halikas, 1978:15 
and 30) (2) and similarly, their stubborn resistance to the establishment of long-term 
semi-state financing institutions via the governor of the National Bank, a state 
appointed official (Psilos, 1964:192), showed their powerful position in the Greek 
establishment. Accordingly, the state's long-term financial institutions, for example the 
Economic Development Financing Organisation (EDFO), were managed in a way that 
could not harm the interests of Greek financial capital. A significant part of their funds 
was allocated to inefficient undertakings out of political rather than economic 
considerations (Psilos, 1964:226). Similarly, although EDFO was established to finance 
the industrial sector, a significant part of its credits went to the primary production and 
agricultural sector (Psilos, 1964:226). The negative attitude of finance capital towards 
the state-owned EDFO became clear when the plan to turn EDFO into a semi-public, 
efficient investment organisation was cancelled because of pressure (Psilos, 1964:192- 
193).
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It was obvious that the web of relations and interconnections between 
(periphery-like) industrial capital, finance capital and the Greek state was perpetuating 
the continuation of stagnant, uncompetitive, labour intensive, old technology and high 
cost production structure in Greece. In explaining why Greece lacked a dynamic 
economy, Ellis argues that the small ruling elite in the political and economic spheres 
had close ties with one other:
The ingrown quality of Greece's small ruling elite, closely 
interconnecting political, financial and industrial circles, is the major 
factor here. Thus, at both levels in Greece, no finance is desired from 
outside the group whether that be the family typically owning a small 
firm or the elite circle controlling the large firms and the banks. (Ellis, 
1964:63).
Consequently, state policies usually promoted the interests of periphery-like industrial 
producers or the latter blocked the state's developmental economic policies.
A third section of capital which occupied a significant place in the political 
economy of Greece in this period came from shipping. Although the financing of Greek 
shipping was dependent on foreign, particularly American, sources (Serafetinidis, 
1979:59), the interaction between the Greek state and Greek shipowners has always 
been close. As Serafetinidis put it:
The Greek state has been the sine qua non factor in the development 
of the Greek shipping industry. The dependence of Greece's shipping 
capital on the Greek state's support and protection is one more aspect 
of the latter's Greek nature... Whether or not some of these shipping 
firms have acquired a multinational character, in the crucial take off 
stage, ... involving competition with shipping firms of other maritime 
nations, and in regard to... finance and taxation, it is to the Greek state 
that they have turned for help. (Serafetinidis, 1979:61).
With American assistance the Greek state contributed decisively to the revitalisation of 
the devastated Greek merchant fleet in the immediate postwar years. Moreover, in 1953
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Greek shipping, like foreign investment, was granted extensive privileges and 
concessions through the foreign investment legislative decree of 2687/1953 (3).
The relationship between shipping and finance capital is also worth mentioning. 
Although Greek finance capital did little to finance the shipping industry directly, it 
gave indirect support through letters of guarantee, assistance in the establishment of 
new companies and intervention in times of crisis (Serafetinidis, 1979:61). Moreover, 
the fact that Andreadis, the owner of the Commercial Bank of Greece was at the same 
time an important shipowner demonstrates the close relationship between shipping and 
finance capital. And when it is added that Andreadis was the state's favourite banker 
(Psilos, 1964:217), the web of Greek political economy becomes evident. Finally, the 
monopoly privileges given to Niarchos, another important shipowner, in the 
shipbuilding industry, and the unwillingness of the state to grant licences to competitors 
in this sector because Niarchos successfully opposed the establishment of a rival firm in 
1963, further underlines the close relationship between the Greek state and shipowners 
(Ellis, 1964:185).
However, the most important actor in the Greek economy at that time was the 
US. The central global aim of US policy makers was the reestablishment of world-wide 
liberal economic transactions. Greece, strategically located at the crossroads of the sea 
and air routes of three continents and the oil-rich Middle East, and with a long 
commitment to western liberal ideology, was a crucial country to be integrated into the 
new liberal economic world order as soon as possible for the smooth recovery and the 
functioning of the system.
Yet the outlook for the Greek economy in the immediate postwar years was 
very grim: the economy was ruined by the Second World War and the civil war, 
without a significant agricultural and industrial structure and production (4). As the 
new hegemonic power of the world economy it became clear to the Americans that 
massive aid would have to be poured into the Greek economy. Accordingly, US dollars 
were extended to Greece through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan for the
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preservation of a liberal ideology and the reconstruction of the Greek economy. 
OEEC/OECD reports between 1952 and 1963 show that this American aid continued 
until the early 1960s.
The terms and the conditions of American aid were set by US officials and 
submitted to the Greek authorities for approval (Kofas, 1990:54). The implementation 
of the aid plan was to be supervised and administered by an American team called the 
American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) which was given limitless authority to 
control the organs of the Greek state and government. AMAG experts included military 
officers, economic advisors, agronomists, engineers, industrial technicians, and experts 
on finance, welfare, transportation and labour relations. They were installed in the 
ministries and other state and governmental agencies to control the implementation of 
aid. Their powers were such that without the approval of the Americans, the Greek 
authorities were unable to take important decisions (Kofas, 1990:55). AMAG gave 
priority to economic and military affairs. In the economy American officials influenced 
monetary, fiscal and commercial policies by dominating important committees, such as 
the Currency Committee, the Foreign Trade Administration, and the Central Loan 
Committee.
The second American economic initiative in Greece came with the European 
Recovery Plan (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan. It was put into practice when 
the Greek-American Co-operation Agreement was signed in 1948 and the AMAG was 
replaced by the Economic Co-operation Administration/Greece (ECA/G). The ECA/G, 
like the AMAG, controlled Greek credit and fiscal policies and hence determined the 
direction of production, capital development, taxes, wages and salaries (Kofas, 
1989:110). Although credit policies were ultimately formulated by the state the 
Americans controlled them through Legislative Decree 588. The second article of the 
law stated that “The Currency Committee shall determine from time to time by its 
decisions the details of the financing of each branch of production, the total amounts of 
credits to be granted and the terms and preliminary conditions under which they are to 
be made available by banks, other credit organisations, or any other kind of public law
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organisation whatsoever, either out of their own funds or out of funds made available to 
them by the Bank of Greece” (5). The ECA/G had the power of both advising and 
directing the Greek government in using aid and in planning, and disposing of domestic 
resources. Furthermore, the Greek government had to inform both the EC A 
Commission and the US government about any development and plan that could affect 
the aid flows.
Nevertheless, the Greek state was given important roles for the distribution and 
implementation of the American aid program, which in turn contributed to the 
development of intimate relations with the Americans and the increase of US influence 
over the political economy of Greece. In this way links were also established between 
the Americans and different factions of the Greek economic elite. First of all, links with 
finance capital were established by depositing American funds in the banking system 
(Halikas, 1978:31). American aid funds which were deposited mostly in the Central 
Bank of Greece closely tied the Americans, state officials and finance capital to each 
other in the process of management and the use of these funds. In the absence of 
domestic savings (6), commercial banks became dependent on the Central Bank whose 
loans were made up of US aid, and on the Currency Committee which was also 
monitored by the Americans for their monetary and credit policies. Under these 
circumstances it was not surprising that the interests of industrial capital were 
incorporated into the interests of other actors especially through the distribution of 
credits. And given the intermingled characteristics of Greek industrial and financial 
capital it became easy to see the established interests between the Americans, the Greek 
state and the finance and industrial capital.
Long-term credits in industry, mostly from direct American aid, were granted 
under the auspices of American officials (Ellis, 1964:272). Thus, it was apparent that 
the Americans were not against the way the Greek authorities distributed American 
funds among Greek industrial capitalists. However, the important point is that US 
funds were distributed to privileged large and old industrial interests which constituted 
inefficient enterprises with antiquated machines and outmoded labour intensive
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production, and entrepreneurs investing in real estate and other speculative areas rather 
than in the modernisation and expansion of their industries - those entrepreneurs which 
we may categorise as “periphery-like producers”. Hence, it is not unrealistic to consider 
this a dependent relationship, and to call those interests the American-oriented 
bourgeoisie.
The relations between the Americans and Greek shipping capital developed in 
parallel to the general practices (Serafetinidis et al., 1981:292). During WW II almost 
75 percent of the Greek merchant fleet had been destroyed. In order to reconstruct the 
shipping sector the Greek government, in collaboration with the American Mission 
(AMAG), prepared a programme and initially American funds were used for this task 
(Serafetinidis, 1979:62). Furthermore, a second decisive step was the purchase of 100 
Liberty type ships from the US government under favourable conditions (7) guaranteed 
by the Greek state (Serafetinidis et al., 1981:294).
US support to Greek shipping capital provided shipowners with the opportunity 
to realise large profits in the international market which made Greece one of the world's 
leading maritime powers. Accordingly, during the 1950s Greek shipowners became the 
major sea carriers of US imports and exports. Furthermore, a significant part of Middle 
Eastern oil was carried by Greek tankers (8). This 'special relation' between the 
Americans and Greek shipping capital benefited both sides: while the Americans were 
anxious to use the centuries-old Greek maritime experience, Greek shipowners made 
immense profits through US protection and preferential treatment. Hence, Greek 
shipowners, whose prosperity depended on their American connections and effective 
American control of the sea routes, were also incorporated into the broad alliance 
between the interests of the Greek economic elites and American hegemony.
Besides US foreign aid, foreign private investment capital was another major 
external actor in the Greek political economy. The foreign capital that flowed into 
Greece was predominantly US private investment capital. American foreign investment 
policy was based on the general principles of postwar global liberalisation, and
123
Greece: 1945-1974
especially on the free flow of capital or foreign direct investment which has been, 
perhaps the most important and innovative aspect of the US designed new economic 
world order. However, although attempts were made to create a favourable climate for 
foreign investment capital in Greece, because of the contradictory protectionist policies 
of the Greek state, the amount of foreign capital in Greece remained negligible until the 
early 1960s.
Economic relations between the USA and Greece were primarily within the 
public sector until the early 1960s. American capital flow into Greece in this period 
took the form of public grants, loans, intergovernmental agreements, etc. But the 
Americans also signed the US-Greek Agreement of 1948 which emphasised the global 
liberal principles of the new economic world order. It included provisions regarding 
private sector relations (Thomadakis, 1980:76-77) which stressed the international free 
trade principle, the avoidance of protectionist policies and anti-trust policies.
The most significant step to liberalise the economy and to attract foreign 
investment capital was taken in April 1953 as a result of American pressure. The Greek 
government devalued the Drachma by a hundred percent and abolished quantitative 
restrictions on imports, special import taxes, and export subsidies. A special law, Law 
Decree 2687 of 1953, was introduced to attract foreign investment capital, and it 
became the basic Greek law for the protection of foreign capital. It was given 
constitutional protection in order to make foreign investment in Greece more attractive. 
It protected foreign investment against expropriation, and made the terms of 
agreements irrevocable to protect against political change and unilateral alterations by 
governments. It also ensured capital mobility by allowing the free repatriation of 
imported capital and remittance earnings. The most important clause covered 
preferential tax treatment. It meant the reduction or waiver of import duties, fees and 
dues of various kinds, and freezing and forgiveness of income taxes on profits.
In this way the formerly autarkic Greek economy was forced by US hegemony 
to reopen to core interests. From this perspective the 1948 US-Greek Economic
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Agreement and the liberalisation policies implemented in 1953, together with the 
accompanying foreign investment law can be seen as deliberate attempts by the US, an 
external actor, to affect the policies of the Greek state in order to promote its global 
interests. The foreign investment was a striking indication of the introduction of the 
American-led new economic world order in the Greek economy.
In the semiperiphery capitalists may have alliances with core powers based on 
their control of peripheral activities, or they may follow independent policies which 
would expand core type activities. Furthermore, the state often plays a dominant role in 
the formation of political coalitions among economic groups (Chase-Dunn, 1989:241). 
As far as Greece is concerned we have seen that the coalition between finance, 
industrial, and to some extent, shipping capital and the US served to consolidation of 
peripheral activities in the economy and the state played an important role in promoting 
the interests of these groups.
3. The Political Environment
Now let us turn our focus from economics to politics in order to see what kind of 
political structure existed in Greece in this economic environment and whether it 
revealed semiperipheral characteristics in the expansion period of the world-economy. 
In world-system analysis during expansion periods semiperipheral countries are 
expected to be subject to high degrees of direct intervention in their internal affairs by 
core states. They tend to become satellites/client states of core powers and/or a political 
agent of the hegemonic power turning ideologically and politically, into its political 
appendage. In this context I shall examine US intervention into Greek internal affairs 
and the reactions of the Greek political establishment.
The politics of the postwar period in Greece was the politics of Greek- 
American relations. All the major Greek political actors and institutions came under US 
influence, and policies were largely dictated by the Americans. The major 
preoccupation of US hegemony was the containment of communism and the Soviet 
Union since communism was seen as the main threat to the legitimisation and
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consolidation of the new economic world order. Hence, anti- communism became the 
central political and ideological reference point around which almost all the 
personalities and issues in Greek politics converged. The Greek establishment was 
turned by its own political actors - the monarchy, the army and the parliament - into a 
faithful political agent for the implementation of anti-Communist policies.
The American view of Greece at this time was that it was a poor country 
devastated during the occupation and war and fighting against a strong internal 
communist insurgency in a geopolitical situation surrounded by three communist 
neighbours, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. If Greece fell into communist hands this 
would be a severe setback for the Americans and for the new economic world order. It 
would mean the loss of US control in the Middle East, Near East and North Africa, and 
it would also encourage other communist groups elsewhere in the world. Hence, the 
Americans concluded that Greece needed urgent and massive American political, 
economic and military aid for the salvation of its future and the survival of the new 
world order under US hegemony. Accordingly, the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine in 1947 marked the beginning of heavy American penetration in Greece (9). 
From this point onwards a relationship was established which can be called 
“Unconditional Atlanticism”.
The monarchy was one of the three elements of the Greek establishment 
through which the Americans established their control over Greek internal affairs. 
Government instability made it almost impossible to fight effectively against the Greek 
communist army. The Americans concluded that apart from military and economic aid, 
Greece urgently needed a stable political body around which anti-Communist political 
forces could unite. Accordingly, in spite of their early criticisms and opposition, the 
Americans turned to the monarchy as a reliable anti-Communist rallying point (10). 
The monarchy was reestablished and the King began to be seen by the Americans as the 
'ultimate guarantor of political stability, military preparedness and loyalty to the western 
alliance' (Iatrides, 1980:67).
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The Americans also established control over Greek parliamentary forces. 
Although the main argument between the conservative and liberal parties before the 
war had concerned the legitimacy of the monarchy (Tsoukalas, 1969:107 and Rousseas, 
1968:84), the new American attitude solved this problem in favour of the King and the 
liberals accepted the legitimacy of the Palace. The outbreak of the Civil War and the 
American demand that the conservatives and liberals co-operated if they wish to 
receive aid removed the differences between these two big political parties and hence 
united the Greek establishment. In fact, the Greek political elite welcomed American 
intervention. They believed that it was only through American aid and protection that 
the devastated economy could be reconstructed and the communist threat prevented. 
From then on the conservatives and liberals/centrists competed with each other for 
American favour. Their support to the Americans was so unconditional that the centrist 
Venizelos told the second secretary of the American embassy that both he and 
Kanellopoulos (Conservative) would abide by the advice given, twice repeating “We 
are desirous of following the instructions of the US government” (Roubatis, 1987:35). 
The Americans frequently intervened in the formation and resignation of coalition 
governments. It became usual for high level American diplomats to tell the Greek 
Prime Minister that he would have to resign (11). In other words governments rose and 
fell through American directives.
In 1952 the Americans, frustrated by the acute instability and talk of “fresh” 
elections, announced significant reductions in American aid. The US ambassador, 
Peurifoy, intervened in order to convert the electoral system from a proportional to a 
majority system. At this time the newly established conservative Greek Rally Party 
headed by ex-chief of the Greek Military Staff, Marshal Papagos, appeared the most 
suitable American ally. Indeed, he had shown his willingness to cooperate by stating 
that ‘Greece exists because the Americans exist’ (12). Accordingly, the majority 
electoral system “advised” by the US ambassador was adopted by the Greek parliament 
and Papagos's conservative Greek Rally came to power with an overwhelming 
majority. A twelve year period (1952-63) of uninterrupted conservative rule began with 
strong and stable governments.
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The army was another important element of the Greek establishment through 
which the US exercised influence, becoming the main bastion of the Americans. It 
always maintained a high degree of autonomy in relation to parliament and the palace. 
The successes of the communists in the civil war and the outbreak of the Cold War had 
forced the Americans to give the Greek army a prominent role against the suppression 
of communism and it was turned into a die-hard anti-Communist institution.
Nothing could be changed in the Greek army without prior consultation and 
approval of the US authorities. Retirements and promotions were decided jointly by the 
Greek government, the Greek General Staff, the American ambassador to Greece, the 
chief of AMAG, and the American General in charge of the US Army Group in Greece 
(USAGG) (Roubatis, 1987:44). Moreover, a Joint United States Military Advisory and 
Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was established to implement new US military plans in 
the civil war. The establishment of JUSMAPG envisaged the elimination of the Greek 
government's say on the question of changes in the Greek General Staff. In this way 
“...the Greek army was transformed into a military establishment made up of Greek 
soldiers and staffed by Greek officers but with foreigners having the final word on its 
make up and operations” (Roubatis, 1987:61). In other words, the army was freed from 
Greek civilian political control and answerable only to its foreign advisor. The 
Americans deemed it imperative for the Greek army to be isolated from society and 
freed from ideological quarrels so that it maintained unity and carried out its duties 
effectively against the communists (Veremis, 1988:242). The position of the army was 
further strengthened by the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent 
incorporation of Greece into NATO. The Greek army, with its own secret service and 
intelligence agency, soon became the central actor fighting against the internal enemy - 
communism. Furthermore, in order to control left wing activities, the Greek 
intelligence agency KYP was founded under the direction of the CIA (Stem, 1977:13). 
The personnel and functions of the CIA and KYP were closely intermingled: the KYP 
was equipped with American technology and its personnel was trained by the 
Americans (Iatrides, 1980:67).
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American intervention into Greek internal affairs was summarised in a 
document which listed the duties to be carried out by the US ambassador to Athens. 
According to this document the US ambassador had ultimate authority over:
(a) Any action by United States representatives in connection with a change in 
the Greek cabinet.
(b) Any action by United States representatives to bring about or prevent a 
change in the high command of the Greek armed forces.
(c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of Greek armed forces.
(d) Any major question involving the relations of Greece
with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the United States.
(e) Any major question involving the policies of the Greek government toward 
Greek political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebelled armed forces, etc., 
including questions of punishment, amnesties and the like.
(f) Any question involving the holding of elections in Greece (Iatrides, 
1980:65).
Thus in the 1950s a stable political environment and a strong coalition between 
the monarchy, army and the parliamentary right was established by the Americans. This 
authoritarian conservatism, which has been identified with the Americans and 
Atlanticism ruled the country (except for a brief period between 1964-65) until the 
summer of 1974. The establishment of political stability was a success for the global 
interests of the Americans. For the next eleven years Greek governments would not 
oppose American interference in Greek internal and external policies even when they 
were in conflict with Greek national interests.
The main political preoccupation of the US in Greece was the suppression of 
communism and communism was understood broadly as any kind of leftist or even 
democratic activity. The loss of Greece to communism or even to neutralism was 
unacceptable to the American designed new world order since it would mean the loss 
of trade and oil routes and other strategic areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle 
East, and North Africa. Moreover if Greece became communist this would set a
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precedent for communist insurgents in other parts of the world. Hence, Greece became 
a politically stable pro-western and anti-Communist state after 1952, and it was 
integrated into NATO. Once internal order and US control were established Greek 
internal politics became less important to the Americans. Priority was now given to the 
country's external relations. Thus it is not surprising that important foreign policy 
decisions were taken in the eleven uninterrupted right-wing years of Greek political 
history.
4. Foreign Policy: Atlanticist Years
I have demonstrated that as a semiperipheral country Greece experienced high degrees 
of intervention in its internal affairs by the US (hegemonic power) and it was turned 
into its ideological and political appendage. We can now turn to Greece's 
semiperipheral foreign policy during the postwar expansion period of the world- 
economy.
In world-system analysis foreign policy does not constitute a separate area of 
inquiry because it is considered a function of the internal and external economic and 
political environments. In the expansion periods of the world-economy, the foreign 
policies of semiperipheral states are thought to be oriented towards the accomplishment 
of the global objectives of the hegemonic power and most of the policies are dictated 
by the hegemonic power. In other words, in the sphere of foreign policy semiperipheral 
states tend to become satellites of hegemonic power in the expansion periods of the 
world-economy.
In parallel to the heavy American influence and intervention in other spheres, 
Greece (except for a brief period in the early 1960s) followed an almost unconditional 
American oriented foreign policy. In other words, Greek foreign policy was designed 
by the Americans to further the integration, consolidation and preservation of the new 
world order. Accordingly, Greece left the formulation and implementation of its 
defence policies to the Americans; sent troops to Korea; joined NATO; signed bilateral 
base agreements with the US; formed a Balkan Pact with Turkey and Yugoslavia; and
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signed an agreement with Turkey and Britain for the creation of an independent Cypriot 
state which was not in conformity with its “national interests”. Finally, it became an 
associate member of the EEC. In the formulation and implementation of most of these 
decisions Greeks were passive and did not raise any significant opposition to the 
subordination of Greek interests to the global and local interests of the US.
From the American perspective, Greece was vitally important for the new world 
order because of its strategic geographical location in the Mediterranean and the 
Balkans. Hence, the territorial integrity and “political independence” of Greece turned 
into a major concern of US policy makers.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the relations between the two Cold War blocs 
deteriorated. NATO was established in 1949 as the major Western defensive institution 
against possible communist aggression. The first Soviet nuclear explosion, the loss of 
China to the communists, the Korean war, increasing Soviet pressure over Yugoslavia, 
and political deterioration in the Middle East caused the Americans to revise their 
global policies. They became much more suspicious of communism. This was soon 
reflected in American policy towards Greece. American support for civil rights was 
abandoned and Greek politicians were encouraged to take tougher measures against 
communists in the US National Security Council Report 103 (Roubatis, 1987:74).
In the external sphere one of the major reflections of the tougher American 
attitude was the admission of Greece into NATO in 1952 despite the opposition of 
some European members. Greek right wing and centrist parliamentary elites attached 
prime importance to NATO membership. During parliamentary debates their 
enthusiasm reached such a point that a leading conservative MP, Kanellopoulos, 
maintained that ‘Greece's membership in the NATO was a very good thing and hence 
prolonged debates on the subject were not required’ arguing that ‘this would insult the 
western allies’ (Couloumbis, 1966:47). On the other hand, the responses of the centrist 
foreign minister, S.Venizelos, to questions during the debate were so uncertain that he 
gave the impression that the government did not know much about the conditions for
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entry into NATO (Couloumbis, 1966:49). The treaty was passed by parliament quickly 
without any serious discussion.
Hence, in 1952 Greece was integrated into the major military institution of the 
new world order by American initiative. However, NATO membership meant that 
defence and security policies and investments would be planned according to the needs 
of the Atlantic Alliance rather than Greece's specific interests. In other words, NATO 
membership would be beneficial only if Greek “national interests” coincided with the 
global interests of the Alliance. This issue came to the surface with the emergence of 
the Cyprus problem after the mid-1950s.
Another remarkable American initiative in this period was the 1953 Bases 
Agreement to establish US military bases in Greece. When the conservative Papagos 
came to power and political stability had been established a bilateral agreement was 
signed on the use of Greek territory by the US armed forces. The conservative 
government considered the agreement beneficial in many ways: closer co-operation 
with the US was ensured and Greek security was enhanced. In fact, however the bases 
were established not in Northern Greece, where the country faced its major threats, but 
on the islands and in the capital (Roubatis, 1987:123). This suited the American 
strategic defence plan for Greece which placed more importance on the islands than on 
the mainland.
The reactions of leading members of the conservative government to the Bases 
Agreement demonstrate that they devoted to a policy of Atlanticism. Foreign minister 
Stephanopoulos argued that “those who were opposed to the agreement should also be 
opposed to Greece's continued membership in NATO since the two were closely 
interrelated...and that if Greece refuses to ratify the agreement she would be expelled 
from NATO” (13). As Couloumbis points out “Greek politicians considered entry into 
NATO a by-product of Greek-US co-operation which had commenced with the 
Truman Doctrine” (Couloumbis, 1966:197).
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The Balkan Pact in 1954 was another American project which consolidated 
Greece's satellite position. One reason for establishing this politico-military pact the 
Soviet hostility towards Greece, Turkey and especially Tito's Yugoslavia. However, 
there was another important American consideration: through this pact Yugoslavia 
would be indirectly linked to NATO, and hence could serve as an example for other 
Balkan and Eastern European countries (Stavrou, 1980:155). In other words, it was 
seen as the means by which the US could infiltrate the communist bloc. From the 
Greek point of view, the pact represented Greece's contribution to US global strategies 
in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and the Greek political elite was eager to contribute.
Greece also had its own national external objectives. In the immediate postwar 
years Greece had territorial claims on its neighbours: “Northern Epirus” (Southern 
Albania) from Albania; an adjustment to the Greek-Bulgarian border; the Dodecanese 
Islands from Italy; and Cyprus from Britain. However, only the Dodecanase Islands on 
the Aegean Sea were ceded to Greece by Italy. The Americans were unsympathetic to 
Greek territorial ambitions in the Balkans and Cyprus, and these demands were 
fmstrated immediately (Coufoudakis, 1987:232).
In this context Cyprus turned into the most striking issue where Greek “national 
interests” were subordinated to the interests of the Atlanticist world order. After the war 
Greek claims for the unification of Cyprus with Greece were opposed by Britain, the 
colonial power. The US had supported the British position. The renewal of Greek 
claims stemmed from the acceleration of decolonization in the British Commonwealth 
in the second half of the 1950s. They were again rebuffed by the UK and the US, and 
attempts to raise the question in the UN were also frustrated by the Americans and 
Greece's other NATO partners. The conservative Greek government was 
accommodating, emphasising the primacy and importance of Atlantic relations over the 
Cyprus issue. The majority of the Greek political elite believed that although 
unification was desirable it should not jeopardise Greece's relations with the US and 
NATO (Couloumbis, 1966:201).
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The strategic location of Cyprus in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean 
made control of the island vitally important for the Atlantic Alliance. The British did 
not want to 1 o se its military stronghold on the island. Moreover, as long as the island 
was open to the use of US army and intelligence services, Americans preferred to see 
British domination rather than unification with weak and vulnerable Greece. 
Furthermore, the increasing neutralist and leftist tendencies in Cyprus made the 
Americans cautious about control of the island.
However, a solution to the problem had to be found in order to reduce anti­
colonial movements, and decrease the nationalistic feelings of both Greeks and Turks 
on the island and the respective mainlands for the sake of the smooth functioning of the 
new world order. The US proposed a partnership between Greece, Turkey and Britain 
to administer Cyprus. This plan was an “embarrassment” for the Greeks because it 
made Turkey another legitimate party on the island. However, succumbing to US 
pressure, all the parties on the island agreed to the establishment of an independent 
Cypriot republic in 1959. Although the agreement was not in conformity with the 
Greek objective of unification, it was ratified in the Greek parliament with a substantial 
majority.
The solution of the Cyprus problem was welcomed by the Americans because 
US global interests, which were jeopardised by the dispute between the two NATO 
members, Greece and Turkey, were maintained. President Eisenhower congratulated 
the premiers of Greece, Turkey and Britain on their agreement which could not ‘fail to 
strengthen and encourage the whole NATO alliance’ (Roubatis, 1987:41). This 
agreement satisfied US strategic needs in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover:
Britain was able to retain two large sovereign bases on the island that 
the US could use, and the listening monitoring stations of the Central 
Intelligence Agency were given permission to continue their 
operations there. Greece and Turkey did not go to war over Cyprus 
and the whole matter was kept away from international organizations 
where other states with interests in the area might have had a chance
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to exert influence that could have endangered American and NATO 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean (Roubatis, 1987:141-142).
Further evidence of Greece's pro-Atlanticist external policy is provided by 
Greek support for US Cold War policies in the UN, where it voted against or abstained 
on the Chinese entry to the UN; the Tunisian complaint over the French presence in 
Bizerte; US intervention in Cuba; total and complete disarmament; the creation of a 
zone free from nuclear missiles and bases in the Balkans and Central Europe (14).
5. An Early Challenge to Atlanticism
In the early 1960s there was a challenge to the established order in Greece from almost 
all directions which led to the collapse of the stability established among the economic 
elites, the political establishment, and the US in the postwar period. These changes 
were reflected in Greek foreign policy.
While the close relations between the dominant economic elites were stable in 
the early 1960s, there was increasing opposition to the monopolistic and oligopolistic 
structures and the state policies which favoured those big business interests. As we 
have seen the credit market conditions which favoured only the largest firms had 
reduced the demand for long-term loans. In fact, it was very difficult for new 
enterprises to gain access to financial resources. The problem was not the lack of loans, 
but their allocation to housing and speculative areas, and the excessive controls and 
formalities on free investment (OECD Report, 1963:35-36).
In 1962 the Federation of Greek Industrialists began to publicise the 
discouraging factors that made it impossible to borrow money (Ellis, 1964:62). It was 
obvious that the existing system was hindering industrial expansion and the inflow of 
new investment capital. This, in turn, resulted in the strengthening of unfair 
competition and non-competitive industries; a dampening effect upon entrepreneurial 
activity; the creation of monopolies; and production with antiquated equipment which 
blocked technical progress.
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Two important developments in the early 1960s were the association of Greece 
with the EEC and the enactment of new incentive laws for the inflow of foreign 
investment capital. The Association Agreement with the EEC was considered a 
revolutionary step (Coutsoumaris, 1963:326). It was thought that it would make the 
Greek economy more efficient and competitive through the modernisation of 
production techniques and equipment. Furthermore, private capital inflow from the 
EEC countries would be increased. However, these developments challenged the vested 
interests of the American-oriented periphery-like traditional economic elite.
The Federation of Greek Industrialists immediately and unconditionally 
supported closer relations with the EEC (Serafetinidis, 1979:230). Most of its members 
were industrialists involved in light industry, and they were unhappy with the industrial 
practices established by the American-oriented traditional economic elite. As we have 
seen in their criticism of the credit system, they made their dislike of the system explicit 
occasionally. They supported a more open system in which they could promote their 
interests more independently. They were not necessarily core-like producers, but they 
acted as if they wanted to become core-like. In 1966, the president of the Federation 
called for the creation of a healthy capital market in Greece (15), arguing that, “Greek 
industry could no longer be owned and ran on a family basis; consequently Greek 
industrialists, like industrialists all over the world, would have to integrate their firms 
into efficient units and finance their enterprises through the capital market”(16). They 
believed that closer relations with the EEC would remove the barriers set by the 
periphery-like American-oriented economic elite.
Although substantial economic growth was achieved under the conditions of 
financial stability during the 1950s (OECD, 1966:31), too little of it had gone to 
transformative sectors of the industry. The structural weakness of the economy 
continued, and chronic deficits in the balance of payments was covered by US 
economic aid until the early 1960s (OEEC/OECD Reports, 1952-1963). Because of 
tight administrative controls and protectionist policies, foreign capital did not invest as 
expected (OECD, 1963:29). The economic situation was not promising. Moreover, the
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Americans were increasingly unwilling to continue economic aid, and Greece had to 
adjust its economy to the economic policies of the EEC as result of the Association 
Agreement. Thus there was no option other than to renew their efforts to attract foreign 
capital.
In fact, this was partly due to covert pressure on the Greek state by the US 
government. The 1953 Foreign Investment Law did not work properly because of 
Greek government intervention in the market. Hence, US aid cuts in 1962 were partly 
an attempt to force the government to open and internationalise the economy so that 
official, state-to-state, American capital could be replaced by private US and 
multinational capital. Accordingly, in addition to Law 2687/1953, parliament passed 
foreign investment laws of 4171/1961 and 4256/1962, which further increased the 
favourable climate for foreign investment in Greece. From then on foreign, especially 
US, capital increasingly began to invest in the Greek economy, and now it went to the 
transformative sectors where the traditional elite was not willing or able to invest (17). 
Thus, about $290 million out of a total of $347 million approved foreign investment 
between 1953 and the end of the 1962, was realised between 1960 and 1962 (Ellis, 
1964:287). Two of these industrial projects (which amounted to $166 million of the 
total $200 million invested in this period) were the Esso-Pappas oil Refinery Complex 
($110 million) and the Niarchos-Pechiney Aluminium Plant ($56,8 million).
The conservative government's policy of granting extraordinary privileges to 
foreign investment capital was opposed by the European-oriented Federation of Greek 
Industrialists. One of the main concerns of the Federation was the loss of the domestic 
market, and accordingly they wanted the government to revise the open door policy so 
as not to discourage domestic initiative (Ellis, 1964:299). The chairman of the 
Federation argued that “ It is not in the spirit of the Treaty of Athens to attached undue 
importance to foreign investment capital which is, of course, welcome in Greece, but 
under equal terms and conditions with Greek capital, as an associate rather than as an 
intruder, as an equal partner rather than as a privileged master” (18). It was clear that
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the Federation was demanding a margin of independence from the Greek state vis-a-vis 
foreign capital.
The liberal Centre Union Party (CU) of Yorgos Papandreou, which promoted 
economic policies similar to those of the Federation of Greek Industrialists, came to 
power in 1964. The CU government, was not against foreign capital providing foreign 
investors were willing to invest in Greece under similar competitive conditions to 
Greek investors (Papandreou, 1967:183). The new government opposed granting 
almost unconditional privileges to foreign capital investment, and wanted to promote 
import substitution industrialisation. Moreover, Y.Papandreou emphasised the 
necessity of breaking up the domestic monopolies (periphery-like production units) that 
had dominated the economy and polity since the end of the WWII.
As soon as it came to power, Papandreou's government demanded a revision of 
the agreements signed with foreign investors by the conservative government. Disputes 
arose, first on the granting of a 50-year monopoly over bauxite; the mining, 
manufacture and distribution of aluminium with Pechiney-Niarchos; and second, with 
Esso-Pappas on privileges to explore for oil and the control of the distribution of its 
profits (Georgiou, 1988:52-54).
The reactions of foreign interests to the CU policy clearly exemplified the 
typical state-oriented policies of a group of (external) economic actors in 
semiperipheral states. It also illustrated the role of the state as an actor in inter-state 
relations. Pechiney called on the French government for assistance and France 
boycotted Greek borrowings from international banks (Georgiou, 1988:53). The US, 
British, and French governments requested Y.Papandreou to change his policy towards 
foreign capital. The American and French ambassadors encouraged rebel CU members 
to put pressure on the government in favour of foreign interests. Niarchos, a 
shareholder in Pechiney, demanded intervention by the King to settle the dispute. 
Andreas Papandreou, a Government minister at the time, in an article in 1972, pointed 
to heavy American pressure on the government in relation to the Esso-Pappas dispute
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(Papandreou, 1972:16). Despite these pressures, Y.Papandreou did not change his 
position. The interesting point, however, was that immediately after his row with the 
King (seemingly over control of the Ministry of Defence- see below) and the 
subsequent resignation of his government, new agreements with increased incentives 
(which would be further enhanced by the military regime after 1967) were made with 
these foreign interests by the new government supported by the King.
Another striking aspect of the new government was its critical stand towards 
what we have called “US-oriented periphery-like capital”. According to Andreas 
Papandreou, in order to increase economic efficiency, the elimination of these 
peripheral monopolies was imperative. First the credit system which favoured a few 
entrepreneurs and businessmen who also had influence over politicians had to be 
changed entirely (Papandreou, 1973:22). Papandreou was also very critical of the poor 
technological and organisational standards of Greek industry, emphasising the need for 
modernisation and the establishment of rationality in all aspects of economic life 
(Papandreou, 1973:121). This indicates that the economic policies of the CU 
government were directed towards promoting the interests of existing and potential (but 
weak) “Europe-oriented, core-like producers” who had found themselves a place in the 
Federation of Greek Industrialists. In 1967, just before the elections which were 
prevented by the military takeover, A.Papandreou stated that “The long run target of a 
democratically elected government should be the formulation of a new balance among 
the existing powers that will allow the government to promote the economic 
development of the country beyond the realm of vested interests, beyond the values of 
establishment (Papandreou, 1967a: 171-72)...[in order to] lay the foundation for a free, 
democratic progressive, modem European nation” (Papandreou, 1968:185).
The policy of the CU government was focused on the steady elimination of the 
existing US-oriented peripheral capitalists, and of the excessive privileges of US 
dominated foreign investment capital while supporting and co-operating with the 
Europe-oriented core-like elements which aimed at modernising and rationalising the
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Greek economy. It was clear that the economic policies of the CU government 
threatened the basic pillars of the established system.
Perhaps the most striking development of the 1960s was the emergence of 
Europe (especially the EEC) as an important actor in Greek affairs. Once the 
Association Agreement with the Community was signed it became an important source 
of financing of the debts and the development programme of Greece (OECD Report, 
1963:34). Thus Greece received a loan of $125 million for a period of five years. The 
balance-of-payments deficits which had been covered by American aid until the 1960s 
now began to be offset mainly through the remittances of Greek emigrants working in 
the major industrial centres of Europe and the increasing inflow of European tourist 
receipts (OECD Report, 1964:17; 1967:33 and Maddison et al.,1966: 81). With regard 
to the geographical pattern of trade (import-export), there was a steady shift away from 
the US towards EEC countries (OECD Report, 1964:25). Moreover, Greece was 
granted credits amounting to $90 million by the European Monetary Fund in 1966 
(OECD Report, 1967:33). Similarly, foreign capital investment approvals from EEC 
countries increased significantly after the Association Agreement (Serafetinidis, 
1979:231).
All these developments indicated the beginning of a change in the established 
economic mechanisms in Greece. The increasing involvement of Europe in the Greek 
economy coincided with the emergence of a new kind of economic actor (European- 
oriented elements in the Federation of Greek Industrialists) and economic policies 
(Y.Papandreou Government) who was critical of the actors (US-oriented periphery-like 
elements) and practices of the previous period (economic policies of the conservative 
government). In broader terms, while the latter economic actors can be called “US- 
oriented peripheral interests” which collaborated with conservative governments, the 
new group can be labelled “European-oriented core-like” interests accompanied by a 
progressive government.
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These developments were echoed in the political sphere. In fact external and 
internal developments led to the challenge by part of the parliamentary elite (European- 
oriented parliamentary elements) to the political orientations of the Greek state, which 
had been practised since the end of the WW n. However, this did not mean a unified 
challenge of the Greek political establishment, which was composed of the King, the 
Army and the Parliament, but was limited to a section of the parliamentary elements. 
Accordingly, the remaining part of the Greek establishment together with the US 
strongly opposed this challenge. Consequently, it was extinguished in a short period of 
time. But it was the first signal of a bigger challenge which would occur in the 
contraction period of the world-economy in the mid-1970s. Let us look more closely at 
the political developments.
In the early 1960s it became clear that the political stability of the 1950s, and 
the balance established between the King, Army and Parliament under the supervision 
of the US was coming to an end. The central problem was a clash between the 
developmentalist, progressive and European-oriented political elite of both right wing 
and centre parliamentary groups and the anti- developmentalist, authoritarian, status- 
quo and US-oriented King, Army and the parliamentary elites of both right wing and 
centre. This division more or less overlapped with the respective positions of “Europe- 
oriented core-like capitalists” and “US-oriented periphery-like producers”.
In the conservative camp, Prime Minister Karamanlis, despite his anti- 
Communist and pro-American credentials, began to resist US influence and 
manipulation, and to act independently of the King (Couloumbis et al., 1976:134). He 
was resentful of the army's independence from civilian authority, and the prerogatives 
of the Monarchy (Clogg, 1986:179 and Serafetinidis, 1979:240). Moreover, he had 
signed the Association Agreement with the EEC. In 1963, however, his moderate 
challenge to the establishment forced him to leave for self-exile in Paris until the 
collapse of the military regime in 1974. The developmentalist progressive right wing 
parliamentary elite converged around Kanellopoulos who argued the need for 
modernisation in the Greek right and expressed approval of German social democracy
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(Katris, 1971:295). It was probably because of the increasingly moderate and 
progressive attitudes developed within the conservative movement that the military 
regime, established in 1967, oppressed not only CU politicians but also progressive 
elements of the conservatives (ERE) as well. However, the main challenge came from 
the developmentalist progressive and Europe-oriented parliamentary elite of the Centre 
Union.
Y.Papandreou's Centre Union government remained in power from February 
1964 to July 1965. It was a major problem both for the Greek establishment and its 
authoritarian-repressive political system, and for global American interests in the 
Eastern Mediterranean because of its anti-military, anti-royalist, anti-American and 
anti-NATO policies. After the advent of the Centre Union to power it became clear to 
the establishment and the US that they could not easily maintain the political system 
established after WW H They were alarmed by attempts to purge the ultra-rightist 
IDEA group from the army, to remove rightist officers from key positions to the border 
points (Mouzelis, 1978:126), and to bring the KYP under control through replacing its 
personnel (Roubatis, 1987:197). The replacement of KYP personnel had annoyed the 
CIA chief in Athens. He began to complain that Russian agents had infiltrated the 
KYP, and the CIA stopped informing the KYP about its operations in Greece 
(Roubatis, 1987:197).
However, the most important problem was not Y.Papandreou but his son, 
Andreas. From his first days as a minister in his father's government, Andreas became 
the main troublemaker. He began to investigate the relationship between the KYP and 
the CIA, and when he was convinced that his and his father's telephones were tapped by 
the KYP/CIA, he established his own intelligence service and put the CIA officials in 
Athens under surveillance (Stem, 1977:24). Furthermore, his uncompromising stand 
and unusual statements in handling the fragile Cyprus issue made him the major 
opponent of US policies in the eyes of the Americans. He was also very outspoken 
against the King and the army, calling for restrictions of the King's powers and the 
political neutralisation of the army. Within a short time Andreas had became an
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obsession of US policy makers. When high level American officials were assigned to 
Greece, they were indoctrinated about Andreas beforehand (Stem, 1977:25). In a CIA- 
prepared file he was described as a serious danger to United States' interests in Greece 
(Stem, 1977:25).
The tension between the Papandreous and the establishment and the Americans 
turned into a crisis when Andreas was accused of leading a leftist conspiratorial group 
in the army known as Aspida. Y.Papandreou attempted to dismiss high ranking officers 
from the army and demanded the resignation of his defence minister, who had been 
secretly assigned by the King to investigate the Aspida affair. He hoped to put the 
defence ministry under his own portfolio in order to establish civilian control over the 
army. This was unacceptable to the establishment. The defence minister, Garofoulias, 
refused to resign and the King would not accept Y. Papandreou's assumption of office 
of defence minister. Subsequently, when Y.Papandreou's bluff to resign was called by 
the King, and when 49 Centre Union deputies split from their party in favour of an ERE 
government, the short but eventful period of Centre Union government came to an end.
The Aspida affair and the downfall of the Centre Union government was a 
Royal manoeuvre in order to return to the orthodox domestic policies of the pre- 
Papandreou period and to follow a less adventurist, and a more US and NATO 
oriented, foreign policy (Couloumbis et al., 1976:130). The Americans supported the 
King against Papandreou and encouraged an atmosphere of political crisis. An 
American officer who worked in Greece at the time told the New York Times in 1974 
that J.Maury, the CIA chief of station in Greece in 1962-68, had helped King 
Konstantine to bribe Centre Union deputies so as to topple the Papandreou government 
(Roubatis, 1987:185 and 189).
Both father and son Papandreou rejected American proposals for the solution of 
the Cyprus problem and firmly supported the Non-aligned Greek Cypriot President, 
Archbishop Makarios. This annoyed American policymakers. Furthermore, 
Papandreou's and Makarios' flirting with the Soviet Union, and Andreas' call for an
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anti-American, anti-NATO, and neutralist foreign policy aggravated American mistrust 
of the Centre Union government. Consequently, when Papandreou attempted to 
establish civilian control over the army, the main US stronghold in Greece, thereby 
challenging the post-war pro-American royalist-conservative-authoritarian coalition the 
Centre Union government could not be allowed to remain in power. A.Papandreou 
described the position of the Centre Union as follows:
...The party clashed with the Americans over the settlement of the 
Cyprus issue. It clashed with the King over his prerogatives, especially 
over those related to the leadership of the Armed Forces, for he was 
stubbornly committed...that the civilian government should have no 
substantive say over the Armed Forces. It clashed with 'parallel 
government' of Greece including the Americans, over the control of 
the...[KYP]...It clashed with the economic oligarchy of the country 
over a reformist and expansionist development policy, and with the 
large foreign investors who had obtained almost colonial terms 
(Papandreou, 1973:22).
The downfall of the Centre Union government, however, paved the way for 
political instability. No strong government could be established while mass support for 
Papandreous was growing. Demonstrations and strikes occurred which implied that the 
Centre Union would come to power with an overwhelming majority in the coming 
elections. At the same time, both Papandreous were attacking the King, the army, 
conservatives and the Americans, arguing that before the implementation of a reform 
oriented programme, the distribution of power in the state had to be changed. To this 
end, according to the Papandreous:
The king would have to learn to restrict himself to the constitutional 
limits of his authority; the army would have to learn to obey the order 
of the lawfully elected government; the Americans would have to 
learn that Greece belong to Greeks, that it was an ally but not a 
satellite; and the Greek oligarchy would have to adjust to the fact that 
the interests of the Greek people at large, and not only their own 
special interests, would be served by the government (Papandreou, 
1973:24).
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The increasing popular support for the Papandreous alarmed the establishment 
and the Americans. The King feared that an overwhelming Centre Union victory would 
bring an end to the Greek Monarchy. The Americans thought that a Centre Union 
electoral victory would bring an end to the US presence in Greece, and hence would be 
a major setback to US global interests. Maury, the CIA Station Chief in Greece, 
enunciated the CIA's conclusion “that a victory by the Papandreous would seriously 
damage the vital US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean area, weaken the southern 
flank of NATO and seriously destabilise the delicate Turkish-Greek relations then 
severely strained by the Cyprus situation” (Stem, 1977:37). The election was set for 
28th May 1967. However, it was pre-empted by the Colonels' Coup on 21st April.
The challenges in the economic and political spheres to US oriented policies 
were immediately reflected in Greece's external relations. From the semiperipheral 
policy perspective, this period was a brief exception in the broader period of 1945-74 
which we defined as the satellite, Atlanticist years of Greek foreign policy. However, 
despite the challenge to Atlanticism, we should bear in mind that American 
intervention in Greek affairs did not come to an end. We should also not forget that 
these abortive challenges to US interests coincided with the increasing role of Europe 
in the world and in the Greek economy.
The brief challenge to Greece's Atlanticist foreign policy line focused on the 
Cyprus issue. Although an agreement had been reached in Cyprus, neither mainland nor 
Greek Cypriots were satisfied with its terms. Greeks believed that the agreement had 
been made in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance (that is the US) without taking Greek 
aspirations into consideration. Moreover, the Turks had become a principal party in any 
decision on the future of the island. The dissatisfaction of Makarios, the Greek Cypriot 
president, came to the surface as early as 1963 when he declared his unilateral revision 
of the constitution. However, this turned Cyprus into a major problem again in the 
Eastern Mediterranean which threatened US global interests: suddenly the status-quo 
on the island was abolished and Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, came close to
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war. A war between Greece and Turkey would be a serious blow for the Atlantic 
Alliance and it would provide opportunities for Soviet exploitation.
American policy towards Cyprus was focused on preventing an ethnic conflict 
and a Greco-Turkish war (Coufudakis, 1980:108). A second aim was to maintain the 
unity of NATO's southern flank. Third, the US wanted to avoid Soviet involvement in 
the conflict, to control Makarios' non-aligned policy, the support he received from the 
Cypriot communist and leftist parties, and his reliance on the UN to promote the policy 
of self determination.
In sharp contrast to the foreign policy of conservative governments, Greek 
foreign policy under Y.Papandreou's CU government conflicted with American 
interests in the region. Although Papandreou accepted Greece's existing alliances, he 
declared that Greece was no longer a satellite but a sovereign nation free to develop its 
own foreign policy in accordance with its long-term interests. He gave full support to 
Makarios' policies. For him, Cyprus, the primary national issue of Greece, could not be 
sacrificed to the interests of the Atlantic alliance. He was very outspoken in his dealings 
with the Americans on the Cyprus issue which angered them (19).
Y.Papandreou argued that Cyprus had to be discussed in the UN rather than in 
NATO and refused all American efforts to arrange a meeting between Greece, Turkey 
and the US to resolve the problem. Furthermore, he sent 20000 officers and men to 
Cyprus, well above the permitted number of 950 Greek soldiers on the island 
(Papandreou, 1973:134). He remained silent when Makarios contracted with the 
Soviets for the delivery of substantial war material (Papandreou, 1973:143) and he 
would not allow the Greek armed forces to participate in NATO exercises. Despite US 
and NATO pressure, he planned to reduce military expenditure and declared that his 
government would welcome Soviet assistance in preparation for a possible war against 
Turkey (Rousseas, 1968:29). The Americans were worried that a Papandreou victory in 
the coming elections would lead to Greece's withdrawal from NATO, and the removal 
of US bases and US communication centres (Stem, 1977:36).
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6. The Restoration of US Influence: The Colonels Come to Power
The establishment of the military regime in 1967 opened a new phase in the political 
economy of Greece. Despite the emergence of weak “European-oriented core-like” 
domestic interests before the military takeover, state-economy relations were 
dominated by “US-oriented periphery-like” capitalists. During, the Y.Papandreou 
period Europe-oriented interests had controlled both government and a part of the 
parliament briefly. However, the advent of the Colonels restored the balance in favour 
of foreign capital and its collaborators. Furthermore, given that interests of those 
“periphery-like” producers and foreign capital had been challenged by the CU 
government and that they were allies of the US, it can also be argued that the military 
takeover in Greece in 1967 was a high level state oriented policy of foreign interests in 
co-operation with indigenous US-oriented groups.
Although almost all the major economic interests supported the coup, the main 
winner was foreign capital. The minister of economic co-ordination of the Junta 
declared this from the outset, stating that “the state attributes particular importance to 
the influx of foreign capital. What interests us is the application of a development 
policy and not the conversion of the country into a testing ground for theories” (Shawb 
and Frangos, 1973:28). It was true that if Greece was to follow a developmentalist 
policy, capital would have to be invested into key sectors of industry. Thus, if 
indigenous capital was unable or unwilling to invest in these sectors, foreign capital had 
to be given the necessary incentives. Accordingly, the Greek state became less selective 
about foreign capital and more willing to extend concessions (Pesmasoglou, 1972:97). 
Under new legislation (89/1967, 378/1968, 916/1971) foreign capital was given 
reinforced constitutional guarantees for the servicing and export of profits on 
investment. The extra privileges granted to the two giants, Esso-Pappas and Pechiney- 
Niarchos after their interests had been restored by the King showed the eagerness of the 
military regime to cooperate with foreign capital.
The military regime also gave preferential treatment to shipowners. They were 
granted incentives not only for their shipping interests but for their participation in
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industrial undertakings (Clogg and Yannopoulos, 1972:xiii). Accordingly, these 
shipping interests, which are sometimes called “comprador bourgeoisie” (Poulantzas, 
1976 and Georgiou, 1988) co-operated with foreign capital and became partners in the 
large industrial undertakings operating in key sectors of industry. Well-known families 
in this group were the shipowners On&ssis, Niarchos, Andreadis, Karas, and Livanos 
(Georgiou, 1988:75).
While foreign capital invested in key industrial sectors which require high- 
technology and specialisation, areas of secondary importance were left to Greek 
enterprises (20). Furthermore, both Greek-controlled enterprises and joint ventures 
became dependent on foreigners in many respects: they were dependent for foreign 
technology, imported intermediate and raw materials, spare parts, the introduction of 
new products, and for the distribution of the company's products abroad through the 
foreign partners' networks (Thomapoulos, 1975:40).
Thus while Greek entrepreneurs were deprived of the opportunity of becoming 
core-like producers' and given secondary roles, US local and global economic interests 
consolidated their position in Greece. 40 percent of the total foreign investment in 
Greece was American capital (Thomapoulos, 1975:41) and this showed the degree of 
vested American interests in Greece. From the American perspective, the penetration of 
US capital in Greece was a requirement of the world order identified with the free flow 
of capital or direct investment. Hence consolidating and preserving US capital was 
vitally important to US foreign policy makers. The Greek colonels were more than 
helpful in this task. Accordingly, the US supported the military regime. A significant 
indicator of this policy was the visit of US Secretary of Commerce, M.Stans, to Athens. 
During his visit he said “We in the US government, particularly in American business, 
greatly appreciate Greece's attitude towards American investment, and we appreciate 
the welcome that is given here to American companies and the sense of security that 
the government of Greece is importing to them” (Goldbloom, 1972:251). Moreover, 
President Nixon wrote to the chief of Junta, Papadopoulos, congratulating him on the 
economic progress of the military administration (Woodhouse, 1982:195).
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In world-system analysis it is argued that semiperipheral countries play the role 
of economic transmission belts in times of expansion. Greece played this role after the 
inflow of foreign capital from the mid-1960s onwards. Foreign-controlled enterprises in 
Greece exported large proportions of their products not only to traditional Greek 
markets but also to their home or European markets: Phillips to Holland and Siemens 
to Germany; ITT to Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and France; Ethyl Corporation to 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East; Republican Steel to Britain, the USA, 
W.Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and Romenia; Union Carbide to Italy, Belgium, Finland, 
Sweden and Austria; Westinghouse to the Middle East; and Pechiney to European and 
Middle Eastern countries (Georgiou, 1988:67-68).
Although America was the leading actor in the Greek economy, Europe's role 
also increased in this period. The remittances of Greek workers in Europe and tourist 
receipts continued to offset the chronic balance of payments deficits (OECD Reports, 
1967 to 1975). Moreover, the amount of European investment capital also increased. 
Individual firms from European countries invested in different sectors of the economy 
(Negriponti-Delivanis, 1985:289-300 and Georgiou, 1988:67-68). The largest European 
investors were France (27%) and Switzerland (13%) (Thomapoulos, 1975:41).
However, despite the increasing role of European private capital, the EEC as a 
whole, in sharp contrast to the US downgraded its relations with the Colonel's Greece. 
The initial response of the Community to the establishment of the military regime was 
to limit the Association Treaty to its current administration. Discussions on agricultural 
harmonisation were stopped and the remaining $56 million EEC loan out of $125 
million, agreed in the financial protocol of the Association Treaty, was frozen. 
Moreover, the EC Mediterranean policy negotiated new agreements with other 
countries in the region with similar export structures, and downgraded the Greece's 
privileged position Greece in the Community.
In the political sphere the Greek state continued to be a political and ideological 
appendage of the US. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the increase of
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Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, American foreign policy focused on the 
containment of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the 
Mediterranean. Moreover, Middle East events which included wars and continuous 
tension between the Arabs and Israel, and where Cyprus remained an explosive issue 
between Greece and Turkey, putting the oil regions and trade routes into danger, made 
the control of Greece imperative for American interests.
In the period between 1967-74 the Americans intervened in Greek politics and 
controlled the state through the Army. In the political sphere, the parliamentary forces 
which had challenged vested interests (particularly the father and son Papandreous) 
were eliminated. In the economic sphere the obstacles to US capital were removed. In 
the foreign policy sphere, tensions over the Cyprus problem were reduced and Greece 
became more servile to American interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
The Army was the stronghold of the Americans within the Greek establishment. 
Between 1950 and 1969, 1,1229 Greek military personnel were trained in the US, and 
another 1,965 Greek students were trained in overseas US installations under the 
Military Assistance Programme (Couloumbis, 1976:126). Furthermore, the coup 
leaders were top KYP men (Stem, 1977:45), an institution established, administered 
and financed by the CIA (Papandreou, 1972:16).
The Colonels had some small effective internal support from the economically 
powerful group of shipowners and internationally oriented financers, as well as from 
some highly conservative sections among the peasants (Ioakimidis, 1984:36). The first 
two groups were mostly Greek-Americans, and they were very influential in US policy 
towards Greece. Onassis, Niarchos and Pappas were the leading members and they 
invested heavily in the Greek economy. Among them, Pappas was a close friend and 
the main financial backer of Spiro Agnew, President Nixon's vice-president. He had 
also been President Eisenhower's finance manager in 1956. Thus Pappas played a very 
useful liaison role between the Colonels and the Nixon administration (Woodhouse, 
1985:31). He had very good contacts with various organs of the US establishment (21).
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However Colonels could not consolidate themselves in the Greek society as a whole 
and hence they functioned in a political vacuum.
Although the Colonels did not succeed in establishing their domestic 
legitimacy, the Americans provided crucial external support for their survival (Clogg 
and Yannopoulos, 1972:xvi). They remained loyal to the US and NATO interests and 
co-operated closely with the Americans. The American administration, in turn, 
tolerated and defended the continuation of the military regime despite strong opposition 
from the US Congress and Europe (22). The Colonels proved so accommodating that 
the American administration was indifferent even to the King's failed counter coup 
against the Colonels only eight months after the advent of the dictatorship. 
Furthermore, despite his close relations with the Americans in the past, Nixon refused 
to see the King during Eisenhower's funeral in 1966 but he did meet with Pattakos, one 
of the principal members of the Junta (Woodhouse, 1982:191). The Americans no 
longer needed the King to ensure stability. On the contrary, they feared that the King 
might be the source of further instability, and they did not want to risk this in a period 
of increasing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe and the 
escalating Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.
However, as in the economic sphere, there was a steady increase of European 
influence in Greek politics, and especially among progressive elements of both right 
and centre. A significant development was the establishment of a common platform 
between progressive conservative and centre groups against the military regime. They 
converged around Kannelopoulos of the conservative RU (Radical Union) and Mavros 
and Zighidis of the CU (Yannopoulos, 1972:168). This rapprochement was encouraged 
by pressure from European conservative and social democratic circles who wanted the 
creation of an alternative centre of power (Yannopoulos, 1972:168). Furthermore 
Karamanlis, the conservative former prime minister in exile in Paris since 1963, called 
for the overthrow of the Junta in a letter in which he accused the Junta of causing 
Greece's exclusion from the emerging European grouping - a situation which would be 
detrimental to the economy and Greek national security. He was supported
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wholeheartedly by leading pre-coup progressive conservative and centrist parliamentary 
elites (Schwab and Frangos, 1973:116 and 119). Given these developments it is not 
surprising that why the Colonels' oppression extended to liberal conservative elements. 
On the other hand, the Junta's rage against Europe had come to a head after Greece was 
forced to withdraw from the Council of Europe. The Junta controlled press, while 
praising the US as Greece's only trustworthy friend, strongly attacked the European 
nations (Katris, 1971:309). It was apparent that a clash between Atlanticism and 
Europeanism was imminent.
The military regime further reconsolidated American interests in Greek foreign 
policy at a time of increasing tension in the Mediterranean, Central Europe and the 
Middle East. In other words, Greek foreign policy continued to play the semiperipheral 
satellite role which had been interrupted briefly during the Papandreou period. Indeed, 
the Junta proved that they were the best option for US interests in Greece. Only two 
months after the Colonels' Coup, the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel broke out, 
demonstrating the importance of US facilities in Greece for the defence of Israel. 
Furthermore, during the crisis the Junta fully co-operated in evacuation of 3000 
American citizens from the troubled area. With the closure of the Suez Canal by the 
Arabs after the 1967 war and the rapprochement between the Egyptian president, 
Nasser, and Moscow, Soviet influence began to increase in the region at the expense of 
the US. Hence, Greece was an even more important military base and logistical asset 
for the Americans (23).
Immediately after the Junta took power the US Administration imposed an arms 
embargo on Greece in order to force the Colonels to return to the status-quo ante as 
soon as possible. However, although the delivery of heavy arms was halted, the supply 
of weapons suitable for internal security continued and in 1968 the ban on heavy 
weapons began to be lifted progressively. In September 1969 the US National Security 
Council came to the conclusion that the Nixon Administration should restart full scale 
military assistance to Greece so that it could fulfil its NATO obligations (Stem, 
1977:58 and 67). This decision was not made public until September 1970.
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The overthrow of the Libyan monarchy by Colonel Gaddafi in 1969 further 
increased the importance of Greece because Gaddafi wanted the Americans to evacuate 
the US air force base in Libya. Another crisis occurred in 1970 with the expulsion of 
Palestinian commandos from Jordan into Syria. The US 6th Fleet intervened in order to 
prevent another war using the US bases in Greece and Greek territorial and air space 
(Couloumbis et al., 1976:138). Furthermore, tension and uncertainty increased with the 
death of president Nasser of Egypt and his successor Sadat's initial inclinations for an 
alliance with the Soviet Union. And when the Labour Party of Malta came to power in 
1971 under the leadership of Dom Mintoff, who declared that he would not allow 
NATO ships to use the harbour of Valetta, the need to improve American military 
facilities in Greece became more urgent (Woodhouse, 1985:96). Consequently, the 
Americans demanded home port facilities in Athens for the US 6th Fleet in order to 
retain a full US presence in the region. US Assistant Secretary of State R.Davies 
maintained that this would promote stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and enable a 
peaceful settlement in the Arab-Israeli dispute (Woodhouse, 1985:106). The agreement 
was signed in 1972 and the American military presence in Athens was more than 
doubled by 10,000 naval personnel and dependants (Stem, 1977:72).
When the 1973 Yom-Kippur War broke out between Egypt and Israel Greece 
declared its neutrality in the conflict. However, Greece continued co-operating with the 
US, allowing them to use communication facilities in Greece, and also airports in 
Athens and Souda Bay in Crete. No restrictions were placed on the movements or the 
resupply of the 6th Fleet. It is thus clear that US enjoyed close co-operation with the 
Greek Colonels in the Mediterranean throughout the dictatorship between 1967-74.
These developments in the Eastern Mediterranean in the second half of the 
1960s made Cyprus much more important for the security of the region and for US 
global interests. This necessitated an urgent solution to the island's problems. On this 
issue the Colonels also proved accommodating and they clashed directly with 
Makarios. Whereas the Colonels were willing to give up a small part of the island to 
the Turks in return for the unification of the rest with Greece, Makarios was strongly
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opposed to any solution which would divide the island into two and bring it under US 
and NATO control. He firmly defended the “independence” of the island. In the eyes 
of the Colonels, Makarios was “a traitor to enosis (unification), a red priest who flirted 
with the local communist party, championed nonalignment, and consorted with such 
dubious Third World figures as Tito of Yugoslavia, and Nasser of Egypt, not to 
mention friendliness with Moscow” (Stem, 1977:86).
Despite Makarios' objections the Colonels agreed with the Turks to negotiate 
over Cyprus and engaged in secret talks during NATO conferences to find a formula 
for mutual action to resolve the problem (Stem, 1977:90-91). They withdrew the Greek 
troops which had been illegally infiltrated on to the island since 1963. Meanwhile 
Makarios' firm stand against a US-NATO sponsored solution, and his pro-Soviet and 
pro-Arab policies, annoyed the Americans. President Nixon called him a 
“Mediterranean Castro” and Kissinger said that he was an enemy of Israel 
(Woodhouse, 1985:155).
The Americans supported the military regime in Greece because the Colonels 
were extremely co-operative in promoting US global interests. For the Colonels, on the 
other hand, American support was their only source of survival and the legitimacy 
which they desperately needed both in the internal and external spheres.
At the same time, however the European role in Greece's external relations was 
increasing. In contrast to the Americans, the Europeans limited their relations with the 
Colonels. The European Community, the Council of Europe, and individual European 
states focused their reaction on the repressive nature of the military regime and the 
immediate return to democratic rule. The EC, for example, suspended the Association 
Agreement with Greece. The EC's negative stance to the Colonels' regime led to the 
isolation of Greece in Europe. The Council of Europe, on the other hand, focused on 
the serious and systematic breaches of human rights under the Junta. The reports 
submitted to the Council concluded that the Colonels' regime was undemocratic, 
illiberal, authoritarian and oppressive (Woodhouse, 1986:289). Hence the
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as early as 1968, voted for the 
expulsion of Greece from membership unless democracy was restored before spring 
1969. Accordingly, after the negative report prepared under Dutch chairmanship in 
1969, the Assembly called for Greece's resignation from the Council. US embassies in 
the European capitals began to lobby against Greece's expulsion, but without success 
(Woodhouse, 1985:71). Since expulsion would be a humiliation, the Colonels 
withdrew Greece from the Council in 1969.
As for individual European countries, the Danish government was the first to 
condemn officially the establishment of the military regime and its repressive policies. 
Later, the Norwegian and German governments joined the Danish, and together they 
tried to raise the Greek question in NATO's Ministerial Council. However, their efforts 
were frustrated by US pressure with the help of the General Secretary of NATO 
(Treholt,1972:216-218 and Woodhouse, 1985:52). The Dutch government also 
attacked the Colonels at a NATO meeting, stressing the democratic and liberal 
foundations of the Alliance, but US pressure prevented any official action against 
Greece (Woodhouse, 1985:118). Furthermore, the Scandinavian, Italian, German and 
Dutch state authorities declared their support for the opposition in Greece (Woodhouse, 
1985:40). In general most European governments allowed the organisation and 
activities of anti-Junta movements in their countries (Rousseas, 1968:130).
In the period of expansion of the world-economy that started after the Second 
World War under the US hegemony, Greece exhibited the general characteristics of a 
semiperipheral state. This lasted for 30 years until the period of contraction in the 
world-economy set in. As discussed in this chapter, parallel to its semiperipheral 
economic development, it experienced direct intervention in its domestic affairs, and 
became a satellite and a political agent of a hegemonic power in its external relations. 
Now, let us turn to the post dictatorship period and see whether Greece followed a 
semiperipheral foreign policy between 1974 and the early 1990s which overlapped with 
the contraction period of the world-economy.
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Notes to Chapter Five
1. Ellis gives two typical examples on how the monopolistic and oligopolistic interests 
protected their privileged position in the market through political pressure, see Ellis, 
1964, pp. 185.
2. Although foreign commercial banks were allowed to establish branches in Greece in 
the 1960s, they could do business only with a small number of foreign enterprises, see 
Halikas, 1978, p. 15.
3. For a detailed account of these developments, see Serafetinidis et al., 1981, p.249.
4. For more information on the economic situation in the immediate war years, see 
Kofas, 1989, pp.8-13.
5. State Department National Archives, 868.516/11-1848, No.1.121, quoted in Kofas, 
1990, p.66.
6. Ellis points out that in 1950 80% of the total savings came from abroad mostly in the 
form of US economic aid. This dropped to 12% in 1960.
7. In December 1946, the American and Greek governments agreed to the purchase of 
100 Liberty type carrier ships, for $545,000 each, by Greek shipowners. Only a quarter 
of the total amount was paid and the Greek state was the guarantor of the remaining 
amount which was to be paid over 15 years, see Serafetinidis et al., 1981, pp.294-95.
8. For further information on the special relationship between the US and Greek 
shipping capital, see Serafetinidis, 1979 pp. 119-121 and Serafetinidis et al., 1981 
pp.295-296.
9. Between May 1947 and June 1956, the American aid had amounted to $2,565 
million. This was the highest per capita aid received by any US aid recipient country in 
the early postwar years, see Couloumbis, 1966, p.28. As for the Truman doctrine, the 
half of the aid went to the army and the other half was for reconstruction. The 
American experts administered the relief programme and participated in working out 
policies connected with finance, trade, exchange control, civil service, and price and 
wage regulation. Moreover, they were assigned to the ministries with an advisory or 
supervisory capacity, see Rousseas, 1968 p.81.
10. At the beginning, the Americans were against the reactionary-conservative and far- 
right groups in Greece. The US State Department had opposed the British idea of 
restoring the monarchy. They were highly critical of the Greek monarchy both as an 
institution and as personified by the King George n, see Iatrides, 1980, p.57 and 
Roubatis, 1987, p. 15. The King was seen a man of limited vision and an arm of the 
Metaxas dictatorship. Yet official US policy remained neutral on the issue, implying
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that the King should not seek American support for the restoration of monarchy, see 
Woodhouse, 1986, p.254.
11. For example, L.Henderson, a senior State Department official on Near Eastern 
Affairs, simply told Prime Minister Tsaldaris that he would have to resign. Similarly, 
US ambassador Grady had sent S. Venizelos a latter saying that they did not want to 
work with his government. For more information, see Roubatis, 1987, pp.40-42 and 83.
12. Interview with Field Marshall Pappagos, Vema 27 April, 1952, quoted in 
Couloumbis, 1966, pp.58-59.
13. Journal of Parliamentary Debates, Athens, 25 November 1953, p.62, quoted in 
Coulombis, 1966, p.85. Couloumbis also points out that there was no provision in the 
NATO agreement that envisaged Greece's expulsion in case of non-ratification.
14. Augue, 11 October 1966, p.3, quoted in Couloumbis, 1966, p. 136.
15. Indeed the development of a healthy capital market was deliberately obstructed by 
the financial economic elite. For a detailed information, see Psilos, 1964, p. 194.
16. The Greek Industry, 1966, quoted in Serafetinidis, 1979, p.230.
17. For a detailed information on the foreign capital investment in Greece between 
1953-63, see Ellis, 1964, Chapter XI and OECD Economic Survey on Greece, 1963, 
p.29.
18. Statement of G.Dracos, Chairman of the Federation of Greek Industrialist. 
Neftembroki, May 6,1963, quoted in Ellis, 1964, p.300.
19. For Papandreou's bold conversations with the Americans, see Papandreou, 1973, 
pp. 137-38 and also Roubatis, 1987, pp 176-77 and 180.
20. For instance, in plastics sector the extraction of raw materials, which was a process 
of primary importance in this sector, was controlled by two giant foreign enterprises of 
Esso-Pappas Chemical and Dow Chemical Hellas, while finishing the product, which 
was a process of secondary importance, was left for the Greek firms. Similarly, the 
Pechiney Company mined bauxite and produced aluminium and alumna, which was a 
process of secondary importance, but the phase of finishing the product, which was a 
process of primary importance, was completed outside Greece, see, Georgiou, 1988
p.68.
21. For a detailed information on the relations between Pappas, the US and Colonels, 
see US Congressional Hearings, 1971, pp 459-62.
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22. For a discussions on the American tolerance to and European reactions against the 
Colonels, see US Congressional Hearings, 1971 various sections and A.Treholt, 1972, 
pp.210-227.
23. For the official American assessment on Greece's importance for the global 
interests of the US and NATO in this period, see US Congressional Hearings, 1971, 
Statement of R.Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs, pp.25-56; Statement of J.H.Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, pp.l 10-115; Statement of 
HJ.Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece, pp.303-324; and Statement of MJ.Hillenbrand, 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, pp.324-337.
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CHAPTER VI
GREECE: 1974 - EARLY 1990s
1. Introduction
In this chapter I shall analyse Greece's semiperipheral foreign policy in the contraction 
period of the world-economy that began in the early 1970s. In world-system analysis 
this period corresponds to the relative decline of American hegemony and the 
emergence of Europe (mainly the EC) as a new economic and political centre of power. 
This chapter will investigate whether, in this changing world context, Greece's internal 
economic and political dynamics and processes responded in the semiperipheral way 
defined by world- system analysis and, accordingly, whether Greek foreign policy 
followed a semiperipheral line.
In world-system analysis it is argued that during periods of contraction some of 
the strongest semiperipheral countries might be able to improve their position in the 
hierarchy of states by upgrading their production and trade patterns in the world- 
economy. In such cases core-like producers begin to become dominant in the 
production processes of the semiperipheral economy. Parallel developments are 
expected in the internal and external politics of upwardly mobile semiperipheral states: 
political intervention by the hegemonic/core power(s) comes to an end; the old political 
structures collapse; they change their international alliances, no longer acting as 
satellites of hegemonic powers and increasing their margin of independence to pursue 
their own national interests. They may also increase their influence in the management 
of international problems. However, a more characteristic foreign policy role of 
upwardly mobile semiperipheral countries is to assert their intermediary or bridge role 
(or, in the terminology of world system analysis, sub-imperial role) between 
geographically, historically or culturally contingent areas and the core regions. One of 
the main motives behind this orientation is both to create privileged and stable markets 
for their export goods while reaping the (secondary) economic and commercial benefits 
of being a springboard for the core for those areas and, at the same time to create their 
own political sphere of influence.
Greece: 1974-Early 1990s
An overall examination of the Greek economy and politics in the post-junta 
period reveals that Greece has not really moved upwards in the hierarchy of states of 
the world-economy despite the seemingly positive changes registered especially in the 
second half of the 1970s.
2. The Economic Environment: 1974 - Early 1980s
The previous chapter revealed that the main features of Greek economic development 
in the 1945-74 period constituted, first, vitally important American aid and later, mostly 
American foreign investment capital; and, second the dominance of periphery-like 
Greek producers. In that economic environment intimate relations were established 
between the Greek state, almost all sectors of the Greek economic elite, the Americans 
and foreign capital. Although this situation was briefly challenged by the modernising 
government in the mid-1960s, the military takeover of 1967 reestablished the 
traditional mechanisms. Developments in the Greek economy after the collapse of the 
military regime and the establishment of democracy in 1974 created the impression that 
a significant shift from the old mechanisms was underway. The state, the most crucial 
actor in the semiperiphery, was at the centre of these developments.
During the post-junta period the intervention of the Greek state in the economy 
acquired new dimensions (OECD, 1992:57). In the 1945-74 period state intervention 
had occurred through subsidies, licences, protectionist policies, etc. In other words, the 
state had restricted its role to providing incentives (mostly financial) to the private 
sector rather than directly contributing to the industrial development of the country 
(Giannitsis, 1991:214). It supported low-technology, labour-intensive, uncompetitive 
traditional industries, and invited foreign capital to invest in non-traditional (mainly 
intermediate and capital goods industries) sectors. Accordingly, the state's overall 
participation in total industrial investment was 0.7 percent between 1965-74 
(Giannitsis, 1991:228). It maintained the dominance of periphery-like production and 
encouraged the accumulation of capital either in the hands of periphery-like domestic 
producers, or foreign investors who invested in relatively high-tech, non-traditional 
sectors of the economy. In the post-junta period, however state intervention
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concentrated mainly around two activities: nationalisations and assuming the role of 
entrepreneurship. These policies indicated that the Greek state attempted to become the 
engine of development.
Although the new government had announced economic freedom as its 
principal policy (Karamanlis, 1974:224 and 1979:227) it undertook a number of . 
nationalisations which enormously increased the economic sphere it controlled. 
According to the Minister of Industry the degree of state control in the economy had 
reached well over 60 percent in 1979 (Clogg, 1987:157). Unlike the postwar 
interventions, this new policy was aimed at two main objectives. First, to balance 
economic and social inequalities and hence to replace private initiative whenever 
economic and social reasons dictated such a policy (Karamanlis, 1979:226). Second, it 
aimed to reduce the power over the economy of that part of the economic elite which 
had collaborated with the military regime between 1967-74. Accordingly, the state 
established a great number of industries in the fields of sugar, fertilisers, 
petrochemicals, armaments and some others, and nationalised Olympic Airways of 
Onassis; the Aspropyrogos refinery of Niarchos; the Commercial Bank Group and 
urban transport company of Andreadis (Karamanlis, 1979:228). The new government 
maintained that development could be achieved through state control of the economy. 
In 1979 a cabinet minister stated that the state controlled 95 percent of the banks; 100 
percent of the energy companies; 100 percent of the communications, 100 percent of 
the companies related to national defence; 100 percent of the public utility companies; 
100 percent of transport; 100 percent of railways and air travel; 60 percent of the 
insurance companies; 50 percent of the refineries; 50 percent of shipyards; and 70 
percent of the fertilisers (Loulis, 1981b:23) (1). Furthermore, on government initiative 
a consortium of four main domestic banks (ELEVME) was established to fill gaps in 
the industrial structure by creating new enterprises or financing investments by already 
existing private companies especially to exploit the country's natural resources, such as 
mining and the chemical industry (OECD, 1976:47). Hence in this period the Greek 
state gave the impression that it had taken on the entrepreneurial role itself and hence 
became the pioneer of the development process. Before discussing whether these
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“developmentalist” state policies were successful in upgrading the production structure 
of the country, let us look first at the relationship between the state and the economic 
elite in the immediate post-junta period.
The political elite in power in the immediate post-junta years were 
developmentalist and progressive elements of both the right-wing and the centre of the 
1960s and early 1970s. Their economic outlook was based upon the disintegration of 
the mechanisms and habits of the (periphery-like) postwar economic system. One of the 
most prominent technocrats of the new government, the governor of the Central Bank 
of Greece, X.Zolotas, expressed the principal expectations from Greek industrialists 
emphasising the crucial necessity of a change in their habits:
In industry the strongest effort must be made by the industrialists 
themselves...Greek businessmen must recognize, with boldness, 
realism and resourcefulness, that the strong financial incentives, 
excessive protectionism and low labour cost, which ensured the fast 
and comfortable growth of their firms, belongs to the past...[They] 
must also understand as early as possible that it is both a duty and an 
advantage for them to cooperate among themselves and with the state 
for the purpose of restructuring the economy, changing the attitudes 
shaped within the confines of a closely protected market, and at the 
same time strengthening the economy's export orientation and 
competitiveness...It is also necessary to change organizational, 
administrative, and marketing methods procedures at the level of 
business firm, with the ultimate objective of attaining optimum size.
This is the only way in which Greek industry can cope with foreign 
and domestic competition, which will grow keener with the passage of 
time. Furthermore, business firms... should stop relying mainly on 
bank credit for financing their investments (Zolotas, 1976:37-38).
One of the objectives of Karamanlis’s interventionist economic policy was to 
reduce the economic bases of two groups: the monopolies, a point which was included 
in the article 106 of the 1975 Constitution (The Constitution of Greece, 1975:45-46) 
(2); and the economic elite which had worked with the Junta by taking advantage of the 
enormous concessions it offered. Thus the nationalisations were politically motivated. 
This economic elite primarily constituted “American-oriented comprador bourgeoisie”
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of Greece because of their intimate relations with the Americans during the Junta.
On the other hand, despite state interventionism, the Federation of Greek 
Industrialists (which can be called the “core-like European-oriented domestic 
bourgeoisie”) was, in general terms, close to the Karamanlis government (Kohler, 
1982:119) and, it supported his primary aim of accession to the EC (Kohler, 
1982:120). Accordingly, it established a research centre in 1975 to provide additional 
support to Greek industry in preparation for full membership of the EC (Kohler, 
1982:143). And in 1976, as the governor of the Central Bank of Greece, Mr. Zolotas 
pointed out, the chairman of the Federation did not ask the government for any 
privileges but demanded the same treatment as that given by EC members to their own 
industrial sectors (Zolotas, 1976:37-38). Indeed, although the Federation represented 
all industrial interests, it was the modem (core-like) big business faction that generally 
set the tone in the decisions, and particularly in relations with the EC (Kohler, 
1982:143). The Karamanlis government, through the Ministry of Economic Co­
ordination, the National Bank and the Development Bank, supported the pro-European 
(core-like) economic elites in their preparations to join the EEC (Kohler, 1982:119- 
120).
From the point of view of “semiperiphery Greece”, the new interventionist 
policies of the state and the co-operation between pro-European (core-like) economic 
elites and the government, gave the impression that in the absence of strong, 
developmentalist core-like producers/entrepreneurs, the state took the economic 
initiative and co-operated with “core-like” economic actors in order to increase their 
strength in the economy, and hence to upgrade Greece in the hierarchy of states. This 
policy was identified with catching-up with the EC economies, and with full 
membership in the Organisation.
The relations between the state and foreign capital in the post-junta period was, 
however, not different from the traditional Greek approach. In keeping with the policy 
of attracting foreign capital as specified under law 2687 of 1953, the government
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underlined the significance of enhancing the incentives and guarantees provided under 
that law by promoting them once more to the constitutional level (Democracy in 
Greece, n.d.:91). Accordingly, article 107 of the 1975 constitution guaranteed the 
protection of foreign investment in Greece (p.46). The relatively advanced, "core-like" 
sector of the Greek economy has been under the control of foreign capital since the 
early 1960s. Private foreign direct investment has played a significant role in 
developing certain important industries, including some major export industries 
(OECD, 1976:23). In the intermediate and capital goods industries (chemicals, 
metallurgy, electrical material, transport means, plastics, etc.) foreign direct investment 
has constituted the technologically advanced non-traditional base of the Greek 
economy since the 1960s (Giannitsis, 1991:215 and 218). As a result, the economy 
depended significantly on the export of the industrial products of transnational 
corporations. Six of the top twelve exporting corporations were subsidiaries of these 
transnationals (Georgiou, 1988:67). Under the circumstances in which domestic capital 
(both private and public) had shown little interest in the non-traditional advanced (core­
like) industrial sectors the Karamanlis government had no immediate alternative to 
protecting and supporting the inflow of foreign investment capital in order to encourage 
the process of catching-up with the EC economies.
The policy of attracting foreign capital can be considered a semiperipheral 
means of upgrading the production structures as long as it leads to structural 
transformations in the economy. However this did not occur in Greece in the post-1974 
period. Foreign investment capital remained reluctant to invest in Greece and its inflow 
into new fields declined (OECD, 1979:20 and 1986:41; Georgiou, 1988:65; Kleinman, 
1988:212).
Full EC membership was considered by the Karamanlis government as the 
most strategic economic target in order to restructure the Greek economy. From the 
semiperipheral development perspective, accession to the Community constituted 
perhaps the most important goal for adjusting the economy to core-like production 
structures which could upgrade Greece in the hierarchy of states towards the core zone.
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Zolotas, governor of the Central Bank of Greece, explained these (developmentalist) 
expectations of EC membership in this way (Zolotas, 1976:22-24): First, the entry of a 
small country like Greece into a wider economic group would have the direct effect of 
expanding its market. Second, accession to the Community would give Greece the 
possibility of benefiting from the advanced and constantly improving technology of the 
member countries. Third, Greece would become familiar with new organisational and 
managerial techniques, and attract increased flows of venture capital. Fourth, it would 
relieve Greece's balance of payments problems. Fifth, membership would enable 
Greece to benefit from various EC funds which could help Greece to restructure, 
reorient and modernise its economy (3). Furthermore, he argued that accession would 
greatly assist the growth of heavy industry in Greece (Zolotas, 1978:49). In June 1979, 
during the parliamentary debates on the Accession Treaty, Prime Minister Karamanlis 
echoed these expectations: ‘social and industrial progress, attraction of foreign capital 
and expertise, and stimulus of competition’ (Woodhouse, 1982:276-77). According to 
Karamanlis, Europe should promote economic justice and help developing countries 
(Woodhouse, 1982:275).
There was a further reason for the impression that the Greek economy had 
shifted towards the core-zone in the post-junta period: some indicators of the economy 
improved in a period of increasing oil prices and world wide recession. For instance, 
Greece's average annual growth rate of GDP between 1975-80 was around 4.5 percent 
(OECD, 1982), and the GNP per capita increased from $2205 in 1974 to $4348 in 1980 
(OECD, 1976 to 1981). According to OECD reports this relatively strong economic 
growth up to the 1980s was due to a rapid expansion in foreign transactions with the 
result that the share of total exports of goods and services in GDP rose from 12.5 
percent in 1970 to 25.5 percent in 1980, and that of imports from 19 percent to 27 
percent (OECD, 1983:41). Perhaps the most striking development was the rise of 
exports and, accordingly, a remarkable exploitation of new markets. In this period, 
Greek exports to the Middle East, North Africa and other oil producing countries rose 
particularly sharply (by 55 percent in drachma values) so that this group's share in total 
Greek exports rose to roughly 16 percent (OECD, 1976:17). Greek exports to the
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Middle East continued to increase until the early 1980s: exports to the Middle East 
accounted for 23 percent of total Greek exports in 1980 (OECD, 1982: 26). 
Furthermore, another important export market for Greece in this period was the EC. 
Indeed, although foreign transactions between Greece and the EC had been increasing 
since the 1960s (4), Greece's access to EC markets increased more than a hundred 
percent in value terms between 1974/75 and 1979/80 (however, this corresponded to an 
increase from 47.7 to 48.2 percent respectively in total Greek exports) (OECD, 
1982:27) (5). Similarly, imports from the EC, increased almost a hundred percent in 
value between 1974 and 1980 and constituted a large proportion of total Greek imports 
(more than 40 percent), but without a significant change in total percentage (6). 
Another important development was the increasing share of semi-processed and 
manufactured goods in exports, mainly in value terms. They increased from 1.5 percent 
in 1977 to 11 percent in 1978, and to 19 percent growth in 1979 (OECD, 1978:18 and 
OECD, 1980:21). The relatively fast rise in industrial exports until the early 1980s was 
due to increasing access to the EC market and, especially, to the rapid increase of 
exports to the Middle East (OECD, 1982:26). When it is recalled that another indicator 
of positional shift in contraction periods is an improvement in the sphere of trade, these 
developments further strengthen the impression that Greece shifted towards the core 
zone.
A fined point which is significant from the perspective of world-system analysis 
is Greece's economic relations with the US. The 1982 OECD report on Greece shows 
that trade between Greece and the US decreased significantly between 1974 and 1980: 
while exports to the US decreased from 8.9 percent in 1974/75 to 5.6 percent of total 
exports in 1979/80, imports from the US fell from 7.7 percent to 4 percent of total 
imports in the same period (OECD, 1982:27). Furthermore, in the field of foreign 
investment there was a shift from American to European investment. In the post-junta 
period the EC investment share became higher than that of the US: 6 and 7 percent of 
total assets respectively (Tsoukalis, 1981:46 and Mitsos, 1980:140). This pattern of 
growing Euro-centricity in the post junta period was also apparent in the number of 
tourists visiting Greece. The number of European tourists reached 74 percent of the
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total in 1978, while those from North America remained around 14 percent 
(Couloumbis, 1983b:98).
In fact, invisible items, mainly emigrant remittances, tourism and shipping have 
played a significant role in offsetting Greece's balance-of-payments deficits since the 
1960s. The OECD reports on Greece between 1975-1982 show that the role of 
invisibles increased in the post-junta period. For instance, in 1977, the substantial 
increase in the trade deficit (from $3.3 billion to $3.9 billion) was covered significantly 
by a sharp rise in invisible receipts so that the current external deficit widened by only 
$0.2 billion (OECD, 1978:16). In 1978 the rise in net invisibles exceeded the rise in 
trade deficit by almost 18 percent (OECD, 1979:17 and 19). In other words, the 
invisible surplus offset about 4/5 and 2/3 of the trade deficits in 1978 and 1979 
respectively (OECD, 1980:19) and the growth of net invisible receipts rose from an 
annual increase of about 17.5 percent in the few years to 1978 to 27 percent in 1979 
(OECD, 1980:24). Tourist receipts were the fastest increasing item: the annual growth 
rate of tourism between 1975 and 1979 was 27 percent, while emigrant remittances 
grew by 5 percent and shipping receipts grew by 18 percent in the same period OECD, 
1982:28). The important point is that both tourism and emigrant remittances receipts 
were heavily dependent on European tourists and Greek workers in Europe. This 
demonstrates that (together with the Euro-centric trade and investment patterns) the 
Greek economy was dominated by Europe in the period between 1974 and 1981.
From the world-system analysis point of view, these developments up to the 
early 1980s created the impression that Greece had entered a process of upward 
mobilisation from its semiperipheral position in the world-economy towards the core 
region. In world-system analysis semiperipheral states are expected to improve their 
trade patterns in the contraction periods of the world-economy, and upwardly mobile 
states are expected to have high growth rates. In the case of Greece, therefore the 
(relative) improvement of trade patterns with the EC and especially with the Middle 
East (both qualitatively and quantitatively) and high growth rates indicated 
semiperipheral development in the second half of the 1970s. Furthermore the
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elimination of old financial, monopolistic and some of the shipping interests of the 
previous periods (mostly “periphery-like” producers) through state intervention, the 
increasing role of the state in the economy, the willingness to become a full member of 
the EEC, and the state's support to the pro-European economic elite implied that the 
state, as an agent of semiperipheral development, had taken a developmentalist- 
entrepreneurial role and supported the strengthening of “core-like” producers.
3.The Political Environment: 1974 - Early 1980s
Let us turn now to the political sphere. Two main developments are expected in the 
domestic political spheres of semiperipheral states in the contraction periods of the 
world economy. First, the old political structures collapse; and second, the intervention 
of hegemonic/core powers in the domestic affairs of the state ceases. With regard to 
changes in the political structures, Greece experienced radical developments in the 
post-junta period. The Greek political establishment had been dominated by three 
principal actors: the Monarchy, Army and Parliament, all of which collaborated closely 
with the Americans. In the immediate post-junta years these institutions were either 
abolished or had to abandon their old roles and habits as democratisation occurred.
First, the monarchy was abolished by referendum. Established as the agent of 
foreign powers it had always been a powerful force against progressive change and a 
destabilising force in Greek politics through establishing and changing alliances with 
other conservative forces. In the 1974 referendum on the future of the monarchy nearly 
70 percent of the electorate voted against it and it was abolished in December 1974. 
The Greek conservatives were forced to dissociate themselves from royalism.
The second issue was the question of the military. According to Karamanlis, the 
military would have to disengage from politics and confine their activities to the 
defence of the country. Although the military had already been discredited by the junta 
experience and the mismanagement of the Cyprus issue and the subsequent defeat on 
the island, liberal-conservatives thought that it should be transformed into a respectable 
organisation which would satisfy both its members and Greek civilians. Accordingly,
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the junta elements were purged from the army and the so-called Turkish threat (7) was 
used towards this end. In this way the military was not excluded from the emerging 
national consensus, instead it was legitimised and integrated into the new political 
system as the country’s protector against “external threat”. The position and duties of 
the army were clearly prescribed by law without giving any pretext for intervention in 
domestic affairs. Thus, after years of active intervention in Greek politics, the military 
was subordinated to civilian rule. This was the end of authoritarianism in Greece.
Perhaps the most critical transformation in the political system in the post-junta 
period was the change in the outlook of the parliamentary (especially the right wing) 
political elite. The main consensus among the Greek political elite in this period was 
the need to establish democracy with political freedoms and civil rights. The new 
conservative right which widened its appeal towards the centre and even towards the 
left (Macridis, 1981:11) took a liberal attitude and abandoned its old die-hard and 
simplistic anti-Communist stand. In this respect, an important event, which 
consolidated national reconciliation and the process of democratisation, was the 
legalisation of the Greek Communist Party. Under the impact of the Pax-Americana 
and in the context of the Cold War, a die-hard and passionate anti-communism had 
been the most important credential of the parliamentary (especially the conservative) 
elite between 1949-1974. Thus, the new liberal-democratic outlook of the 
parliamentary elite was indeed a revolution in Greek political life. Another striking 
change was the rejuvenation of the conservative right parliamentary group: the vast 
majority of its MPs were now young, liberal (some had social democratic inclinations), 
and new to politics (Kohler, 1982:117 and Loulis, 1981a:59). Couloumbis summarises 
the revolutionary change in the Greek right:
The old traditional right known for its dynamic methods such as 
electoral manipulation, repressive techniques, royal and military 
intervention in politics, and monopoly control over the army and 
security services, is being pushed into a far and uncomfortable comer.
The new right, mainly Karamanlis’s creation is a center right
coalition, committed to genuine parliamentary politics with a Western 
European orientation (Couloumbis, 198 lb: 188).
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Karamanlis’s aim, however was to ensure bourgeois modernisation and 
rationalisation which would be crowned by Greek accession to the EC. From the very 
beginning he directed his main efforts to this endeavour (8) (Mavragordatos, 1983:75 
and 76). When he formed his New Democracy party, he stated that:
ND believes that Greece is not only entitled, but can assure the 
distinguished place and happiness of its people within the Europe to 
which she belongs, if it mobilises all its abilities and if it make use of 
all the virtues of its people...A fundamental precondition, however for 
all this is the implanting in our country of a genuine and up-to-date 
democracy. Towards this end the great camp of ND is totally and 
unanimously dedicated (Karamanlis, 1974:225).
In the 1945-74 period there had been constant American intervention into 
Greek politics. In the post-junta period, however, this came to an end. In the summer of 
1974 the Junta collapsed as a result of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus following a 
Greek coup which aimed at unifying of the island with Greece. When the Junta 
collapsed anti-Americanism was at the top of the Greek political agenda. There was a 
consensus among the political elite and the ordinary people that the US had helped the 
Colonels to seize power in 1967 and had supported them afterwards. The resentment 
against the US reached its peak during the Cyprus crisis, and Greeks began to accuse 
the Americans of being insensitive to the Turkish intervention and of siding with the 
Turkish arguments. In an environment in which their strongholds were either 
discredited and put under civilian control (the military), abolished (the monarchy), or 
had abandoned their unconditional Atlanticist orientation (parliamentary elite), it was 
almost impossible for the Americans, who had been experiencing a relative decline of 
their hegemony, to intervene and impose their policies on Greek domestic affairs. The 
centre of the decision making gravity moved to a pro-European cabinet and Prime 
Minister (Couloumbis, 1983b: 113). The Americans realised that ‘a return to the old 
bilateral relation of dependence was virtually impossible, and for many people also 
undesirable’ (9).
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4. Foreign Policy: 1974 - Early 1980s, “Europeanization”
In world-system analysis, in parallel to economic and political changes, the following 
main developments are expected to occur in the external relations of an upwardly 
mobile semiperipheral state in the contraction period of the world economy: they 
change their international alliances, abandon satellite-type foreign policies, and their 
ability to pursue a relatively more independent foreign policy from the hegemonic/core 
powers increases; they compete with other semiperipheral states for economic and 
political gains; and they tend to assert their intermediary and bridge (or sub-imperial) 
role between geographically, historically and culturally contiguous areas and the core 
regions. Furthermore, they attempt to become involved in the management of 
international problems. In the case of Greece, most of these characteristic 
semiperipheral foreign policy orientations can easily be observed. The foreign policy of 
Greece in the post-junta period was erected upon the following principles:
1. Greece still belonged to the West, but not simply as a loyal and unconditional 
ally. The western alliance would have to accept that Greece had its own national 
interests which would no longer be sacrificed to the interests of Atlanticism. Greece 
therefore, had to act in accordance with the requirements of its national interests.
2. To promote its economic and political interests and further diversify its 
foreign policy, and also to get rid of the “disillusionment” caused by the Atlantic 
Alliance (that is US and NATO), Greece had to integrate into the European 
Community.
3. Greek foreign policy would not be unidimensional but would pursue a 
multidimensional orientation. To this end Greece would promote its relations with the 
USSR, Eastern Europe, China, the Middle East and Non-aligned countries.
The most striking foreign policy change in the post-junta period was extent to 
which Greece abandoned its postwar unconditional Atlanticism and followed a strong 
pro-European (EC) line. This is what world-system scholars would call “a change in 
international alliances”. The indicators of this shift were, first, Greece's withdrawal 
from the military wing of NATO in August 1974, ostensibly because of “NATO's 
inaction” against the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. This demonstrated that Greek
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national interests would now come first, and would no longer be sacrificed to the 
interests of NATO or the US. Later, when Greek perceptions of NATO had changed 
somewhat, Karamanlis offered a “special agreement”: Greek forces would be integrated 
in NATO only in the event of East-West warfare. A second indication of breaking with 
Atlanticism and the US was the reduction in the number of US military bases in Greece 
from seven to four. They were brought under Greek control with the insistence that the 
operation of the bases would be permitted only when it was considered necessary for 
Greek national interests (Coulombis, 1981a: 176). The status of the bases remained a 
problem between Greece and the US until 1983. Moreover, the home-porting 
agreement of the US 6th Fleet was also terminated, and the US President appointed an 
experienced diplomat to Athens with a reputation of non-involvement in domestic 
affairs (Couloumbis, 1983a: 138). The changing nature of Greek-American relations 
was noted in the US Congressional Study Mission Report in 1975 mentioned above, 
which stated that “...in January 1975, when the study mission arrived in Athens, the 
level of Greek-American co-operation had reached its lowest point in the entire postwar 
period. Even more important it seems likely that these relations will soon be redefined 
in a significantly different way” (10).
While Atlantic relations were put on a new track, Karamanlis proceeded with 
his policy of making Greece a full member of the EC as soon as possible. From his first 
election campaign, he had emphasised that he would pursue a policy of accelerated 
entry of Greece into the Community (Clogg, 1987:63). This new notion of 
"Europeanism" was considered as a kind of political ideology by the New Democracy 
Party (Katsoudas, 1991:5). Karamanlis believed that Greece was a part of Europe and 
that it should take its place in the realisation of the idea of a united Europe (Karamanlis, 
1974:225). His determined efforts to convince the nine EC leaders played a decisive 
role in the decision of the Community to accept Greece as the Tenth member in May 
1979(11).
The signing of the Treaty of Accession in May 1979 marked Greece's formal 
shift from unconditional Atlanticism to Europeanism. EC membership was seen as an
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invaluable step in escaping from American influence and client status and upgrading 
the position of Greece in the international sphere. A few months before signing the 
Accession Treaty Karamanlis stated that “on joining the mighty European family as an 
equal member Greece will no longer be obliged to seek protection from one or another 
superpower” (12). The increasing economic and political rivalry between the EC and 
the US - a rivalry which included the Mediterranean region - in the 1960s and 1970s 
also an important role in the strong Europeanist orientation of Greece. “Europeanism” 
was not considered a new kind of Atlanticism (dependence) because Greece would be 
an equal member in this new alignment as opposed to the asymmetrical relationship 
patterns of postwar Atlanticism. Karamanlis noted the “upgraded” position of his 
country in an address to the party congress: “... within the Community...[Greece] will 
have a say not only in its own fortunes but in the future course of Europe, since it will 
influence Community resolutions through its vote” (Karamanlis, 1979:226).
Another semiperipheral tendency of Greek foreign policy was to abandon its 
satellite-like policy and to emphasise its independent stance. Not surprisingly, this 
policy (of independence) was explained as “independence-from-the-US”. The 
Community was seen as an alternative alliance of Western states whose interests were 
not identical with those of the US. Furthermore, since the Community decisions are 
taken by unanimous vote, a decision contrary to Greek national interests could not be 
imposed on the country, and this would strengthen Greece's independent foreign policy 
stance (13).
The withdrawal from NATO's military wing, the renegotiation of the status of 
the US bases, and the termination of the home-porting agreements of the US 6th Fleet, 
were also part of this new "non-satellite independent foreign policy line". Greece also 
established independent relations with the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
the USSR and China. Previously in the relations with the Soviet Bloc, Balkans, and 
China had been based on American established norms and policies. Even when West 
Europeans revised their policies vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, Greece had refrained from
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taking an independent stance (Stavrou, 1980:157-158). Thus Karamanlis’s opening to 
the Soviet Bloc, Balkans and China (on both political and economic grounds) and 
setting up bilateral and multilateral relations were clear examples of Greece's new 
“non-satellite and independent” policy (14).
Fighting against other semiperipheral countries, for example, Turkey, Spain and 
Portugal, for economic and political gains on the way to full membership in the EC was 
another semiperipheral characteristic of Greece's external policy. The negative response 
of the EC Commission in 1976 to the Greek application for full membership partly on 
the basis of the conflict between Turkey and Greece and its possible ramifications on 
the Community's future relations with Turkey seemed an important obstacle to Greece's 
future membership of the organisation (15). Turkey had enjoyed an associate status 
comparable to that of Greece until then. With the prospect of Greece's accession, 
Turkey could suffer discrimination both economically and politically in its relations 
with the Community (de la Serre, 1979:41) and this would undermine the balance 
between the two vis-a-vis the Community. The reports linking Greek accession with 
the settlement of disputes with Turkey and the emphasis on the identical status of the 
two countries were unacceptable to the Greek government. Karamanlis protested the 
Commission's decision on moral and political grounds (Vemey, 1987:261). He argued 
that Greece had no economic disputes with Turkey and its accession would not affect 
the development of the Community's relations with Turkey (Siotis, 1981:102). He 
launched an intensive diplomatic campaign directed at the nine-EC member states. The 
problem was solved in favour of Greece thanks to his persistent and determined policy. 
A second problem emerged with the Spanish and Portuguese applications for full 
membership in 1977. Indeed, this changed the context of the Greek application in the 
minds of Community policy makers: concessions to Greece, once given, could be used 
as precedents by Spain and Portugal (Wallace, 1979:23). They proposed the 
globalisation of the Community's Mediterranean policy. However, from the Greek 
perspective this would decrease the economic gains Greece expected. As a result of 
Karamanlis’s swift and intensive diplomacy (16) which was based on the uniqueness 
of each application, Greece's special position in the Community because of the
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Association Agreement of 1959 (17), and the policy of further acceleration of 
negotiations for accession (Vemey, 1987:263), the problem of globalization was also 
overcome.
A more striking example of Greece's semiperipheral foreign policy was the 
intermediary role it was willing to play between the EC and the Middle East and North 
Africa. In world-system analysis, this represented sub-imperialist disposition taken by 
an upwardly mobile semiperipheral state. Karamanlis pursued a very active diplomacy 
in both of these regions between 1975 and 1980 (Woodhouse, 1982:269) (18). Middle 
East markets had become a major outlet for Greek exports, and on this basis Greece 
was willing to play a sub-imperial or a bridge role in this region for the Community. 
This policy was justified through Greece's geographical proximity to the region and the 
“historical ties” maintained over centuries (Zolotas, 1976:20 and 1978:50). According 
to the Governor of the Central Bank, X.Zolotas, one of the advantages the EC would 
gain from the accession of Greece was:
...the geographic position of Greece which lends itself to the 
establishment of industrial and other firms - involving the 
collaboration of Greek with foreign venture capital - that will be 
aimed at penetrating the markets of the Middle East and Africa 
(Zolotas, 1976:20).
A further reason given for the Community to use Greece as a bridge to these regions 
was the extensive activities undertaken by Greek architectural, planning and 
engineering firms (19) in Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, United Arab Emirates 
and Africa (Zolotas, 1976:12-13 and 1978:50-51). The strong presence of Greek 
technical firms in the Arab countries and the dynamic growth of Greek exports (20) 
would help to promote the EC's interests in the Arab market:
This could be achieved by setting up joint Greek-EEC ventures 
capable of developing their activities either in the construction sector 
or in the commercial penetration of the Arab countries... Greek 
technical experts and businessmen, who are fully aware of the special 
economic, political and cultural condition prevailing in the Arab
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countries, would considerably facilitate the access of joint Greek-EEC 
companies to the area of the Middle East ( Zolotas, 1978:52).
Moreover, Greece was also seen as a springboard to African markets for joint Greek- 
EC ventures: Such joint enterprises could supply the developing countries of Africa 
with a wide variety of products, including building materials, chemicals, electrical and 
telecommunications equipment, clothing, foodstuff, etc. (Zolotas, 1978:52). The 
intermediary and/or sub-imperialist tendencies which could turn Greece into a regional 
power were also evident in Greek efforts to make the country the financial, and transit 
centre in the region (Woodhouse, 1982:270-271 and Zolotas, 1978:52-53).
With regard to the Balkans, Karamanlis’s pledge to contribute to peace and 
order (that is to European efforts at preserving detente and arms control) through its 
economic and cultural relations with the Balkans (Woodhouse, 1982:274 and Veremis, 
1983:176) was an indication of Greece's aspiration to play a wider role in the area. The 
Balkan States Conferences convened by Greece in 1976, 1979, 1981,1984 and 1986 
(Kofos, 1991:115) which aimed at economic and technical co-operation were a step 
taken in this direction.
In sum, it was apparent that Greece tried to present itself as an intermediary or a 
bridge between the geographically and historically contiguous areas of the Middle East, 
North Africa and the Balkans and the EC core zone, and hence attempted to play a 
subimperial role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Woodhouse summarises Karamanlis’s 
policy: “He recognised that... he could enhance Greece's standing with her associates by 
providing them, through Athens, with a window to the East, looking out in particular 
on the Arab world and the Communist bloc. This was his achievement abroad” 
(Woodhouse, 1982:287).
5. The Economic Environment: Early 1980s - Early 1990s
All the indications thus gave the impression that Greece was experiencing an upgrade 
in its international status or, in the terminology of the world-system analysis, a shift
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towards the core zone in the world system hierarchy of states. There was indeed an 
improvement in the position of Greece. Yet the decisive point is that Greece's shift 
upwards in the hierarchy of states was not based on structural transformations in the 
production structures of the country. In world-system analysis, a shift from the 
semiperipheral position towards the core zone corresponds to a substantial shift in 
production patterns towards high profit, high technology and high wage (that is core- 
like) sectors of the world- economy. However, OECD reports on Greece indicate that in 
the period between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, Greek industry expanded in the 
traditional branches such as textiles, food, beverages and construction materials 
(cement, steel and aluminium), and lacked investment in more sophisticated, 
technologically advanced new lines of production (that is core-like) and activities 
(OECD Reports, 1977 to 1983). However, almost all the traditional Greek industries 
are classified as regressive industries (that is periphery-like), and their relative 
importance in world demand has stagnated or declined (Giannitsis, 1991:218-19 and 
OECD, 1990:74) (21).
Thus Greece continued to specialise in resource (raw material) intensive and 
labour intensive products, and it retained a comparative disadvantage in technologically 
advanced goods (OECD, 1990:74). The sectors that typically use more advanced 
technology in both labour and capital intensive industries have remained small (OECD, 
1990:75) (22). The attempts made by the Greek business community (Federation of the 
Greek Industrialists) and the state in the immediate post-junta period to transform the 
structure of the economy thus proved unsuccessful. However, wages during this period 
increased considerably (OECD, 1977 to 1983) (23). In world-system analysis, 
substantial and successive increases in wages may indicate an upgrade in the position 
of a state because it is hypothesised that the wage increases may correspond to an 
improvement in production structures. However, as OECD reports show, this is not the 
case in Greece. On the contrary, the substantial increases in wages in this period 
contributed to the deterioration of the Greek economy in subsequent years rather than 
indicating an upgrade in the status of the country.
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On the other hand despite the new developmentalist intentions of the 
government in the post-junta period state ownership was limited to public utilities and 
was almost nil in the manufacturing sector (Tsoukalis, 1981:36). The state's 
participation in total industrial investment accounted for 4.3 percent in the period 
between 1975-80 (Giannitsis, 1991:229).
In sum, although some economic indicators suggested an improvement in the 
Greek economy in the period between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, it was not 
because of a structural transformation based on genuinely competitive, technologically 
advanced new lines of (core-like) production. It was the result of the increasing share of 
invisibles and total exports (especially to the Middle East) in the GDP and also due to 
the competitive advantage of Greek products despite the constant increase in labour 
costs (OECD, 1983:41). To put it differently, periphery-like production patterns and 
producers continued to dominate the Greek economy in this period.
This situation in the Greek economy did not change throughout the 1980s and 
in the early 1990s. All the OECD reports of this period indicate that the Greek economy 
could not adjust to changing production and world wide trade patterns, or to 
technological progress (OECD, 1983 to 1992). Greek producers have failed to adopt 
new productive structures in response to the new requirements of world demand 
(OECD, 1991:27). The economy has remained dependent on resource and labour 
intensive industries (periphery-like) for which demand in the world market has been 
declining. Between 1980-87 the share of ascending, technologically advanced (core- 
like) industries in total Greek exports remained around 2 to 13 percent, while the share 
of resource and labour intensive (periphery-like) industries was around 35 to 45 percent 
(OECD, 1990:76) (24). Greek exports were concentrated in a few products: textiles, 
clothing, footwear, cement, aluminium, iron and steel together presented about three- 
quarters of manufacturing exports and there had been no apparent tendency to change 
since the mid-1970s (OECD, 1990:75). Furthermore, the failure to develop new 
technologically advanced (core-like) lines of production coupled with increasing 
labour costs (25) and falling profits (26) caused further deterioration in the cost
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competitiveness of traditional (periphery-like) Greek products (OECD, 1982 to 1992). 
Unlike Greece, most of the OECD countries adopted their production structures to the 
new world demand structure, especially after the second oil shock in 1979. Moreover, 
new more cost efficient suppliers (in South East Asia) emerged for labour and resource 
intensive products in which Greek exports specialised (OECD, 1990:78) (27). Thus 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s periphery-like production and producers 
remained dominant in the Greek economy.
State policies and the relations between the state and capital also indicated that 
'periphery-like' interests controlled the Greek state throughout the 1980s. In this sense, 
the post-junta developmentalist image of the Greek state diminished in this period. The 
financial system (especially the two largest commercial banks, special credit 
institutions, and the biggest insurance companies) was under excessive (direct and 
indirect) state control (28). Hence 4/5 of the total credits extended to private business 
was controlled by state agencies (OECD, 1986:55 and 1992:72). The important point is 
that credits were often given irrespective of banking and financial criteria. Hence they 
were extended especially to (periphery-like) large enterprises at the expense of better 
performing ones (OECD, 1986:55). Furthermore, commercial banks sometimes refused 
to extend credit to efficient firms in order to protect enterprises with similar activities 
with which they have privileged relations (OECD, 1986:footnote 56). Moreover, when 
the privileged but inefficient (periphery-like) firms faced financial difficulties in paying 
back their credits, state controlled commercial banks began to participate in their 
management in order to protect their own interests. In this way, the banks either 
continued to supply credit to these firms or acquired many of the loss making 
(periphery-like) enterprises (OECD, 1986:56 and 1987:34). Hence, far from becoming 
an engine of semiperipheral development the state itself turned into a periphery-like 
producer in the 1980s.
The state also provided subsidies and grants to non-viable traditional 
(periphery-like) industries with problems of overmanning and heavy indebtedness (29). 
This diverted real and financial resources from the competitive economy and from
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more profitable uses (OECD, 1990:61) (30). The financing of the large deficits of 
inefficient, loss-making public enterprises by state grants and special bank loans further 
indicated that resources were allocated to the “periphery-like” production patterns 
(OECD, 1990:61). In sum, it had become clear in the 1980s that the Greek state was 
unable to turn into a developmentalist state - both in itself and for the private sector - in 
order to accomplish a shift towards the core zone of the world-economy.
Greece's determined orientation towards full EC membership, coupled with its 
impressive macro-economic indicators in a period of world wide recession had created 
an impression that it was moving from its semiperipheral position towards the core 
zone of the world-economy. This “upward mobilisation”, on the other hand, was 
identified with Europeanization. The Financial Protocol signed between the EC and 
Greece in 1977 provided for the Community's participation in measures to promote the 
rapid development of the Greek economy (Opinion, 1979: 65). Indeed, with the 
revitalisation of the Association Agreement in 1974, the Community accepted the 
necessity of reducing the disparity between the Greek economy and the economies of 
the member states (Opinion, 1979: 66). Furthermore, it was apparent that with full 
membership, Greece would be able to benefit from the financial resources of the 
Community (transfers and various funds) for restructuring and modernising its 
economy. Given the Community's formal approval of Greek accession in 1979, it was 
not unrealistic to think that Community membership was an important opportunity to 
upgrade Greece's status in the hierarchy of states towards the core zone. Hence, it was 
expected that Greece (as an “upwardly mobile” semiperipheral state) would adjust its 
economy to the economies of the member countries by using the financial and technical 
opportunities of the Community. It was thought that the balance would shift in the 
Greek economy towards core-like production patterns.
After 1974, the Community focused on financial transfers to the Greek 
economy. In the pre-accession period (1974-81) the Community's contribution was 
limited to the release of the $56 million of the First Financial Protocol which had been 
blocked since 1967, and to the Second Financial Protocol which provided $336 million
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to Greece. There were also transfers from the European Investment Bank in 1975 and 
1980 which amounted to $30 and $77 million respectively.
A massive influx of EC transfers to the Greek economy materialised after 
Greece's accession in 1981. First, the Community extended 2,542 million ECU to 
Greece in response to a memorandum from the socialist government demanding 
recognition of Greece's special problems, and asking for special treatment and 
assistance to bring the Greek economy closer to those of its partners (Vemey, 
1987:265). Net EC transfers increased substantially (77 percent) between 1981-83 
(OECD, 1983:38), stabilising at around $700 million annually in 1985, which covered 
15 percent of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (OECD, 1986:15 and 35). 
The inflow of capital from the EC also played an important role in offsetting Greece's 
balance-of-payment deficits. In 1983-84 EC capital financed an average of 35 percent 
of total Gross External Financing Requirements (Kefalas and Mantzaris, 1986:70). 
Similarly, in 1985, in the face of a financial crisis when the current deficit stood at 
almost 10 percent of GDP, the EC provided 1.7 billion ECU loan to support an 
austerity programme (OECD, 1991:24). EC transfers to Greece continued to increase in 
the second half of the 1980s. Between 1980-1985 net transfers from the EC were equal 
to 1.5 percent of GDP, they reached 4.9 percent of GDP in 1989 (OECD, 1990:68). 
Moreover, receipts from the EC amounted to $3 billion in 1990 (OECD, 1991:24) and 
total EC loans outstanding represented 8 percent of GDP, or a quarter of Greece's 
foreign debt, in 1991 (OECD, 1991:24). Furthermore in 1991, in the face of a large 
balance of payments deficit and a sizeable external borrowing requirement, the 
Community extended a loan of 2.2 billion ECU ($3 billion) to provide relief to the 
Greek balance-of-payments (OECD, 1991:24).
Although net EC inflows reached more than $20 billion (including special and 
EIB loans) between 1981-91, the Greek economy was unable to catch up with the 
growth and structural changes in other EC countries (Kapetanyannis, 1993:80). EC 
transfers and loans either played a role in averting a balance-of-payment crisis, limited 
the resort to foreign private credit throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (OECD,
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1991:22; Kleinman, 1988:208 and Kefalas and Mantzaris, 1986:78), went into 
consumption rather than in investment, or were wasted (Tsoukalis, 1992:155). In short, 
they did not contribute to the structural transformation of the Greek economy. As 
Vemey puts it “... success in channelling more Community resources to Greece often 
seemed to become an end in itself. All too frequently, the Greek government appeared 
unable to absorb the financial support it was offered or to co-ordinate its use in a way 
that would help the country to adjust to the challenge of Community competition” 
(Vemey, 1993:150). Hence, despite the inflow of massive amounts of EC funds and 
contrary to expectations, the Greek economy could not overcome its structural 
weaknesses, nor its low level of technology, poor infrastructure and its specialisation in 
regressive industries.
Furthermore, direct foreign investment in Greece was hardly influenced by full 
EC membership and Greece was little affected by the transnational mergers and 
acquisitions that restructured European industry (Tsoukalis, 1992:155). Moreover, in 
the second half of the 1980s it became apparent that foreign companies (especially 
European) were unwilling to use Greece as an intermediary in the Middle Eastern and 
North African markets (Tsoukalis, 1981:45 and 47). While the share of the Middle 
Eastern and North African markets in total Greek exports amounted to 23.2 percent in 
1981, this figure declined dramatically to 11.7 percent in 1987 (OECD, 1990:104). 
However, trade relations between Greece and the Community increased significantly 
after accession. While the share of Greek exports to and imports from the EC were 46.3 
and 47.7 percent respectively in 1981, they reached 60.3 and 54.3 percent in 1987 
(OECD, 1990:104). The increasing share of invisibles (especially European tourist 
receipts) in the Greek economy (OECD, 1987:22) and their positive role in offsetting 
balance-of- payment constraints were other significant developments in Greek-EC 
economic relations in the 1980s. Accordingly the EC share in invisibles reached 38.9 
percent in 1983 (Manasakis, 1986:149).
The developments in the 1980s show that the “Europeanization” of Greece, 
which can be identified with the concept of “Semiperipheral Development” or
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“mobilisation towards the core zone”, can be explained in terms of the transfer of huge 
amounts of money from the EC, increasing Greek-EC trade relations, and the inflow of 
EC tourists etc., but not in terms of structural transformations in the production 
patterns. In world-system analysis, an upgrade in the hierarchy of state refers first, to an 
upgrade in the sphere of production. This did not occur in Greece. What happened was 
not a shift from peripheral to core-like production patterns. On the contrary, the Greek 
economic elite invested in regressive industries (mostly with low levels of technology) 
rather than in technologically advanced sectors capable of inducing significant 
modernising and restructuring effects in industry (Giannitsis, 1991:218 and Petras et 
al., 1993:181). Greek industrialists were seeking for easy profits (a periphery-like 
characteristic) rather than investing in productive spheres. An OECD report shows that 
Greek industrial firms, which had privileged access to credit, borrowed for more than 
they required in order to re-lend the money to domestic and import traders with which 
they had business relations (OECD, 1986:57-59) (31).
The state's continuous financial support of ailing and problematic firms, and the 
loss of competitiveness and foreign market shares clearly indicated the dominance of 
“periphery-like” production patterns in the economy. An OECD report on Greece 
points to the state oriented policies of these 'periphery-like' producers, and the way they 
articulated their interests at the state level. Moreover, it emphasises the central position 
of the state in the semiperiphery:
[state intervention]...has had strong bearings on mentalities and 
behavioral attitudes as economic agents become accustomed to state 
interference and to petitioning the government for permanent 
assistance and protection whenever relative income positions are felt 
or perceived to be threatened by competitive forces and structural 
change. This has impaired the market flexibility and the growth 
potential of the Greek economy (OECD, 1990:58).
Thus, this report clearly shows that the Greek economy and state remained under the 
control of 'periphery-like' producers and did not experience a 'core-like' challenge in the 
post-junta period.
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Another point which seems to deviate from one of the semiperipheral 
hypotheses is related to the increases in the per capita GNP in this period. As we saw, 
per capita GNP can be accepted as an indicator of the world-system position of a state, 
and continuous and remarkable increases or decreases in GNP are a sign of upward or 
downward movement in the world-system hierarchy of states. The Greek GNP per 
capita income, which was $4348 in 1980, decreased to $3380 in 1984 and increased 
moderately to $3966 in 1986 (OECD Reports from 1980 to 1986). However this trend 
came to an end when the GNP figures rose up to $5058 in 1988; to $5359 in 1989; and 
to $6629 in 1990. From the world-system perspective, it is strange for GNP per capita 
to increase in an economy which is dominated by 'periphery-like' structures and which 
has been performing badly for a decade (OECD Reports from 1989 to 1992).
In sum, the developments in the 1980s and early 1990s show that Greece has 
not experienced an upgrade in its status in the world-economy. On the contrary, it fell 
to the bottom place in the OECD area at the beginning of the 1980s, and has remained 
there since (OECD, 1992:76). Greece's actual and potential output growth rate was 1.5 
percent during the 1980s, one of the lowest in Europe (OECD, 1991:18), and the 
growth of GDP fell to 0.1 percent in 1990 compared with 2.6 percent in the OECD area 
(OECD, 1991:9).
The bad performance of the Greek economy in the 1980s opened a 
development gap between Greece and the rest of the OECD area (OECD, 1991:84) and 
the EC (Vemey, 1993:151). Subsequently, Greece fell behind Portugal in the 
Community, to the twelfth and the worst economy (Kapetanyannis, 1993:80 and 
Vemey, 1993:151). This in turn created a controversy about the economic and political 
status of Greece in the EC. On the one hand, Greece has retained full membership of 
the prestigious Community of advanced (core-like) economies as an equal member. On 
the other hand, it has created a “Greek problem”, as a discordant member and a 
constant drain on the EC budget (Vemey, 1993:151). From the perspective of 
semiperipheral development, all these facts once again indicate that although Greece
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has been a member of the Community since 1981, membership has not led to an 
upgrade in its status towards the core zone of the world-economy.
6. The Political Environment and Foreign Policy: Early 1980s - Early 1990s
6.1. Political Environment
In the political sphere, Greece entered the 1980s with a socialist government, which 
indicated an important step forward for the consolidation of democracy. In the context 
of semiperipheral politics, this can be considered a continuation of the transformation 
process of the old political structures begun in the post-junta period. Accordingly, 
despite the socialist government's unsuccessful performance in improving the structure 
of the Greek economy, democratic political structures remained intact during the 1980s. 
However, it should be bome in mind that the Community's massive transfer of 
resources into the Greek economy in this period must have played a decisive role in 
protecting Greek democratic structures.
6.2. Foreign Policy: Europeanization ?
In parallel with its poor economic performance, Greece did not exhibit the 
characteristic behaviour of an upwardly mobile semiperipheral state in the foreign 
policy sphere. What was expected from “upwardly mobile semiperipheral Greece” was 
a gradual increase in influence and weight in the EC and in world politics, harmonious 
relations with its partners in Western Alliance - especially in the EC; and the
emergence of a Greek sphere of influence (though in a secondary sense) in the
geographically and historically contiguous areas. Greece did not attain these objectives 
in the 1980s and early 1990s.
In fact, in the 1980s Greek foreign policy was based upon the
rhetoric of “independence” (32), a characteristic foreign policy orientation of
“upwardly mobile” semiperipheral states. The main objective was to show that Greece 
was no longer a satellite state. It was clear that the unconditional Atlanticist years were 
over, and Greece was now an equal member of the highly prestigious EC. Furthermore,
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the re-entry of Greece into NATO in 1980 and the agreement reached with the 
Americans on the operation of US bases in 1983 were other indicators of Greece's non­
satellite status, in that the agreements (especially the bases agreement) observed the 
Greek interests and established a balance in the relations between Greece and the US 
(Pranger, 1988:256). Hence, the socialist governments' rhetoric of “independence” did 
not constitute a new phenomenon.
However, contrary to the expectations from an “upwardly mobile 
semiperipheral country”, Papandreou's “independent” Greek foreign policy 
disharmonized political co-operation both in NATO and in the EC. Moreover, Greece 
itself became a problem in the Western alliances. In relation to the US and NATO (39), 
Papandreou declined to participate in NATO military exercises in the Aegean Sea 
because of Greece's disputes with Turkey. During the boycott of a NATO exercise in 
1983, he permitted a Soviet fleet to visit the Greek port of Pireus which also coincided 
with an EC meeting on political co-operation in Athens. At a NATO Defence 
Ministers' meeting, he demanded a NATO guarantee of Greece's borders with Turkey. 
Furthermore, he responded negatively to the deployment of American Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles as part of NATO's Intermediate Nuclear Force Modernisation 
Program while making no reference to the USSR's SS20s. He also defined the USSR as 
a factor which restricted the expansion of capitalism and its imperialistic aims 
(Loulis, 1985:7), and he similarly described NATO as the first politico-military bloc 
which caused the inevitable emergence of Warsaw Pact (McCaskill, 1988:318). 
Papandreou promoted the Romanian idea of establishing a Balkan nuclear-free zone, 
which in turn led to significant rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He refused to 
condemn the Soviet shooting down of a South Korean Airliner on the grounds that it 
had been on a spying mission, and he established good relations with radical Arab 
states with which the US had problems.
In relations with the EC, Greece's disharmonizing “independence” line 
demonstrated in a number of ways (40). In 1981 the Papandreou government rejected 
the Community's plan to send peace-keeping troops to Sinai and would not be
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associated with Camp David. Papandreou also complained about an EC resolution 
which supported the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad. In 1982, he resisted 
Western sanctions following the introduction of martial law in Poland, and dismissed 
his deputy foreign minister for signing an EC communique condemning Soviet 
involvement in Polish affairs. He also vetoed an EC attempt to condemn the USSR for 
shooting down Korean Airliners Flight 007. Moreover, after the American bombing of 
Libya, Greece demanded milder sanctions against Libya than its EC partners and 
refused to apply measures against the Libyan regime unless there was tangible proof 
that Libya fostered terrorism. Finally, Greece refused to align itself with its EC partners 
in the condemnation of Syria for its role in blowing-up an Israeli airliner (33). The 
problem was that, contrary to the expectations from an “upwardly mobile state”, Greece 
itself became a problem both in NATO and in the EC.
However, the main indication that Greece had failed to achieve an upgrade 
towards the core zone was its inability to create a sphere of influence, and/or to 
participate in the management of international problems. In this context, Greece's 
relations with the Middle East represent the best example. As we have seen, during the 
second half of the 1970s, Greece asserted its intermediary role between the Middle 
East, North Africa and the EC, hoping to become an economic and financial centre and 
crossroads in the region. Although this policy proved unsuccessful in the early 1980s, 
the Papandreou government continued the policy. Papandreou had already established 
close relations with “progressive” and radical regimes of the Middle East such as Syria, 
Libya, PLO etc., (Elephantis, 1981: 113 and Clogg, 1984:22). Once in power, he 
initiated a new opening to the Arab World. In contrast to Karamanlis, he based his 
Middle. East policy on pro-PLO and pro-Arab policies: the PLO was granted 
recognition at the end of 1981, closer relations were cultivated with Libya and Algeria, 
Papandreou visited Arab countries (Ioannides, 1991:147-48), a direct line of 
communication was established between Greece and Syria (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 
1987:115), and an agreement was signed with Syria against world imperialism and 
racist Zionism (Loulis, 1985:28). Papandreou emphasised Greece's support for the 
Palestinian cause and denounced the Israeli occupation of Arab lands (Ioannides,
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1991:147). This new opening to the progressive and radical Arab states was based on 
an economic rationale: it was expected that this policy would bring an influx of Arab 
capital and investment into the Greek economy (Ioannides, 1991:147 and McCaskill, 
1988:310). Various economic agreements (especially on oil and improved trade) were 
signed with Arab states during the 1980s (McCaskill, 1988:316). However, the Arab 
contribution to the Greek economy (capital flows, investment, commercial and trade 
benefits, etc.) remained negligible: the Arabs were reluctant to embrace Greece 
(McCaskill, 1988:312 and 316; Ioannides, 1991:147; Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 
1987:115; Macridis, 1984:58). Accordingly, although Greece attempted to contribute to 
the solution of the Middle East conflict as a member of the EC, pledged to work as a 
go-between (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987:115), and declared the need for an 
effective Greece-EC initiative to resolve the crisis (Constas, 1991:52), these attempts 
proved unsuccessful and did not bring any benefit to Greece. Furthermore, the pro-PLO 
and pro-Arab policies did not make the Arabs take a pro-Greek stands vis-a-vis Turkey 
on the Cyprus and Aegean problems. Finally, Greece did not participate in the 
international management of the Iran-Iraq War, or later in the Gulf War, other than by 
sending a few warships for surveillance.
Greece was no more successful in playing an active role in the Balkans (Kofos, 
1991:116). The Balkan conferences convened on Greek initiative in the 1970s and 
1980s and the proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans were important 
developments because for the first time in the postwar period security problems began 
to be discussed in Balkan forums (Kofos, 1991:116). However, the interests of the 
Balkan states soon waned and the Balkan Conferences did not lead to a privileged status 
for Greece in the Balkans (Kofos, 1991:115). In fact, Greece's failure to upgrade its 
position in the hierarchy of states was demonstrated in its policy vis-a-vis the Yugoslav 
crisis in the early 1990s. Greece implicitly supported Serbia in the Yugoslavian wars 
and split with its partners in the European Union (EU) over the name and recognition 
of Macedonia. Greece was taken to the European Court of Justice by the EU during its 
presidency because of the Greek trade embargo on Macedonia. Thus, contrary to Greek 
expectations, the country became a part of the problem in the Balkans rather than an
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intermediary between the region and the EU or a participant in the management of 
international crises.
6.3. Conclusion
In sum, these examples show how little Greek foreign policy had become Europeanized 
by the early 1990s. And if Europeanization can be identified with development and 
modernisation, or alternatively, in the terminology of the world-system analysis, as an 
upgrade in the hierarchy of states it seems clear that Greece has not accomplished a 
shift towards the core zone in the post-junta period. The Greek example also shows, as 
the world-system model predicts, that upward mobility of semiperipheral states is 
exceptional. In other words, although all semiperipheral states can benefit from a 
contraction period in the world-economy only a few of them [the most strong one(s)] 
can succeed in shifting their positions in the world-system.
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Notes to Chapter Six
1. For detailed information on the range of activities of the Greek state in the fields of 
public utilities, manufacturing, enterprises, trading concerns and special credit 
institutions in this period, see Kolmer, 1981, pp.300-303.
2. This point was also included in Karamanlis’ss government declaration in 1975 as 
one of the major objectives of the economic policy, see, Kohler, 1982, p. 161 (footnote 
69).
3. See, also, Zolatas, 1976, pp.34-35.
4. For instance while Greece's exports to the EC increased from 32.8% in 1960 to 
47.7% in 1977, its imports from the Community increased from 33.6% to 42.5% in the 
same period, see, Tsoukalis, 1981, p.37 andMitsos, 1980, p.129.
5. The OECD report on Greece in 1982 shows that the Greek exports to the 
Community increased in the following amounts between 1969/70, 1974/75 and 
1979/80:
Greek Exports to the EEC ($ million)
1969/70 1974/75 1975/80
272.21 1.031.55 2.189.7
(45.5%) (47.7%) (48.2%)
6. The value of Greek imports from the EC increased from $2,079,14 million in 
1974/75 to $4,258,62 million in 1979/80. However, the percentage of EC imports in 
total Greek imports decreased from 42.9 % to 41.9% for the same periods respectively 
(OECD, 1982).
7. Greek political leadership "believes" that Turkey has expansionist designs on Greece.
8. The reorganisation of church-state relations, armed forces, and law and order in 
general, can be considered in the process of bourgeoisie modernisation.
9. Quoted in Tsoukalis, 1981, p. 157
10. Quoted in Symeonides-Tsatsos, 1991 p. 19.
11. For an account of Karamanlis’s endless efforts to make Greece a member of the 
EEC, and the problems emerged in this period (1974-79) see, Siotis, 1981, pp.99-110.
12. Quoted in Woodhouse, 1982 p.274.
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13. This point has recently been proved on the issue of the recognition of Macedonia 
under this name.
14. For an account of Greece's opening to Soviet Bloc, Balkans, and China see, 
Woodhouse, 1982, pp.260-269.
15. For information on the EC's considerations in the relations between Turkey, Greece 
and the Community see, Siotis, 1981, pp. 100-102; de la Serre, 1979, p.41; and Opinion, 
1979, pp.50-51.
16. For Karamanlis’s diplomacy on this issue see, Vemey, 1987, p.262
17. For an account of Greek arguments see, Zolotas, 1978, pp.9-14 and Vemey, 1987,
p.262.
18. For information on Karamanlis’s active diplomacy in the Middle East and North 
Africa see, Woodhouse, 1982, pp.269-71.
19. In 1978 there were about 30 Greek firms with a combined staff of over 8 thousand 
Greek engineers and skilled workers, which undertook construction projects worth $5 
billion in these countries, see Zolatas, 1978, p.51.
20. The activities of Greek construction companies contributed heavily to the 
expansion of Greece's exports to the Middle East -from $66 million in 1973 to $533 
million in 1977. These export items mainly consisted of cement, building materials, 
metal structures, transport equipment, see Zolotas, 1978, p.51.
21. See OECD, 1990, Table 25
22. Between 1975 and 1979 while the shares of resource and labour intensive industries 
in total Greek exports were 42.2% and 32.2% respectively, in technologically 
advanced sectors it was, 18.2% for scale-intensive industries; 4.7% for differentiated 
goods; and, 2.3% for science based industries, see OECD, 1990, Table 24.
23. The annual growth of unit labour cost in the private and non-agricultural sector was 
around 19% between 1974-79, and it increased to 26% in 1980, see OECD, 1982, p.23.
24. The shares of these industries in Greek exports and the shares of OECD demands 
(imports) for these goods in the 1975-87 periods were as follows:
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1975-79 1980-84 1985-87
Resource-intensive industries
Greek exports 42.2 39.2 35.4
OECD imports 32.1 20.8 17.6
Labour-intensive industries
Greek exports 32.6 37.6 44.7
OECD imports 17.1 16.9 16.7
Scale-intensive industries
Greek exports 18.2 15.6 13.9
OECD imports 32.5 37.2 33.0
Differentiated goods
Greek exports 4.7 4.8 3.9
OECD imports 19.0 19.5 20.8
Science-based industries
Greek exports 2.3 2.8 2.0
OECD imports 8.3 10.7 12.0
Source: OECD Country Reports, Greece, 1990 .
25. Annual percentage change of unit labour cost in manufacturing were as follows, 
1980, 27%; 1981, 26.5%; 1982, 36 1/4%; 1983, 19 1/4%; 1984, 23 1/4%; 1985, 20%; 
1986, 12%; 1987, 12%; 1988, 17 1/2%; 1989, 19 1/4%; 1990, 21 1/4%. Source: OECD 
Reports, Greece, 1987 and 1992. The 1990 OECD Report on Greece states that the 
level of wages of production workers was three times as high as that of production 
workers in the Greece's Asian competitors, see OECD, 1990, footnote 32.
26. 1987 OECD Country Report states that essentially low average net profit rates 
turned negative since 1982, p.78.
27. In these fields S.Korea and Hong Kong have emerged as the most challenging 
competitors after the mid-1970s, see OECD, 1990, p.78.
28. For detailed analysis of the Greek financial system see OECD, 1986, pp.52-64.
29. For detailed information on the ailing and problematic firms, see OECD, 1987, 
pp.34-36; OECD, 1992, pp.65-68, and various other OECD Country Reports on Greece 
from 1986 onwards.
30. These problematic firms absorbed about half of total state grants and subsidies, and 
a fifth of total bank credits. Even so the financial situation of these enterprises 
improved little, see OECD, 1990, p.61. Furthermore, these problematic firms 
comprised some 40 of the country's biggest companies, see OECD, 1991, p. 14.
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31. For the rentier, anti-developmentalist character of Greek industrialists in the 1980s, 
see also Petras, 1987 and Petras et al., 1993.
32. For Papandreou's tough foreign policy see Loulis, 1985; Pranger, 1988; and 
Christodoulides, 1988.
33. However, the socialist government's position towards the EC began to change in the 
second half of the 1980s due to the difficulties experienced by Greek economy, see 
Christodoulides, 1988, pp,289-292 and Vemey, 1993, pp. 145-150. As the Greek 
economy became more dependent on EC transfers, Greek foreign policy was modified. 
One indication was the signing of the Single European Act in December, 1985 and 
acceptance of the institutionalisation of the European Political Co-operation which 
meant the abandonment of Greece's “independent” stance in foreign policy, and 
represented a U turn, see Vemey, 1993, pp. 146-147. Relations with the US also began 
to improve because Papandreou realised that strained ties with Washington would be 
bad for Greece's defence policy. He was also warned by American friends that if he did 
not refrain from anti-American policies, Greece would loose the support of US 
Congress which had been considerably influenced by the Greek-American lobby since 
1974, see Haas,1988, p.63.
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CHAPTER VII 
SPAIN: 1945 -1976
1. Introduction
In this chapter and the following I shall analyse Spain's “semiperipheral foreign policy” 
in two main periods in the framework of world-system analysis: first, in the period 
between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Franco period in 1976; 
and second, in the post-Franco period, from 1976 to the early 1990s. These two periods 
roughly overlap with the expansion and contraction periods of the world-economy 
respectively. I shall begin by showing various semiperipheral characteristics of Spain in 
the political and economic spheres.
In world-system analysis the study of a semiperipheral country means 
essentially the study of a semiperipheral state. This is because the relations between 
state policies and the accumulation of capital are the key to observing developments in 
other spheres in semiperipheral countries. Thus the struggle to control and/or transform 
state policies is the main activity of semiperipheral economic actors, such as owner- 
producers, work force, multinationals, etc.
However, the direction of capital accumulation in the semiperiphery is not only 
determined by the state-oriented activities of various economic actors but also through 
state policies. First, the semiperipheral state may favour the interests of some groups 
over those of others. That is why various groups fight to influence state policies. And at 
this point, the state of the world-economy and the relative positions of its principal 
actors (hegemonic power, challenger, core states) become important determinants for 
the policies of the state and various interest groups in the semiperiphery. Moreover, the 
state itself may take steps to create opportunities for entrepreneurs, and it sometimes 
takes on an entrepreneurial role itself (Chase-Dunn, 1989:20). In this way, the state may 
become the pioneer of the development process in upwardly mobile semiperipheral 
countries (Chase-Dunn, 1989:241).
Spain: 1945-1976
2. The Economic Environment
A cursory glance at Spain's political economy in the period between the end of the WW 
II and the late 1950s shows that the state intervened extensively in the economy. This 
intervention was realised in two ways: first, the state favoured the interests of the 
financial elite and indirectly, because of the intimate relationship between the two, the 
interest of the industrial elite. Second, while creating opportunities for entrepreneurs, 
the state also took on an entrepreneurial role itself.
In this period the Spanish state (or the Franco regime) relied on five main 
instruments of intervention in the economy (1) all of which were adopted after the end 
of the Spanish Civil War in 1939. These policy instruments were, a system of Syndical 
Organisation; the licensing of industrial investment; the establishment of a large public 
holding company called Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI); exchange controls and 
other means of direct supervision of external economic transactions; limiting foreign 
investment opportunity.
The Syndical Organisation, a vertical organisation in which the employers and 
employees were obliged to co-operate, served mainly to regulate wages (Anderson, 
1970:48). It aimed to eliminate class conflict and anarchic competition. In practice it 
operated as an effective means of controlling labour.
The practice of licensing industrial investment required all investment decisions 
to be approved by the government. It meant that the establishment of any industrial 
unit, or the expansion, modification, or relocation of an established firm required an 
official permit (IBRD, 1963:338) In this way established firms were protected against 
internal and external competitors. Furthermore, more efficient enterprises were 
prevented from improving their market shares at the expense of less efficient firms 
(IBRD, 1963:339 and Baklanoff, 1978:16). Moreover, the practice of industrial permits 
led to favouritism and arbitrary procedures applied to some privileged entrepreneurs by 
the officials in the Ministry of Industry (Baklanoff, 1978:16). Thus good connections 
with state officials rather than efficiency, cost or markets were important in obtaining
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industrial permits (Donges, 1971:44). Furthermore, a preferential category of industries 
of national interest was established by the state (IBRD, 1963:338), and incentives were 
provided in the form of economic privileges to domestic 'firms of national interest' by 
bureaucrats according to political rather than economic considerations (Liberman, 
1982:169-170).
On the other hand, INI meant state investment and entrepreneurship, especially 
in industry. It was assigned the goal of industrialising the country. One of its declared 
aims was to establish industries where the private sector was incapable of investing, 
and its enterprises were considered in the category of 'national interest'. INI’s activities 
were widespread and included almost all industrial sectors (IBRD, 1963:346). It could 
create new industries through state funding. Its primary investments were directed into 
the strategic sectors of steel, hydroelectric power, chemicals, metal works, autos, 
shipbuilding, transportation and communication, etc. (Anderson, 1970:40). However, it 
was also active in areas where private industry was already well-established, and it 
acquired interests in private firms (IBRD, 1963:349).
The state also exercised direct control over Spain's external economic 
transactions, providing strong protection for domestic producers. Control was 
implemented through high tariff barriers, import quotas, import licensing, exchange 
controls, bilateral trade agreements, etc. (Baklanoff, 1978:16). Moreover, discouraging 
laws and regulations limited the amount of foreign investment and this in turn 
effectively prevented foreign competition and protected domestic producers.
Nevertheless, in spite of extensive state intervention in the economy the 
financial elite had the political and economic power to influence state policies 
(Baklanoff, 1978:18-19). It was primarily because of this that Franco relied heavily on 
the financial elite (i.e., the bankers) during and after the Civil War, allowing it to play a 
strong role in the reconstruction and development of the private sector (Anderson, 
1970:76). Monetary and credit policies were supervised by a Council consisting of 
representatives of the government, the commercial banks, and the Banco de Espana
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(Central Bank). Furthermore, the shares of the Banco de Espana were owned by 
commercial banks and private investors, as well as by the government (Whitaker, 
1961:230) (2).
Another striking feature of the Spanish economy was the intimate relationship 
between financial and industrial elites. In fact, economic power was concentrated in the 
hands of the five largest banks which in 1957 held 64% of the nation's private deposits 
and 49% of total deposits (Baklanoff, 1978:19) (3). As a result of the low level of 
financing and the lack of a developed capital market almost all private firms were 
dependent on one of these banks (Baklanoff, 1978:19 and Harrison, 1993:69). On the 
other hand, the banks themselves invested heavily in industry, either by acquiring 
shares in enterprises or through lending operations (Wright, 1977:102). In this way the 
seven largest Spanish banks controlled almost 600 of the major firms (Anderson, 
1970:76) and increased their reserves and profits enormously throughout the 1950s 
(Harrison, 1993:69). The dependence of large private firms on the banks was further 
consolidated through the membership of bank officials on the boards of directors of the 
largest firms. Hence they influenced management and investment decisions of a great 
part of the Spanish private sector (Baklanoff, 1978:19 and Anderson, 1970:77). One 
study of the Spanish business and financial community reported that the larger Spanish 
entrepreneurs saw the banks as important components of their own decision process 
(4). In this monopolistic environment it was very difficult for newer firms to find long 
term capital for their investment requirements without established banking connections 
(IBRD, 1963:354).
The structural features of the Spanish economy revealed the dominance of 
periphery-like production patterns in this period. In 1963 a World Bank Mission 
described these characteristics (IBRD, 1963:330-34) as follows (5): first, Spanish firms 
were too small to operate efficiently, only a few relatively new industries were able to 
meet the necessary conditions for large scale production. Second, the equipment used in 
most enterprises was obsolete, old or inefficient. For instance, while the textile industry 
had about 15 to 20 % of modem equipment, only 1/4 of the equipment in the heavy
197
Spain: 1945-1976
machine industry was modem. Thus large segments of Spanish industry were 
characterised by low productivity, high cost and uncompetitiveness (6). These 
characteristics underline the dominant position of periphery-like producers in Spain in 
this period. However, according to the report, there were exceptions to this general 
pattern, which indicated the semiperipheral position of Spain. These exceptions 
reflected the in-between status of Spanish industry: within a single branch of industry a 
mixture of old and new, large and small, efficient and inefficient could be found, and 
impressive modem plants existed side by side with the very outmoded ones (IBRD, 
1963:332). Not surprisingly, the dominance of high cost, old technology, highly 
protected, uncompetitive production in the 1950s resulted in production for the 
domestic market rather than a competitive export-oriented economy.
State policies (intervention in the market through laws, regulations, licences, 
etc.) aimed to control the direction of industrial investment and sectoral allocation. 
Private enterprise was both regulated and controlled and, at the same time, provided 
with incentives and protection beyond liberal norms (Anderson, 1970: 42). These 
incentives included public investment in infrastructure, fiscal incentives, investment 
subsidies, wage and price controls, and strong protection against foreign competitors 
(Donges, 1971:38). However, the result was the continuation of inefficient, high cost, 
low-technology production, and the dominance of periphery-like producers in the 
economy (Donges, 1971:44-45).
Another principal actor in the Spanish economy in this period was the US. In 
the postwar period, when a new economic world order was being established under the 
leadership of the US, Spain was excluded from American-led international economic 
recovery programmes, for example, the Truman Doctrine or the Marshall Plan 
(European Recovery Plan) which to reconstruct the economies of Europe. The primary 
reason was Franco's collaboration with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during the 
Second World War.
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In fact, however, Spain's exclusion was due to strong European opposition 
rather than to an American decision. In 1946 the US administration concluded that only 
Franco could guarantee US interests in the Iberian peninsula (Dura, 1985:136 and 160). 
Talks on including Spain in the ERP were started by the Americans as early as 1948, 
and the US House of Representatives voted in favour of inclusion by a huge majority 
(149 against 52) (Gallo, 1973:183-84). However, the amendment was rejected by a 
Joint Committee of the US Senate and House of Representatives because of European 
reactions (7). Despite European opposition, US policy makers were determined to 
include Spain in the US-led economic aid programme.
America's policy of including Spain in the new world economic order was 
carried out in two main ways. First, until 1953 credits and loans to the Spanish 
economy were extended through private American banks, US Export-Import Bank, and 
credits from the US Congress. In this way the Spanish government received loans from 
Chase Manhattan Bank and National City Bank of NY ($25 million and $30 million 
respectively); a $62.5 million Ex-Im Bank credit authorised by the US senate, and a 
further $100 million credit authorised by the US Congress (Rubottom and Murphy, 
1984:19). In order to obtain Ex-Im Bank loans, the Americans demanded that the 
Spaniards should prepare a recovery plan similar to those prepared by Marshall Aid 
recipient countries. Subsequently, the Spanish Plan was approved by Washington and 
an American team outside the Marshall Plan was appointed to administer the loans.
A second US initiative was realised through the Pact of Madrid (known also as 
Bases Agreement) of 1953. Under this agreement the US administration extended $930 
million economic aid and $374,236 million military assistance by the end of 1959 
(Whitaker, 1961:240-41). In addition, $392 million worth of surplus agricultural 
products, repayable in Spanish Pesetas, was supplied by the US. Furthermore, more 
than $500 million was poured into the Spanish economy for the construction of US 
military bases (Dura, 1985:347). American Catholic charity organisations collected a 
large amount of aid for Spain (Whitaker, 1961:241). Under the agreement the Spanish 
government accepted a US-authorised special economic mission called US Operation
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Mission (USOM) to administer American aid (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:37). 
Another important characteristic of Spanish-American economic co-operation was the 
number of US agencies involved. Under a technical exchange programme several 
specialists from a variety of fields visited Spain, and more than 300 Spaniards were 
trained in the US each year after the Agreement (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:38; 
Whitaker, 1961:244).
However, this crucial and massive ( by Spanish standards) US aid was extended 
on condition that Spain liberalised and opened its economy. The Americans demanded 
that the Franco administration devalue the Spanish currency, lift restrictive barriers to 
foreign investment, and reduce the power of government-controlled industries (Dura, 
1985:235 and 263). The Americans attached particular importance to the liberalisation 
of the Foreign Investment Laws, and hence the flow of US private capital into the 
Spanish economy. Just before the 1953 agreement American pressure was intensified. 
S.Griffs, the US ambassador to Madrid at the time, made a revealing declaration to the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Spain:
...we are hopeful that many of the restrictions now applied to 
American business operations can be ameliorated or removed [..and] 
that American corporations may be encouraged to make investments 
in Spain through permission to obtain larger interests in Spanish 
companies than is now allowed (8).
Similar official pressure was continued throughout the 1950s (Rubottom and Murphy, 
1984:66) (9).
On the other hand, from 1948 onwards there were pressures on the US 
Administration from American businessmen for economic aid to Franco's Spain (Dura, 
1985:219). The idea was that US dollars would enable foreign exchange hungry Spain 
to purchase long desired and necessary American industrial and agricultural products. 
The economic potential of Spain attracted American businessmen. By travelling to
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Madrid in increasing numbers they showed their willingness to do business in Spain 
(Dura, 1985:220).
Simultaneously, the relations between the Americans and Spanish 
bankers/businessmen became closer. The Franco administration had given an important 
role to the Spanish banking/ financial community in improving relations with and 
obtaining aid from the US. First, in 1948 J.F.Lequerica, a board member of one of the 
top industrial banks in Spain (Banco de Urquijo), was given the responsibility of 
creating a heterogeneous Spanish lobby in the US (Dura, 1985:206-7), a mission which 
he successfully completed. Second, Franco appointed M.Arruba, the Minister of 
Commerce and at the same time an experienced banker who had been president of 
Banco Exterior of Spain before his appointment to the cabinet, to head the Spanish 
team in negotiating the Pact of Madrid in 1953 (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:22). 
These appointments indicated the intermingling of the Spanish state, Spanish financial 
circles and the Americans. For Spanish bankers/industrialists and American 
businessmen the US-Spanish Agreement of 1953 (Pact of Madrid) signified a decisive 
and determined US involvement in the Spanish economy, and the stabilisation of the 
Franco administration. This reassured both domestic and foreign businessmen to invest 
capital in Spain (Ellwood, 1994:163 and Gallo, 1973:224).
From the point of view of the Spanish economic elite the 1950s witnessed the 
consolidation of the power of bankers throughout the various sectors of the Spanish 
economy; by 1960 banking interests controlled more than 60% of the manufacturing, 
mining and utilities sector (Dura, 1985:334). Furthermore, although the American 
administration did not oppose government projects they were determined that Spanish 
private capital should also get its fair share from the 1953 agreement. Accordingly, 
American officials usually supported Spanish bankers, and thus large Spanish private 
enterprises, in their demands for funds for expansion and modernisation (10) 
(Whitaker, 1961:246; Rubottom and Murphy, 1984: 39). Thus the Spanish economic 
elite (bankers/industrialists) obtained direct support from the US government.
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US interests replaced British and French firms through the acquisition of 
German holdings and British and French interests in several Spanish firms (Dura, 
1985:340).In this way, the Americans consolidated their participation in the electrical, 
chemical, pharmaceutical and rubber sectors, and also penetrated into the mining, steel, 
food processing and insurance sectors in the 1950s. On the other hand, the increasing 
preponderance of US capital in Spain led to the collaboration of the Spanish economic 
elite with American interests. In one such case, two firms, which represented 32% of 
the total production in the rubber sector, were bought by J.Luis de Anzar Zabala, an 
influential Spanish financier. However, the real buyer was an American firm (General 
Tyre and Rubber Co.) for which Anzar played the role of American agent in the deal 
(Dura, 1985:340-41). Another important dimension of US involvement in the Spanish 
economy was realised through the participation of American private capital in major 
industrial concerns organised by INI. In the 1950s, for example, American firms 
participated with INI in the establishment of REPSA in the petroleum products sector 
and ENDIDESA in steel production (Liberman, 1982:174).
In this way, although Spain was excluded from the ERP the Americans 
provided aid in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s for the reconstruction of the 
Spanish economy. However, while US aid played the key role in importing desperately 
needed capital goods and also in offsetting the deficit in the current account balance 
(OEEC, 1958:36-37) Spain was opened to US penetration at the same time and 
incorporated into the US-led new world economic order. Spain became the member of 
OEEC/OECD, IMF, and the World Bank in 1958, and a member of GATT in 1963. As 
far as the Franco administration was concerned, the US connection meant accepting 
American prescriptions in the organisation of the Spanish economy. First, the US 
administration had some control on how American funds were to be spent. Second, 
American private capital decided where to invest its capital and this did not necessarily 
coincide with Spanish priorities (Ellwood, 1994:164).
More decisive American intervention came with the Spanish Stabilisation Plan 
of 1959. The objective was to eliminate the body of controls, regulations and state
202
Spain: 1945-1976
interventions affecting innumerable aspects of Spanish economic activity (OECD, 
1960:5). The main American concern was the liberalisation of external trade and the 
abolition of restrictions on foreign investment. Accordingly, the Spaniards devalued the 
Peseta and launched a programme of reviewing tariff laws, dismantling existing 
quantitative controls, globalizing country specific quotas, and abolishing the public 
trading corporations responsible for importing and distributing raw materials.
As for foreign investment, legislation (which would be strengthened in 1963) 
was introduced to encourage foreign investment which offered substantial incentives 
and guarantees to foreign investors (11). A decree defining the parity of Peseta within 
the gold-exchange monetary system brought Spain into the Bretton Woods Agreement 
(Liberman, 1982:203). Although the plan was submitted to both the IMF and the 
OECD by the Spanish government in the hope that the Spanish economy would be able 
to receive the financial help of the international agencies and foreign governments, the 
pressures for these reforms came from the US (Whitaker, 1961:79). Further initiatives 
in drawing up the plan had been taken by the IMF and the OECD (Whitaker, 1961:79) 
under strong US influence (Tsoukalis, 1981:76). The plan was supported by $420 
million foreign aid of which almost half was to come from US public and private 
sources and the other half from the IMF and OECD. With this plan, the American 
economic commitment to further liberalise the Spanish economy was consolidated. 
Furthermore, American economic aid to Spain continued in the form of US Counterpart 
Funds for Public Finance and US Economic Assistance during the 1960s 
(OEEC/OECD Reports, 1960 to 1966). Total US economic aid reached $694,3 million 
during the 1960s and it was roughly $130 million per annum in the 1970s (Cordata, 
1980:245).
Although the basic global objective of the US was the establishment of liberal 
capitalism and free market economic policies, in the American system the state was no 
longer to replace markets but it was given a regulatory role in the functioning of the 
economy for efficient resource allocation. Accordingly, in the early 1960s the Spanish 
government invited the assistance of the World Bank in the preparation of a long term
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development plan designed to expand and modernise the Spanish economy (IBRD, 
1963:vii). Three such development plans were implemented between 1964 and 1975. 
Their main objectives were economic development, the promotion of a market 
economy, greater integration into the international system and improvements in social 
welfare (Harrison, 1993:25) (12). While the public sector was urged to meet the targets 
of the plans, state officials tried to direct private sector activities through a set of 
indirect policies, such as credit, fiscal measures, special agreements and incentives. 
Broadly speaking, this was another American initiative to fit the Spanish economy into 
the new world capitalist economic order by assigning a new role for the 
“semiperipheral Spanish state” in the economy.
Since the state is the central economic actor in the semiperiphery, various 
groups try to affect state policies in order to promote their interests. From this 
perspective it is not unrealistic to say that the Americans (a foreign actor) directed both 
stabilisation and development plans to change the economic policies of the Spanish 
state. With the stabilisation plan the Spanish state committed itself to liberalise its trade 
policies. However the abolition of restrictions on foreign investment capital was more 
important to the Americans than tariffs and quotas on goods and services. After all, the 
principle of the free flow of investment capital across borders was one of the 
innovations and main pillars of the new world capitalist economic order.
The laws promulgated in 1959 and 1962-63 gradually lifted almost all 
restrictions on the amount of capital that foreigners could invest for the purpose of 
establishing new firms and expanding the capacity of existing firms (OEEC, 1960:30; 
1962:24; and 1963:8). From 1960 to 1974 all forms of net private long-term foreign 
capital investment in Spain reached $7.6 million (Baklanoff, 1978:43); 41% of the 
accumulated foreign direct investment ($2,016 million) came from the US, and a large 
proportion of the 17% Swiss share of the total probably originated in the US 
(Baklanoff, 1978:44-45). Of the 200 largest American industrial firms 92 had 
subsidiaries in Spain of which 61 had majority participation (Baklanoff, 1978:49) (13). 
Most of them were established in relatively advanced technology or high growth
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sectors of industry (Liberman, 1982:231). In fact, between 1960 and 1975 the 
American role in the Spanish economy changed from supplier of official grants, loans, 
credits etc., to the major source of private investment capital.
There were many reasons for the massive inflow of US private capital into 
Spain. According to a study of US affiliated firms in Spain the reasons for investing 
there included a rapidly expanding market, a favourable investment climate with 
^political, economic and financial stability; low labour costs; generally lower tax rates; a 
favourable location for exports to Europe, Latin America and the Middle East; and 
closer association with the EEC (due to Spain's 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement) 
which provided better access to the EEC market (Baklanoff, 1978:49) (14). In the 
period between 1953 and the late 1960s the American presence was enormous in 
numerous sectors of the Spanish economy (Pollack, 1987:30) (15).
Despite liberalisation and further integration into the world- economy, the 
Spanish state remained a central actor in the economy during the 1960s and 1970s. In 
other words, in accordance with its semiperipheral position, the state controlled the 
economy by creating opportunities for entrepreneurs and taking an entrepreneurial role 
itself. Three main forms of state intervention were put into practice (Wright, 1977:38- 
45). First, the state intervened to bring about specific changes in a sector or a region, 
using joint action programs in which private firms in a particular sector undertook to 
increase production, productivity, quality targets, in return for state credits and tax 
benefits. Other schemes encouraged firms to merge to increase production efficiency in 
return for tax rebates; and, offered state investments in preferential industries. The 
second form of state intervention included low interest rates for private and official 
credits, and export incentives for stimulating industrial investment and exports. The 
Banking Law in 1962 extended both private and official credits. The Institute for 
Official Credit (ICO) played an important role in the extension of long term credits for 
investments (OECD,1966:41 and Baklanoff, 1978:37) which vigorously increased the 
trend towards private productive investment (OECD, 1966:6). Furthermore, the state 
supported the private sector and encouraged domestic capital formation by keeping
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wages low. In labour relations the state worked through the Ministry of Labour, through 
Syndicates, which were subservient to economic ministries and, when necessary, 
through direct and violent intervention (Wright, 1977:80-81 and Anderson, 1970:169). 
In this way the Spanish state, on the one hand, reallocated resources from public to 
private sector in the 1960s and 1970s and hence contributed decisively to its dynamism 
(OECD, 1972:40; 1974:34). On the other hand, it exerted control through indirect 
instruments, like credits, tax, etc. (16).
The third way in which the state intervened in the economy was through 
ownership of industrial companies. In spite of Spain's commitment to the market 
economy after 1959, INI continued to play an important role in the economy. In 1976 
its domestic activities represented 37% of the petroleum refined in Spain, 23% of the 
electric power generated in the country, 45% of the national steel production, 50% of 
coal, 67% of aluminium production, 97% of national shipbuilding, and 46% of the 
domestic manufacturing of automobiles (Liberman, 1982:171) (17). Furthermore, it 
owned all Spain's major airlines, operated its national railways, postal and 
communications system and the distribution of tobacco products (Baklanoff, 1978:35). 
INI also had effective control of 60 different firms which, in turn, participated in almost 
190 domestic and foreign subsidiaries and affiliates (Baklanoff, 1978:35 and Wright, 
1977:45). Another important state activity was the allocation of funds for building and 
improving the transport, electric power systems telecommunication infrastructure of the 
country (OECD, 1966:40; 1974:32).
As for relations between the state and other economic actors, after the 1959 
Stabilisation plan the state continued to favour the accumulation of capital in the hands 
of financial capital and its control over the industry. First, although the Banking Law of 
1962 de jure opened the way for newcomers in the banking sector, its conditions made 
the establishment of new banks very difficult. This reinforced the dominant position of 
the Big Seven Banks. In fact, the banking community helped to formulate the new 
economic policy in the early 1960s (Anderson, 1970:202). Not surprisingly, during the
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first development plan the number of firms controlled by the six major banks increased 
considerably (Amodia, 1977:215).
The relations between the state controlled saving banks and private banks was a 
good example of the intimate relations between the state and the big financial 
community: the deposits of the Saving Bank (which came mainly from less well off 
rural areas) were lent at rates well below the market rate to certain privileged industrial 
companies which were often owned by the big commercial banks (Wright, 1977:110). 
Furthermore, throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Big Seven Banks controlled some 
70% of the total assets of the commercial banking sector, granted 60% of all loans, held 
90% of all private assets and exercised direct control over a quarter of the country's 200 
largest concerns (Wright, 1977:106; Maravall and Santamaria, 1986:75). In 1967 these 
Seven Banks figured among the 20 most profitable and important Spanish enterprises 
(Carr and Fusi, 1981:163). Furthermore, in the 1970s the banking community made 
large profits from its linkages with the energy industry (Lopez, 1990:27).
The close links between the banks and industry continued in the 1960s and 
1970s: through majority and minority shares, the banks owned between 40 to 50 % of 
the industrial concerns (Wright, 1977:117), supplied boards of directors to large 
enterprises and guided their investment decisions (Anderson, 1970:76). Another 
important dimension of the relations between the state and financial capital was the 
participation of private capital in state monopolies such as petroleum distribution 
(Campsa), telephones (Telefonica) and tobacco (Tabacaera) (Graham, 1984:81). 
Similarly, half of the important board positions of INI were filled by members of the 
financial elite (Lopez, 1990:27). Furthermore, INI was used by private sector firms as a 
partner in order to have access to cheap long-term credits (Graham, 1984:81).
The connections between foreign capital and the Spanish state and banking- 
business community also reveal striking features. In the early 1960s both the state and 
the banking community welcomed American capital. For example, the state gave 
concessions to American firms to explore for petroleum in Spain's African colonies.
207
Spain: 1945-1976
The Spanish Ambassador to Washington had connections with American banks. 
Spanish bankers, on the other hand, welcomed US private capital investments as well 
as government sponsored loans (Whitaker, 1961:211 and 249). In the 1960s foreign 
(especially US) investment capital was involved in joint ventures with the Spanish state 
and the Spanish banking/industrial sectors. INI also became involved in joint ventures 
with US multinational companies, particularly in motorcars, heavy trucks, petroleum 
refining and iron and steel sectors (Baklanoff, 1978:35 and 51). In 1972, foreign capital 
was present in 61 of the 300 largest industrial companies through sharing its interests 
with the Spanish banks and with INI (Munoz, 1979:171). Of the largest 159 
multinationals, 85 were American, 60 of which had interests in 351 Spanish companies 
(Munoz, 1979:169) (18).
As a consequence of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan and successive Development 
Plans in the 1960s and early 1970s a relative change occurred in Spain's industrial 
structure. Previously it had been dominated by inefficient, high cost, low technology 
production. In the mid-1960s as a result of deliberate policies of liberalisation and 
rationalisation, Spanish industrialists obtained both the incentive and the practical 
possibility of importing modem equipment and advanced technology for the first time 
since 1930 (OECD, 1965:15). These policies made possible the normal flow of raw 
materials and capital goods into industry and opened the way for the rapid expansion of 
the Spanish economy during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Chemicals, 
petroleum products, rubber products, basic metals, automotive industry, electrical 
machinery sectors grew rapidly, while the traditional sectors of textile, clothing, food 
and beverages lagged behind the total industrial growth (Donges, 1971:58-59). 
However, industry relied heavily on the transfer of foreign technology and foreign 
capital rather than on endogenous development. Thus Spanish industry either remained 
dependent on foreign patents or on foreign capital which was firmly established 
especially in those rapidly growing technologically advanced sectors (Wright, 1977:47 
and Munoz, 1979:167). However, despite structural change and rapid economic growth 
(7.3% annual average) between 1960-1974, extensive parts of Spanish industry 
(especially the traditional branches) remained inefficient and technologically backward
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(Donges, 1971:58; Wright, 1977:47 and Salmon, 1991:6). Furthermore, in most sectors 
a number of large firms continued to exist side by side with a multitude of small units 
(Wright, 1977:46).
In the context of the semiperiphery argument, it is clear that core-like 
production patterns began to ascend in the Spanish economy at the expense of 
peripheral ones in the mid-1960s. Two economic actors played an important role in the 
process of modernisation: the Spanish state (through the policies we have described) 
and, the Spanish financial/industrial elite which supported the liberalisation and 
development plans of the OECD and World Bank for Spain in the late 1950s and early 
1960s (Whitaker, 1961:200 and Anderson, 1970:195). Spanish businessmen who had 
been unwilling to invest in new technology before the 1960s changed their attitudes 
when they realised that further industrialisation was impossible in the existing 
economic environment (Donges, 1971:61). Hence, many entrepreneurs met the 
challenge of improving efficiency and adopting advanced technology in their respective 
branches.
The strong investment boom and the employment of relatively advanced 
technology in industrial production in the early 1960s led to the satisfactory growth of 
industrial exports and also to the diversification of Spanish exports. From 
approximately the middle of the 1960s, the growth of industrial exports accelerated 
markedly to 25% per year between 1963 and 1972 (OECD, 1973:20). Moreover, 
Spanish exports underwent a fundamental structural change with regard to their 
commodity composition. Until then, Spanish exports had mainly consisted of food 
products which accounted for 60% of the total. However, industrial exports (which had 
accounted for 1/3 in 1963) reached nearly three quarters of the total exports in 1972 
(OECD, 1972:31-32; 1973:20). Furthermore, this spectacular growth was accompanied 
by important changes in composition: while the share of cotton fabric, petroleum 
products, pig iron decreased in total exports, commodities such as household electrical 
goods, electrical equipment, and machine tools and ships (capital goods) etc. began to 
be exported in appreciable quantities from the middle of the 1960s (OECD, 1972:32
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and Baklanoff, 1978:68) (19). Another important result from a semiperipheral 
perspective is that Spanish industrial products penetrated world markets. Between the 
mid-1960s and early 1970s the Spanish share in world markets more than trebled 
(OECD, 1973:20), rising by an average of 9% (OECD, 1975:15).
Another significant development in the period between 1960 and mid-1970s 
was the emergence of Europe as an important factor in the Spanish economic 
development. American economic aid lasted until the mid-1960s, providing the 
necessary foreign exchange for imports, and offsetting the balance-of-payments deficits 
(OECD, 1958:36-37). However, while American involvement in the Spanish economy 
took the form of private direct investment in the mid-1960s the role of official grants 
and loans decreased substantially (OECD, 1961:30; 1962:22; 1963:25). Indeed, the 
tremendous expansion of capital goods imports which led to the breakthrough in 
industrial exports and structural changes in export commodity composition, and the 
subsequent trade deficits between the early-1960s and the mid-1970s were not financed 
by official American economic aid but by new sources of foreign exchange: tourism 
receipts, emigrant workers remittances and foreign private capital inflow.
Tourist receipts and workers remittances came from Europe. OECD country 
reports between 1961 to 1977 show the increasing importance of tourism receipts, 
emigrant workers remittances and capital inflows in offsetting the current trade balance 
deficit. The fact that 90% of tourism earnings came from European tourists (OECD, 
1973:11) and that almost all the workers remittances were sent by Spanish workers 
employed in major European industrial capitals revealed Europe's increasing role in the 
Spanish economy in this period. Between 1962-1973 the annual receipts from tourism 
went up from $500 million to $3,300 million, while emigrant remittances increased 
from $150 million to $900 million in the same period (OECD, 1977:33) (20). The 
reconstruction of European economies and the rising economic activity and prosperity 
in Europe began to contribute to Spanish economic development indirectly in this way.
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Europe's increasing role in the Spanish economy between 1960 and the mid- 
1970s was not confined to providing foreign exchange through tourist receipts and 
workers remittances. Trade between Spain and the EEC increased remarkably between 
1961 and 1977 (Tsoukalis, 1981:85). In 1961, 26% of Spanish imports came from the 
EEC. The proportion had grown to 43.2% in 1973 and 33.8% in 1977. Similarly, while 
37.6% of Spanish exports went to the EEC in 1961 the proportion had increased to 
46.3% in 1977. On the other hand, US-Spanish trade either diminished or remained 
stagnant in the same period (Tsoukalis, 1981:85). Spanish imports of American goods 
fell from 25.2% in 1961 to 16.3% in 1973 and 12.1% in 1977. On the export side, the 
level rose from 9.9% in 1961 to 13.9% in 1973 and fell to 9.8% in 1977.
In the sphere of foreign investment the EEC share also increased significantly in 
the 1960 to mid-1970s period. EEC capital had represented only 20% of foreign 
investment in 1961-62 (US 45%). It reached 31% (US 32%) in 1969 (Rubottom and 
Murphy,1984 :99) and 35% in 1975 (US 41%) (Baklanoff, 1978:43). The signing of a 
Preferential Trade Agreement between Spain and the EEC in 1970 (eight years after 
Spain applied for an Association Agreement) marked the institutionalisation of 
increasing European influence in the Spanish economy.
Another important point is that the majority of the Spanish business community 
had favoured some kind of association with the EEC since the early 1960s (Anderson, 
1970:191 and Gallo, 1973:336). In fact, their enthusiasm for such an agreement was a 
clear indication of their orientation towards modernisation and reorganisation 
(Europeanization) of the Spanish economy. This is a characteristic behaviour of the 
economic elite of an upwardly-mobile semiperipheral state. However, the support of 
the Spanish state to, and its collaboration with, this modernising economic elite in this 
process was another important point which should be kept in mind (Baklanoff, 1978:25 
and Gallo, 1973:336).
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3. The Political Environment
Now let us focus on the domestic political sphere to see whether Spanish politics 
displayed semiperipheral characteristics in this period. As we have seen, semiperipheral 
states are subjected to high degrees of intervention in their domestic affairs by 
hegemonic and/or core states during the expansion periods of the world-economy. In 
this way, they become satellite/client states and ideological and political agents of 
hegemonic power/core states.
The politics of the postwar period was dominated by Spanish-US relations. The 
main preoccupations of the Americans were to dismantle the power of autarkic state 
policy-makers who opposed the new liberal world economic order, and to integrate 
Spain into the US policy of containing communism politically, militarily and 
ideologically. Spain's geo-strategic assets were critical in the American decision to 
control the developments in the country. Its geographical location between the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and between Europe and Africa made Spain a 
crossroads for shipping, sea lanes and communication channels. Thus, its control was 
crucially important for the smooth functioning of the US designed world-economy and 
for the containment of communism.
In the immediate postwar years, the US administration concluded that only 
Franco could provide the kind of order which would protect US global interests in 
Spain (Dura, 1985:152). Accordingly, US policies were directed towards preventing any 
destabilisation of the Franco regime. Hence, in the political sphere, American support 
(intervention) assisted the continuation of Franco's authoritarian regime for the next 
three decades. While publicly condemning the fascist nature of the Franco regime 
Americans extended economic and military aid to, and signed economic and military 
agreements with, Franco's Spain. Furthermore, in the late 1950s the American 
administration even stopped condemning Spain and increased its aid. In the diplomatic 
sphere the Americans tried to neutralise diplomatic attacks on Spain which might 
endanger its political stability. In one case, for example, the Americans urged France
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not to bring a proposal to the UN Security Council for the imposition of economic 
sanctions on Spain.
US policy was a severe blow to the hopes of the anti-Franco groups in and 
outside Spain and it enabled the Spanish dictator to survive. American support for 
Franco continued until his death in the mid-1970s. For example, during a visit to 
Madrid in 1959, the President Eisenhower emphasised his support for stronger 
friendship and more active co-operation between the US and Spain (Whitaker, 
1961:81). Visits of top level US statesmen continued until Franco's death in 1976 (21). 
An American admiral participated in Franco's Civil War celebrations in June 1967 (US 
Hearings, 1971:229-30) and US troops participated in joint manoeuvres to down a 
hypothetical rebellion against the Spanish government in 1969 (US Hearings, 
1971:296). In the same vein, US Secretary of State Rogers refused to meet a prestigious 
group of opposition leaders during his visit to Madrid in 1970 (US Congress Hearings, 
1971:297).
There were three main reasons for American involvement in Spanish affairs. 
First, Spain's economic and market potential had to be integrated into the new open- 
door world economic system. Second, Spain's strategic location was important for the 
world-economy and for the containment of communism. Third, the continuation of 
Spain's anti-Communist orientation had to be guaranteed.
As early as 1946 the State Department decided that since Spain did not threaten 
international peace, and since US interests were served satisfactorily by Franco, there 
was no justification for American intervention to topple Franco's administration (Dura, 
1985: 160). American businessmen were also putting pressure on the Truman 
administration for an economic aid programme to Spain to provide the necessary 
foreign exchange for the purchase of American industrial and agricultural goods (Dura, 
1985:219). Despite administrative and financial difficulties, Spain's economic potential 
attracted American businessmen and major US oil companies such as Standard Oil,
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Texaco, Caltex and Aramco, had already invested in Spain (Dura, 1985:220). The 
potential of the Spanish market could not easily be ignored easily.
However, the condition for American aid was the elimination of autarkic 
policies, and hence the dismantlement of the power of the political cadres and 
institutions of the autarkic period in the policy making process. In order to bring about 
such changes the Americans had to convince Franco, since the functions of Chief of 
State, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and Chief of the 
National Movement and its corporate representative Falange (the official party) were 
combined in the person of Franco. Furthermore, there was no separation of powers: 
Franco totally controlled the Spanish executive, legislature and judiciary (Gilmour, 
1985:23). In this system the factions in the establishment (Falange, Church, Army) 
were neither given monopoly power nor totally excluded from office (Carr and Fusi, 
1981:35). Franco was the supreme political manipulator.
In accordance with the State Department's advice, the US administration used 
covert mechanisms to bring about changes in the Spanish politics. Economic aid was 
the important instrument in this process. First, the approval of loans to Spain from 
private US banks in the late 1940s was preceded by Franco's announcement that Spain 
was a monarchy. Second, the Pact of Madrid was signed after the Spanish cabinet was 
reshuffled in 1951 at the expense of pro-autarky ministers. However, the decisive blow 
to the Falangist, pro-autarky ministers came before the 1959 Stabilisation Plan.
After 1957 Franco sharply decreased the number of Falangists who supported 
import substitution, protection, exchange rate manipulation, etc., in the economics 
ministries. Instead, a new group of technocrats with a strong commitment to the liberal 
economic philosophy, and who were closely associated with the Catholic secular lay 
organisation Opus Dei, were appointed to the key economic ministries of Industry, 
Finance, Commerce, Public Works, and Agriculture. In sharp contrast to the Falangist 
technocrats, the Opus group opposed import substitution, protection, exchange rate 
manipulation, and supported a free market economy - that is the free flow of goods,
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capital and labour. In fact the Americans had pressed for such changes to the Spanish 
economy through diplomatic means for years. After 1953, the American ambassador 
had urged the Spanish government to remove excessive regulations, discourage 
monopoly, encourage competition, and abolish prohibitions on foreign investment. 
American pressure had increased in intensity after 1955 (Anderson, 1970:91). 
However, no such pressures was put on Franco with regard to the nature of the political 
regime (Whitaker, 1961:126).
By 1962 when Spain agreed to adopt development plans after World Bank 
advice the new ruling elite (Opus Dei) which represented big business and financial 
interests, became the most powerful group in the formulation of economic policy 
(Harrison, 1993:24). Opus technocrats aimed to transform Spain into an efficient, 
dynamic and productive economy through rationalisation, planning, and eliminating 
inefficient and archaic structures (Gallo, 1973: 266). There is evidence to suggest that 
Opus ministers were in contact with economic leaders and authorities in America and 
Europe (Anderson, 1970:104). By 1959 the balance of power and the composition of 
the Spanish administration had changed in favour of the modem capitalist, pro-market 
Opus group of the Catholic Church, and the power of the statist, autarkic Falangist 
faction had been dismantled. However, despite their liberal economic outlook, Opus 
ministers were authoritarian in the political sphere. Hence, the repressive nature of the 
Franco administration did not change. Spaniards were denied the basic freedoms of 
expression, association and assembly until the end of Franco regime in the mid-1970s.
The army was another element of the Spanish establishment on which the 
Americans exercised influence. The Americans saw the primary task of the Spanish 
army as the maintenance of domestic stability. The Bases Agreement of 1953 (part of 
the Pact of Madrid) gave the Spanish armed forces a key role in the relationship 
between Spain and the US (Whitaker, 1961:70). They were given the task of defending 
US bases against military attacks, but their fundamental duty was to maintain domestic 
stability (Whitaker, 1961:71). This was crucially important to the global economic and 
strategic interests of the Americans. For this purpose the US extended money, military
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equipment, technical and professional training to the Spanish armed forces. Total US 
military assistance to Spain amounted to $849,3 million between 1951-59, $679,3 
million in the 1960s, and roughly $150 million during each year of the 1970s (Cordata, 
1980:245) (22).
After the Bases Agreement Spanish pilots were trained on American planes, 
and many soldiers received American training in other spheres of military operations 
both in Spain and the US. Joint military exercises with the US resulted in the 
integration of NATO concepts into Spanish military thinking and operational doctrines 
(US Hearings, 1971:242). As a result of the close relations between the US and the 
Spanish armed forces, military personnel in Spanish cabinets increased in the 1957 and 
1969 cabinet reshuffles (Payne, 1968:42 and Mackenzie, 1973:73).
US influence probably strengthened Spain's die-hard anti-Communist stand. In 
fact, Franco had always been anti-Communist but he was also strongly anti-liberal. As 
American influence increased, he gradually abandoned his anti-liberal stand and 
dismantled the power of corresponding political groups in the establishment. He also 
strengthened the anti-Communist nature of his regime. Yet the striking point is that 
there was no immediate internal or external communist threat to Spain. In the domestic 
sphere, the Spanish communists were crushed during and after the Civil War. In the 
external sphere, the country's geographic location rendered communist aggression very 
unlikely. Nevertheless, anti-communism became a central policy of Franco's Spain. 
Throughout the 1950s not a day passed without a declaration of Spain's determination 
to fight against communism (Gallo, 1973:212).
The Opus Dei technocrats, who joined the cabinet between the late 1950s and 
early 1970s were in favour of closer co-operation with the EEC. Indeed, they were 
identified with a 'Spain is part of Europe' position (Mackenzie, 1973:92) because they 
applied for an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1962 and were involved in the 
negotiations which resulted in a Preferential Trade Agreement in 1970. Although their 
basic aim was economic integration with the EC, they emphasised the political aspect
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of their Europe-oriented position after signing the Preferential Trade Agreement. 
Foreign Minister L.Bravo (of Opus Dei), for example, stated that
Spain ever attentive to three continents has now taken the decision to 
plant its roots in Europe: our destiny is worked out. This agreement 
indeed only represent a first step, but the practical irreversibility of the 
process is present in everybody's mind, as well as the certainty of the 
final objective (23).
However, the main obstacle to the Association Agreement was the nature of the 
Spanish political regime which was incompatible with the democratic principles that 
governed the Community's member states.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s it became apparent that the dynamism of the 
rapidly changing Spanish economy and society could no longer cope with the 
antiquated political structures of the Franco regime (24). The increase in the number 
and intensity of strikes, demonstrations and Basque - terrorist attacks demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of the control mechanisms (the various forms of repression, and the 
official syndicates which controlled labour force) of Franco's regime.
The repercussions were striking. On the one hand, with the establishment of a 
new form of capitalism in Spain in 1959, the form of working class threat had changed. 
The owners of many of the large and more competitive enterprises who wanted to 
expand their operations in the EEC emphasised the need to integrate labour into this 
new capitalism through reward-based productivity arrangements: in other words, the 
system of syndicates had become a major obstacle to the future growth their businesses 
(Preston, 1986:17 and 1984:33). In fact, from the outset Europeans had demanded the 
dismantlement of the Syndicate system in Spain. Accordingly, the big, competitive 
businesses entered into direct dialogue with both the Workers Commissions and 
moderate opposition leaders. They had to risk liberalisation in order to avoid 
cataclysmic confrontation (Preston, 1986:17 and 57). The dissatisfaction of the 
economic elite with the old institutional arrangements led to similar changes in the
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Francoist political structures (Preston, 1986:17). First, the church began to withdraw 
the regime's moral legitimacy. Second, a group in the Francoist political elite (known as 
Aparturistas) began to defend the adjustment of political structures to the new form of 
capitalism (Preston, 1986:16). Accordingly, in 1974 they launched a programme which 
envisaged an opening and wider participation in the system. The EEC's refusal to 
accept Spanish membership as long as its undemocratic political regime persisted 
played a decisive role in changing the outlook of the business elite to the Francoist 
political structures. They were the Europe- oriented core-like producers who owned 
high-tech, efficient and competitive enterprises.
4. Foreign Policy: Atlanticist Years
We can now turn to Spain's semiperipheral foreign policy during the postwar expansion 
period of the world-economy. The foreign policies of semiperipheral states in periods 
of expansion are directed towards the accomplishment of the global objectives of 
hegemonic/ core powers. Accordingly, they tend to become satellites of hegemonic 
power and subordinate their national interests and national sovereignty to the global 
and/or regional (local) interests of the hegemonic power.
In the postwar period the Spain usually followed a pro-American foreign policy. 
In other words, it assisted the consolidation of the US-led world order. Hence, Spain 
signed agreements with the US allowed them to shape Spanish foreign and defence 
policies. Not surprisingly, Spain turned into a satellite state of the US and Spanish 
national interests were subordinated to those of the US.
Located at the crossroads of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and of Africa 
and Europe Spain was important to the Americans. Its control of the oil routes and the 
shipping lanes, and its geographical proximity to the oil regions made Spain important 
for the new world economic order. It also had an important role to play in the 
containment of communism in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa. 
Moreover, its land mass down to the Pyrenees was a fall back area in case of a Soviet 
attack on Western Europe. Thus Spain was also important for the security of the new
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world order. This last point was emphasised in the US National Security Council 
(NSC) Report # 68 in 1950, and the NSC Report #72/4 recommended a bilateral 
agreement for military co-operation with Spain (Dura, 1985:269-70 and 291).
On the strategic front the central aim of the US was to maintain the security of 
the new world capitalist system against the Soviet Union and world communism. In 
1949, NATO was established as an important component of this global policy. The US 
administration wanted to bring Spain into NATO because of its geo-strategic location 
and to secure political stability in the country (which was also crucial for US economic 
interests). However, there was an important obstacle to Spanish entry into the 
Organisation: the Europeans strongly opposed Spain both because of Franco's war time 
alliance with the Nazis and Fascists, and because of the undemocratic nature of the 
Franco regime. Under these circumstances, the Americans had to find another formula 
to incorporate Spain into the Western defence system. The formula came with the 1953 
Bases Agreement (Pact of Madrid) between US and Spain. Under this agreement, the 
US was authorised to establish, maintain and use naval and air bases, military and 
transit facilities and oil pipelines on Spanish soil. In this way the Americans indirectly 
linked Spain to NATO. The Spanish bases became part of the US overseas bases, and 
hence a part of the US global defence system. The Agreement clearly signified Spanish 
participation in the US policy of containment. H.Baldwin, a leading American expert 
on defence issues, described the Bases Agreement as follows:
...the geographic and strategic importance of Spain, her mobilization 
potential of 2,000,000 men, her relative social, political and 
geographic security as a base, and her strategic raw materials of 
potash, iron core, zinc, lead and mercury are a major geopolitical 
asset... [on the other hand]... Spain's bases help to seal the Western 
gateway to the Mediterranean; her Atlantic islands aid in controlling 
and protecting trans-Atlantic shipping lanes and the Iberian peninsula 
provides additional disperse sites for light, medium and heavy bomber 
strips. And Spain behind the rampart of the Pyrenees, provides a last 
line of defence if the rest of Western Europe should fall, and offers a 
springboard for offensive land, sea and air operations. Her bases are 
particularly important as an alternative to the great bomber strips in 
Morrocco, surrounded by political and social unrest, and the great
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supply and air installations in France, which might be threatened by a 
Soviet advance across the Rhine or by a change in present French 
policies perhaps incident to German rearmament (25).
The 1953 Agreement was renewed in 1963, 1969, 1970 and 1976, and each 
time its content was further enriched and Spain was further integrated into US global 
designs. In the 1963 agreement, for example, US nuclear submarines were permitted to 
base in the US naval base Rota in southern Spain. Indeed, in 1963 Spain, with its naval 
and air bases, and its radar post and nuclear stock-piles, turned into an important 
country in the American overseas defence network (Gallo, 1973:311). Joint military 
exercises served to introduce NATO military concepts into Spanish military thinking 
and operational doctrines (US Hearings, 1971:242). In the early 1970s the Americans 
claimed that the bases provided the infrastructure to support American forces deployed 
in Europe and the Mediterranean, contributed to world-wide strategic and tactical 
mobility, and also to America's deterrent capacity, particularly by providing coverage 
for Polaris nuclear submarines (US Hearings, 1971:218 and 248-49).
The increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean in the second half of the 
1960s and the loss of US base in Libya had increased Spain's strategic importance. 
According to J.M.Morse, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
NATO Affairs, Spain could provide a springboard for the introduction of air and 
ground forces in to the Eastern Mediterranean in times of tension. And since Spain was 
out of the range of the majority of Soviet high density short and medium range ballistic 
missiles, it would provide a rear area to the central Europe defence system (US 
Hearings, 1971:258-59). Since Spain was also contiguous to North Africa, it would 
become even more significant if Soviet influence and penetration were to continue in 
the Western Mediterranean area. Moreover, Spain was also important for the defence of 
Israel and American oil interests in the Middle East (US Hearings, 1971:294).
In the absence of the formal defence relations between Spain and NATO, the 
Americans maintained informal contacts through briefings and consultations with 
Spanish officials on current developments in the early 1970s and informed them of the
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main points of the discussions after each session of the NATO Council and Defence 
Planning Committee (US Hearings, 1971:272 and 293). To increase co-ordination 
between NATO and Spain, the 1970 Bases Agreement established a Joint US-Spanish 
Committee on defence matters and the Commander-in-Chief of the US NATO forces in 
Europe was appointed its principal advisor. In sum, through these mechanisms Spain 
was informally incorporated in the US-led Western defence system in the 1945-mid- 
1970s period.
Another semiperipheral characteristic of Spain's external policy was its client 
status vis-a-vis the US. In the early postwar period Spain was subjected to international 
political ostracism. It was not accepted in the UN and UN member countries withdrew 
their ambassadors from Madrid. Furthermore, it was excluded from Marshall Plan and 
NATO. However, American diplomatic patronage played a decisive role in gaining 
Spain's admittance to a number of international organisations - chiefly the UN. First, 
the US played the leading role in revoking the 1946 UN ambassadorial ban on Spain, 
by defeating a proposal in 1947 which demanded the reaffirmation of the resolution on 
the recall of ambassadors from Madrid (Whitaker, 1961:30). In 1948, the US Secretary 
of State officially requested the annulment of the UN condemnation of Spain; and in 
1950 the Americans invited UN member states to appoint ambassadors to Spain and 
demanded the admission of Spain into the UN specialised organisations (Gallo, 
1973:188-89). As a result Spain joined the WHO in 1951, UNESCO in 1952, ILO in 
1953, and the UN in 1955.
The Americans also wanted to include Spain in the Marshall Plan but the 
Europeans strongly opposed the idea. However, as we have seen the Americans used 
other means to assist Spain. Similarly, the Americans were anxious to bring Spain into 
NATO and, attempting to influence to modify their attitudes, they took every 
opportunity to remind other NATO members that Spain was really important (US 
Hearings, 1971:274; Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:113). In this endeavour, however, 
the Americans were unsuccessful. Once again they resorted to bilateral links through 
the Bases Agreement in 1953.
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American patronage and protection saved Spain from total international 
isolation but it turned the country into a client and a satellite state, and a political and 
ideological appendage of the US. Franco's emphasis all this time was on anti­
communism, and stability and order in the country (Gallo, 1973:184). Stability and 
order secured US official and private capital in Spain, while anti-communism indicated 
Spain's political and military commitment to US global objectives. Spanish foreign 
policy was mainly based upon anti-communism in this period. In 1948 Franco 
emphasised ‘the necessity for building up an alliance against Soviet menace and the 
Spanish willingness to participate in this organisation’ (Whitaker, 1961:36). Similarly, 
in 1949 he declared that ‘as long as arms and economic aid come from the US there 
would be no need to spill American blood for the defence of Europe’ (Dura, 1985:254). 
A further Spanish commitment to the anti-Communist crusade came in 1950 when the 
Spanish embassy in Washington declared that ‘Spain was willing to help the US to 
check communism by sending forces to Korea’ (Gallo, 1973:183). Franco's message to 
the Spanish parliament (Cortes) when the Bases Agreement was signed in 1953 defined 
the Agreement 'as the honour of fulfilment of Spanish foreign policy' (Gallo, 
1973:223).
Indeed the nature of the Agreement was proof of Spain's client and satellite 
status. The Mutual Defence Assistance section stated that Spain agreed ‘to cooperate 
with the US in controlling trade with nations that threaten world peace’ (Whitaker, 
1961:47). Not surprisingly, Franco issued a call for an international boycott of 
“communist goods” in 1954 (Shneidman, 1980:162). The renewal of the Bases 
Agreement in 1963 and 1970 indicated the continuation of Spanish commitment to US 
global interests. After the 1970 renewal President Nixon and the Spanish foreign 
minister declared their determination to check Soviet expansionism, particularly in the 
Western Mediterranean and North Africa (Cordata, 1980:249). Spain's satellite 
characteristics were apparent in the way the Americans utilised the bases, especially 
during the Middle East conflicts. The Spanish bases enabled the Americans to respond 
to the Lebanon in 1958, the Congo crisis in 1954, and to Middle Eastern crises in 1967 
and 1973 (US Hearings, 1971:218 and 220).
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Spain's satellite status was evidenced on other fronts too. Spanish foreign policy 
towards Eastern Europe echoed Washington, for example, in 1951 Franco proposed ‘a 
Western crusade of liberation to free the “captive people” of Eastern Europe from 
Russian communism’. Similarly, in 1952, the Spanish foreign minister announced ‘the 
Spanish support for a Western strategy of roll-back against the Soviet menace’ and 
stated that ‘such a policy was demanding all the military plans of the “free world” to be 
designed primarily for the rescue and liberation of East European sister nations who 
were subjected to the “most appalling of oppressions’” (26).
Anti-communism was also an important aspect of Spanish foreign policy 
towards Latin America and the Arab World. In 1958, the Spanish foreign minister 
emphasised the danger of communist penetration of Latin America and implied Spain's 
intention to assist the US in combating communism in the Southern Cone (Whitaker, 
1961:343). In fact, Franco abandoned Spain's “Hispanidad” policy in Latin America 
which aimed at the restoration of Spanish hegemony in the Southern Cone (Rubottom 
and Murphy, 1984:12) (27). Instead the “Hispanidad Programme” was converted into a 
cultural unity of Hispanic states (Whitaker, 1961:30). Similarly, Spain no longer argued 
that the US had turned Latin America into a new kind of colony through investments 
and bases (Whitaker, 1961:375).
Spanish foreign policy also followed a pro-American line towards the Arab 
World. During the 1956 Suez crisis, Franco altered his initial support for Nasser under 
American pressure and with the increasing Soviet penetration in Egypt (Whitaker, 
1961:330 and Flemming, 1980:134). Franco sounded the tocsin against communist 
penetration of the Arab World (Whitaker, 1961:343) and by the early 1960s he had 
identified the radical and neutralist Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria as 
potential dangers to the status quo and the agents of the Soviet Union (Flemming, 
1980:141). On the other hand, although Spain refused to recognise Israel, Franco 
provided bases to the US, Israel's principal supporter, and he allowed the Americans to 
use these bases to assist Israel in 1967 and 1973.
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Another characteristic semiperipheral foreign policy behaviour in periods of 
expansion is the subordination of sovereignty and national interests to the global 
interests of hegemonic power. Many of the Spanish policies exhibited this 
characteristic. First, the secret clauses of the 1953 Bases Agreement and other 
confidential agreements between Spain and the US in this period subordinated of 
Spanish foreign and security policies to American interests. A secret clause of the 1953 
Spanish-American Defence Agreement (which remained in force between 1953 and 
1970 and was secret until 1981) gave the US a blank cheque to use the Bases in times 
of emergency and actual war (Vinas, 1984:41-42; 1988:147). This clause allowed the 
Americans to take the initiative in acts of reprisal with no obligation to the Spanish 
administration other than passing on information about their intentions (Pollack, 
1987:151-52).
Similarly, a secret US NSC document in 1956 declared the American intention 
to use bases in Spain to attack the Soviet Union if it was deemed necessary (Pollack, 
1987:26). Other secret technical agreements, 22 confidential procedural agreements, 
and a non-public status-of-forces agreement for US personnel and dependants which 
further limited the Spanish sovereignty, were signed with the US between 1953 and 
1960 (Vinas, 1988:147).
In fact, the American bases were the only reason why there might be a 
communist attack on Spain. Thus, the deployment of the latest US B-47 aircrafts 
capable of carrying nuclear bombs, and the construction of a sea-base for the US 
Polaris nuclear submarines turned Spain into a principal target in case of an East-West 
conflict. Indeed, Spain was alarmed during the Cuban Missile Crisis since it was a host 
country to US bases (Story and Pollack, 1991:154). Another example of how Spanish 
interests were subordinated was the authorisation to build a nuclear submarine base in 
southern Spain. Permission was given without negotiations, and even without the 
knowledge of the Spanish foreign ministry, just before the commencement of 
negotiations for the renewal of the Bases Agreement in 1963. (Vinas, 1984:42-43).
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During the 1950s and 1960s Spanish defence policy was concerned not about a 
possible communist attack, but about the Moroccan threat to the North African 
possessions of Ceuta, Mellila, Ifni, the Spanish Sahara and Spanish Guinea (Whitaker, 
1961:322). Spanish threat perceptions did not change in the early 1970s. A strategic 
study prepared by the Spanish armed forces in 1971 defined North Africa as the most 
important security risk for Spain and referred to the territorial claims of Morocco, 
emphasising the potential sources of conflict with this country (Vinas, 1988:148). A 
retired American army officer who served in the American Embassy in Madrid pointed 
this out to the US House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Europe:
The Spanish military see the principal external security threat to Spain 
posed for North Africa on the south rather than from over the 
Pyrenees in the north... They are concerned with the defence of Ceuta 
and Mellila which are considered parts of metropolitan Spain... (and) 
to a lesser degree, the protection of the Spanish Sahara (US Hearings, 
1971:243).
Despite their sensitivity over the North African possessions, the Spaniards lost 
almost all of them during the Franco period. In North Africa, the most striking example 
of the subordination of Spanish national interests to the US occurred in 1957, when Ifni 
was invaded by Moroccan irregulars. In this case the Americans did not allow the 
Spanish army to use American weapons to put down the attack (Rubottom and 
Murphy, 1984:61). Nowhere in the defence agreement was there a US obligation to 
assist Spain in case of an attack on Spanish colonies or protectorates (Pollack, 
1987:152). In fact, none of the military agreements signed between the US and Spain in 
the period between 1953 and mid-1970s included a commitment by the US to the 
defence of Spain (Payne, 1968:38 and US Hearings, 1971:226). Thus, while Spain 
might become a victim or part of an East-West conflict, there was no US guarantee of 
support against threats or attacks on Spanish territory.
The erosion of Spanish sovereignty and the subordination of its national 
interests were also apparent in the way the US used its bases in Spain in the Middle 
East Crisis of 1967 and 1973. First, despite the traditional Spanish-Arab friendship and
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Spain's refusal to recognise Israel, the Americans provided logistical support to Israel 
from their Spanish bases in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The Spanish government was 
either kept in ignorance or unable to stop them (Pollack, 1987:97). Second, after this 
incident although the Americans were told by the Spaniards that they would not be 
allowed to use the bases in any future conflict between the Arabs and Israel, USAF 
tanker planes in Spain refuelled American jets being flown non-stop from the US to 
Israel. This was done without prior notice to the Spanish government (Rubottom and 
Murphy, 1984:107). The Spanish government protested but they did so after the event 
rather than to interfering at the time of refuelling (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:107). 
An important consequence of these developments was that Spain's reliability 
diminished in the eyes of the Arabs and its claim to be a bridge between Islam and 
Christianity was undermined.
Nevertheless, occasionally in the 1960s Spain followed policies that took its 
national interests into account. Hence, it broadened its demands in return for US bases, 
opposed Israeli policies in the Middle East, established friendly relations with Cuba, 
claimed its sovereignty over Gibraltar, took steps to normalise relations with the Soviet 
Union, etc. However, none of these foreign policy actions challenged US global 
interests. They seemed to be aimed at extracting more aid from the Americans.
Another semiperipheral characteristics of Spanish foreign policy in this period 
was to playing a bridge role between the West and Latin America and the Middle East 
(28). There was a constant interplay between Spain's “bridge policy” and its relations 
with the US (Whitaker, 1961:320). The “bridge policy” in the Arab World was 
announced during the Spanish foreign minister's long tour of six Middle Eastern 
countries in 1952 (Flemming, 1980:134). Accordingly, Spain offered its good offices 
between Britain and Egypt and the inclusion of Arab league into Western defensive 
system (Whitaker, 1961:327). A similar attempt was made during the Suez crisis in 
1956 but the “bridge” collapsed under the weight of the US bases in Spain (Whitaker, 
1961:330).
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In Latin America the “bridge policy” was put into practice mainly through the 
new Hispanidad programme which was redefined as “a system of norms destined to 
better defence of Christian civilisation and to the ordering of international life in the 
service of peace” (Whitaker, 1961:343). In 1958 the Spanish Foreign Minister hinted 
that one of the aims of the Hispanidad was to assist the US in combating communism 
in Latin America (Whitaker, 1961:343). Thus the “bridge” policy indicated Spain's 
willingness to become a springboard for US interests in both the underdeveloped Arab 
World and Latin America in return for economic and political benefits. However, the 
Spanish initiative was unsuccessful. The existence of US bases in Spain and the strong 
neutralist tendencies among the Arabs were the main causes of Spain's failure in the 
Arab World. On the other hand, Latin Americans were not willing to support Spain's 
“bridge” policy because the Hispanidad programme reminded them of the close 
association between the US and dictatorships (Whitaker, 1961:349-50).
European-Spanish relations were mostly negative during the Franco period. The 
West Europeans resented Franco's war time alliance with Hitler and Mussolini, and 
Franco's dictatorship was incompatible with the democratic regimes of Europe. The 
Europeans strongly opposed including Spain into ERP and excluded it from NATO and 
Council of Europe throughout the Franco period. The 1953 bilateral military agreement 
between the US and Spain aroused negative reactions among the Europeans (Whitaker, 
1961:40). Not surprisingly, Franco's address to the Cortes after the 1953 Bases 
Agreement carried a strong anti-European tone (Whitaker, 1961:53).
However, the increasing power of Opus Dei ministers in the Spanish 
governments during the 1960s gave the first sign of a Europeanist orientation in 
Spanish foreign policy. The establishment of the EC in the late 1950s played an 
important role in this development. Accordingly, the Opus Dei ministers applied for an 
Association Agreement with the EEC in 1962. Nevertheless, despite their liberal 
economic philosophy, the new “Europeanist” team in the Spanish government did not 
aim to change the undemocratic, authoritarian nature of the Franco regime. As a result, 
the Community first shelved the Spanish application and then, after two years, started
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exploratory talks at the commercial level. Despite the Spanish desire for full integration 
(Gallo, 1973:336-37), the EEC only granted Spain a Preferential Trade Agreement in 
1970, which provided a limited access in the economic sphere. Although the Spanish 
Foreign Minister made a highly Europeanist speech after the Preferential Trade 
Agreement which emphasised ‘the Spanish decision to plant its roots in Europe’ 
(Baklanoff, 1978:74), in the 1970s there was increasing opposition of in the EC to the 
political developments in Spain (Harrison, 1985:163). Member states attacked the 
attitude of the Franco regime to political dissidents, and in 1975 they put strong 
pressure on him to convert the death sentences on five Basque terrorists to life 
imprisonment. Following the execution (and in a sharp contrast to the US Secretary of 
State, Kissinger, who described the event “basically an internal Spanish matter”), they 
recalled their ambassadors from Madrid and postponed trade talks with Spain 
(Rubottom and Murphy, 1985:114). Another interesting point about Spanish-EEC 
relations was the strong American opposition to the tariff terms of the EEC-Spanish 
Preferential Trade Agreement (US Hearings, 1971:228) which showed the 
contradictions between the US and Europe on the control of the resources in the 
Mediterranean in the 1970s.
5. Conclusion
In sum, in the period of expansion of the world-economy under US hegemony, Spain, 
though not to the extent of Greece, exhibited the general characteristics of a 
semiperipheral state. Various economic actors directed their activities to effect the state 
policies. It experienced covert US intervention in its domestic affairs. The Americans 
supported Franco to stay in power. Moreover, the Spanish state, which was also a 
central actor in the economy, was gradually transformed from an autarkic structure into 
a liberal one as a result of continuous American pressure for a change in the political 
cadres and institutions. Furthermore, in the foreign policy sphere it became a 
satellite/client state and a political and ideological agent of the hegemonic US.
Now, let us turn to our focus to the contraction period of the world-economy in 
order to see whether or not Spain showed semiperipheral characteristics in this period.
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CHAPTER VIII 
SPAIN: 1976 - EARLY 1990s
1. Introduction
In this chapter I shall discuss Spain's semiperipheral foreign policy in connection with 
the economic and political developments in the period between the mid 1970s and the 
1990s. As we have seen this period corresponds to a “contraction period” and the 
“relative decline” of American hegemony, and the emergence of Europe (EC) as an 
economic and political power in the world-economy. I shall investigate whether Spain's 
internal economic and political structures and its foreign policy responded to these 
changes in a semiperipheral way.
The world-system school argues that during contraction periods of the world- 
economy some of the strongest semiperipheral countries may be able to upgrade their 
positions in the hierarchy of states by upgrading their production structures and trade 
patterns in the world-economy. In such cases core-like producers increase their weight 
in the production processes of the semiperipheral economy. Structural changes in the 
economic sphere usually go hand in hand with changes in the internal and external 
politics of “upwardly mobile” semiperipheral states: interventions in their domestic 
affairs by the hegemonic/core power(s) come to an end; the old political structures 
collapse; they change their international alliances and no longer act as satellites and/or 
clients of hegemonic powers; and their margin of independence to pursue their national 
interests increases. They may also increase their influence in the management of 
international problems. A more common characteristic foreign policy behaviour of 
'upwardly mobile' semiperipheral countries is to emphasise their intermediary or bridge 
role between the core areas and some less developed countries/regions (periphery) with 
which they have historical and cultural ties, and/or geographical proximity. One motive 
behind this policy is to reap secondary economic and commercial benefits by becoming 
a springboard to underdeveloped regions for hegemonic/ core states. A second motive 
is to create their own political spheres of influence in the periphery.
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2. The Economic Environment
An overall examination of Spain in the period between the mid-1970s and early 1990s 
shows that it was in the process of upgrading its position towards the core area. The 
establishment of democracy after Franco's death in 1975 and the transformations in the 
economy, especially during the 1980s revealed that a shift from the old mechanisms 
was underway. Not surprisingly the Spanish state was at the centre of these 
developments.
In spite of the rapid economic growth of the 1960s Spanish industry was 
dominated by traditional heavy sectors of iron, steel, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding 
etc., while the traditional sectors of textile, clothing, footwear, leather etc., 
predominated the light industry in the 1970s (OECD, 1986:50; 1994:59). The world 
economic crisis of the mid-1970s and early 1980s which stemmed mainly from the two 
oil-price shocks hit the traditional industries in which Spain specialised in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Moreover, large investments were encouraged in these declining and 
technologically backward sectors until the late 1970s (OECD, 1986:32). Hence, the 
Spanish productive system did not adjust to the changing patterns of world demand: 
manufacturing production was still concentrated in those sectors in which world supply 
exceeded demands, and Spain's comparative advantage in these sectors eroded as result 
of increasing competition with the low-cost, newly industrialised countries (NICs) of 
South East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe (OECD, 1981:10-11) and of rising 
energy and real wage costs in Spain (OECD, 1982:26). Furthermore economic 
difficulties were aggravated by insufficient product differentiation and lack of high-tech 
sectors like consumer electronics, data processing equipment, electronic components, 
optical and photographic equipment, aircraft, telecommunications, etc., in which world 
demand was briskly increasing (OECD, 1981:11).
Moreover, in spite of the transformations in the 1950s and 1960s, the economic 
system was still rigid and under state protection. Excessive protection of the domestic 
market, the proliferation of subsidies and transfers to enterprises, and difficulties in the 
credit and financial markets hindered the normal operation of market forces and a more
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effective resource allocation, and therefore also the structural transformation of industry 
(OECD, 1984:18). In general, small firms, which were overdependent on bank credits, 
survived because of protection (OECD, 1981:11). Thus, extensive state intervention, 
regulatory framework, corporatist attitudes, inefficiency and protection from foreign 
competition remained the main characteristics of the Spanish economy until the early 
1980s (OECD, 1986:50; 1992:63).
In the 1960s and 1970s state played an important role in the economic 
development of Spain. It engaged in planning, it adopted an entrepreneurial role, 
provided economic infrastructure, and offered various incentives and subsidies to the 
domestic and foreign investors (Tsoukalis, 1981:98). At the end of 1978, INI, the 
public holding institution, participated directly in seventy different firms and indirectly 
in over two hundred firms. It was involved in 15% of the electricity generated; 35% of 
automobile and 30% of industrial vehicle manufacturing; 65% of petroleum refined; 
60% of steel production; 50% of coal mined; 95% of shipbuilding. It also owned large 
holdings in the fields of air transport, tourism, regional development, banks, and 
foreign trade (Gobbo, 1981:64). In other words, it was responsible for 1/3 of all 
industrial investment and a significant part of employment in the country (Gobbo, 
1981:73). The situation hardly changed in the early 1980s (Moxon-Browne, 1989:6) 
(1). Furthermore, through the INI, the Spanish state entered into joint ventures with 
foreign governments in oil prospecting in Kuwait, Iran and Libya, iron and bauxite 
mining in Brazil and uranium mining in Niger (Baklanoff, 1978:35). It also invested in 
the electronic computer industry with a Japanese company, Fijutsu, and held shares in 
the Arab-Spanish Bank (ARESBANK) (Liberman, 1982:308).
One of the consequences of the world economic crisis of the 1970s and early 
1980s was the nationalisation of loss making private enterprises, and a concomitant 
overmanning in large public enterprises of iron, steel and shipbuilding. In addition, 
heavy subsidies and wage increases led to chronic losses in public enterprises (OECD, 
1984:9; 1986:35). Thus during the economic recession of the second half of the 1970s 
and early 1980s the public sector became a huge dustbin for inefficient private
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industries, and excess capacity developed in these sectors (Salmon, 1991:33 and 
Harrison, 1993:48). Consequently in this period Spain usually pursued a defensive 
strategy that aimed to shelter the existing structure of economic activity and 
employment from the deep changes affecting the world-economy (OECD, 1984:51). 
The two main weaknesses of the Spanish economy during the mid-1970s and early- 
1980s were its reliance on excessively labour-intensive technology, and excess 
productive capacity supported by subsidies and privileged tax treatment (Liberman, 
1982:355).
Nevertheless, the Spanish state was aware of the economic shortcomings and 
after the 1977 elections took steps to restructure the industrial sector, improve 
competitiveness, reform economic institutions and increase the flexibility of factor 
markets (Salmon, 1991:9). The first step was the 1978 Moncloa Pact which established 
price and wage guidelines and envisaged a programme of basic economic and 
institutional reforms. It set up a norm for wage increases, intended to dismantle 
complex system of government intervention, eased institutional rigidities and 
government controls on distribution of credits, allowed foreign banks to operate in 
Spain (OECD, 1978:33-34). Second, a medium-term economic programme adopted in 
1979 was based on three points: increasing reliance on competitive market forces, 
efficient resource allocation, and the transformation of the production system against 
higher energy prices and competition from the NICs (OECD, 1980:26). Spanish policy 
makers concentrated their efforts on providing competitive stimuli to the domestic 
market through import liberalisation, attracting foreign direct investment, creating more 
flexible capital and financial markets, and improving the pattern of resource allocation 
both through market mechanisms and government incentives (OECD, 1980:26).
At first, however state industrial policy was mainly focused on restructuring the 
crisis-stricken sectors of steel, shipbuilding and consumer goods (refrigerators, 
television, radios etc.) (OECD, 1980:39). Meetings were held with individual 
companies (Harrison, 1993:48). The major role of the state in this process was to 
provide the necessary legal, fiscal and financial support and to monitor the fulfilment of
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the objectives set by the private sector (OECD, 1981:29). Accordingly, a legal base was 
prepared in 1980, and the Law on Industrial Reconversion was promulgated in 1981 to 
solve the underlying problems (OECD, 1982:37 and Harrison, 1993:49). In the same 
vein, capital transfers, subsidies and tax benefits were offered to both public and private 
sectors in order to accelerate industrial restructuring (OECD, 1981:40 and Harrison, 
1993:49).
The new industrial policy also aimed at adapting Spanish industry to new 
patterns of world demand and increasing its competitive advantage. Funds were 
earmarked in the budget for the advancement of Research and Development (R&D) 
(OECD, 1981:29). Rationalisation was promoted by abandoning the policy of 
nationalising private companies in crisis (OECD, 1979:30 and Salmon, 1991:33). 
Moreover, investments in the energy sectors, (mainly in the electric power industry) 
increased substantially from 1% in 1979 to over 40% in 1981, and a new state energy 
holding (INH) was established in 1981 (OECD, 1982:35). Between 1978 and 1981 the 
Spanish state also tried to establish a more flexible labour market through a series of 
agreements (Aguliar, 1984:128) which liberalised the dismissal of workers and 
recognised the right to strike (OECD, 1979:34; 1980:21). Further liberalisation of 
tariffs, quotas and licenses occurred in this period.
In spite of various attempts to raise the efficiency of state enterprises, industrial 
restructuring lagged behind the targets in the early 1980s. Although state transfers for 
industrial restructuring reached 171 billion Pesetas between 1979 and 1982 it usually 
went to absorb losses rather than to deal with structural problems (OECD, 1986:33). 
Indeed, the emphasis was on cushioning the effects on traditional industries of 
"restructuring" (Salmon, 1991:9). According to an OECD report, Spain had to reduce 
uncompetitive enterprises which benefited from subsidies, tax exemptions and official 
credits and hence passed the burden on to more dynamic and efficient firms (OECD, 
1982:43).
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The process of fundamentally transforming the Spanish economy began only at 
the beginning of 1983 when the new Socialist government decided to re-examine the 
method of implementing industrial restructuring. A White Paper on Reconversion and 
Reindustrialisation was prepared and it was supported by a law. This new law 
complemented the 1981 Law on Industrial Reconversion and was based on a tripartite 
collaboration between the authorities, employers and the employees (OECD, 1984:46- 
47). The socialist government seemed to revolutionise the economy. For many years, 
Spain had pursued a strategy of sheltering the existing, inefficient and low technology 
structure of activity and employment from the deep changes affecting the world- 
economy. It seemed that the government was now were determined to deal with the 
structural problems of the economy (OECD, 1984:51).
The new policy was based upon two key elements: first, to improve 
productivity and restore a healthy profit position by cutting excess capacity and 
overmanning and by restructuring the financial liabilities of excessively indebted 
enterprises; and second, to promote investment and technological innovation in those 
activities with good future profit potential (OECD, 1986:33). The new policy dealt in 
detail with the main problems in both private and public enterprises, ranging from large 
labour force cuts and the concentration of ailing industries in certain regions, to the 
creation of administrative and monitoring bodies in charge of implementation and the 
choice of specific financial instruments (such as state transfers, long term credits, 
guarantees, etc.) (OECD, 1986:33). Moreover, in the field of technological 
development a law was passed to co-ordinate and rationalise existing programmes and 
strengthen the relationship between scientific research and innovation. The Centre for 
Technological and Industrial Development, which provided funds for R&D, was 
expanded and transformed into a modem institution (OECD, 1986:35).
OECD reports on Spain after 1986 point out that the industrial restructuring 
programme is going well. Excessive labour costs and plant capacity in ailing industries 
were reduced, the modernisation of economically viable industries was supported 
through investment credits and subsidies, and flexible contracts were introduced in the
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labour market. Emphasis has been given to technological development in industry. 
Operational losses of public enterprises were first stabilised and then reduced, and 
subsequently a number of them became profitable companies. The social security 
system was rationalised, energy prices were adjusted and conservation measures were 
undertaken.
Substantial public sector expenditure and private sector investment contributed 
to the implementation of the reconversion plan (Salmon, 1991:118). Eighty percent of 
the investment targets in the plan was realised (OECD, 1989:40). The role of the state 
in the successful implementation of the reconversion plan was apparent since the 
subsidies and credits of the Industrial Credit Bank were equivalent to some 85% of the 
total investments undertaken by reconversion firms (OECD, 1989:40). As a result the 
latest plants were installed and Spanish industry was reorganised (Salmon, 1991: 118).
Indeed, from the mid-1980s Spanish industrial policy stopped supporting 
traditional industries and promoted investment in new sectors. As a result of 
replacement investments and additions to the capital stock embodying new 
technologies, efficiency gains and rationalisation became possible in the production 
structures (OECD, 1990 :71). 70% of Spanish firms introduced new technologies in 
this period (OECD, 1990:73). The composition of industrial output changed as the 
output began to grow faster in high technology sectors (OECD, 1990:71). In other 
words, Spanish companies achieved diversification by increasing the technological 
element in the product's added value (Aledo, 1993a:26). The establishment of larger 
and more competitive enterprises through successful mergers (as in the fertiliser 
industry) was another significant development in this period.
Public sector activity was also reoriented. This was important because public 
holding companies were not only concentrated in the utilities and strategic sectors but 
existed across the whole spectmm of economic activity. In the early 1990s, the public 
sector was one of the largest industrial group and Spain's leading exporter (Salmon, 
1991:28-30 and OECD, 1989:48; 1990:40). As a result of the restructuring plan, INI
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abandoned its dustbin role for unprofitable and inefficient private firms. Indeed except 
in some rapidly declining industries (such as shipbuilding), INI achieved a spectacular 
growth of productivity in many sectors towards the end of the 1980s and its financial 
situation improved appreciably (OECD, 1988:37). In 1987 its overall losses were 
reduced to a fifth, and by 1989 it had turned into a profitable organisation (OECD, 
1989:38; 1990:40).
A striking indicator of the upwardly mobile nature of the Spanish economy was 
the significant change in the state's view of R&D activities (2). In accordance with the 
policy of 'catching-up with the EC economies', a law for the Promotion and General 
Co-ordination of Scientific and Technological Research was passed in 1986. Co­
ordination between public research centres and private companies was improved and 
co-ordination with and participation in international R&D programs were promoted. In 
1988 R&D projects began to be subsidised by the Ministry of Industry and priority was 
given to high-tech sectors. Thus, while computer and space technologies received 
15.9% and 11.4% of the subsidies respectively, traditional sectors received only about 
1% of the total (Aledo, 1993b:33). In the early 1990s Spanish research activities 
focused on ascending sectors of new materials, computer and telecommunications 
technology (Aledo, 1993b:32) (3). Furthermore, the government encouraged private 
and public research institutions to participate in European and international R&D 
programs in order to absorb and generate technology within the domestic production 
system. Hence, Spanish enterprises took part in various EC and international projects 
such as, BRTTE, ESPRIT, RACE, EURAKA, Airbus, European Nuclear Research 
Organisation, European Molecular Biology Laboratory, etc. (Aledo, 1993b:34).
From the world-system school perspective, it was apparent that the Spanish 
state supported the consolidation of core-like (efficient, high-tech, high profit) 
production patterns while gradually dismantling inefficient, declining, periphery-like 
industries. Nevertheless, the state was not alone in this process. The Spanish economic 
elite also influenced state policies. The Seven biggest banks (the financial elite) were 
the most important and dominant group in the economy and industry, controlling 80%
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of the total assets and investments in all sectors and playing a key role in the economy 
(OECD, 1984:44&50 and Moxon-Browne, 1989:10). They exerted decisive influence 
on economic and political spheres (Moxon-Browne, 1989:9). Indeed, Suarez's centre- 
right Union de Centro Democratico (UCD) represented the progressive wing of the 
Spanish financial and industrial elite (Preston and Smyth, 1984:36). The government 
was linked in various ways to the more progressive sectors of the Spanish capitalism: 
the vice-president of the National Confederation of Spanish Business Organisations 
(CEOE), the mouthpiece of big modem enterprises (Kohler, 1982:59), was appointed 
Minister of Industry for example, while the Minister of Labour was a member of the 
inner group of the UCD. Several ministers had close personal ties with the powerful 
Spanish banks (Preston, 1986:93; Menges, 1978:34 and Coverdale, 1977:626). 
Accordingly the promulgation of laws and preparation of plans for restructuralisation 
of the economy was not a mere coincidence; there were intimate relations between the 
political and economic decision making bodies. The removal of numerous government 
regulations and controls, tax benefits, subsidies, etc., changed the protected and secure 
environment and upset the traditional (periphery-like) business sectors (OECD, 
1981:40).
Nevertheless, in parallel with the relative failure of the Suarez government to 
implement the new economic measures, the business elite began to express 
dissatisfaction with the government in the early 1980s (Martinez, 1993:136-138). 
According to Martinez's research, although a number of businessmen still preferred old 
paternalistic and statist policies, many others favoured a free market and a competitive 
economic environment (Martinez, 1993:137). The Spanish business elite wanted to be 
a part of Europe and it sought for a more assertive political voice in economic and 
efficiency terms (Martinez, 1993:136-138). The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) 
managed to reassure many important bankers and businessmen of their determination 
to remove the economic obstacles (Preston and Smyth, 1984:64). F.Gonzalez, the 
Socialist Prime Minister, declared that the party would “...undertake serious and 
profound reforms which in principle [were] difficult to approach from a socialist 
perspective” (4). The re-examination and later the successful implementation of
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reconversion and restructuralisation were clear indications of the success of the policies 
of “core-like” producers at the state level. The Socialist government's decision to 
allocate resources to high-tech and competitive industries promoted the interests of the 
“core-like” fraction of the Spanish economic elite (Lopez IE, 1990:66). In other words, 
it represented a victory of the “core-like” producers over the traditional “periphery-like” 
economic elite.
In the context of semiperipheral development another state policy that played a 
decisive role in the process of upgrading the Spanish economy towards the core zone 
was to attract foreign investment. Accordingly, OECD reports between 1977 and 1985 
indicate that the net inflow of foreign direct investments in Spain increased 
considerably. The incentives given by the Spanish state, the relatively large domestic 
market, and the prospect of Spain's membership of the EC were the main reasons for 
the increase in foreign investment (OECD, 1984:12). Nevertheless, a substantial inflow 
of foreign investment (both direct and portfolio) was realised between 1983 and 1985. 
The reasons were manifold. First, as a result of restructuring business prospects were 
improved, and confidence in the Spanish economy increased. Second, administrative 
controls on capital movements were further reduced. Third, the profit rates rose in 
Spain, and fourth, the prospects for Spanish accession to the EC improved (OECD, 
1986:14).
The net amount of foreign direct business investment in Spain in the first half of 
the 1980s averaged around $900 million, and the total amount of various kinds of 
foreign investment reached $2.5 billion in 1985 (OECD, 1986:14). However, a 
particularly spectacular rise was registered between 1985 and 1990 (OECD, 1988 to 
1994). In 1986 foreign investment increased by 75% (Salmon, 1991:19) and it reached 
$14 billion in 1990 (OECD, 1994:21). According to Harrison, the amount was $16.6 
billion in 1989 which was roughly equivalent to 3% of Spanish GDP (Harrison, 
1993:63). Between 1985 and 1990 foreign direct investment contributed to the growth 
of total business investment by 40 to 50 percent (OECD, 1990:9). In this period many
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multinational firms shifted production to Spain, and foreign companies acquired 
controlling interests in Spanish companies (OECD, 1988:22 and 25).
The greater buoyancy in the inflow of foreign investment after 1986 was due to 
a number of factors. First, 1986 legislation enabled foreign entrepreneurs to transfer 
unlimited amounts of capital, profit and dividends abroad (Salmon, 1991:19). Second, 
full EC membership reduced the political risk of investing in Spain. Third, labour 
market rigidities were abolished. Fourth, good social climate, regional, financial and 
fiscal incentives, links with EC and Latin American markets, the strong position of 
Peseta, and the decision by European countries to establish an integrated market by 
1992 contributed to the inflow of foreign investment in Spain. (OECD, 1990:65 and 
Salmon, 1991:20). Furthermore, the Spanish privatisation policy actively encouraged 
foreign penetration (Salmon, 1991:39). Although the upswing in the foreign investment 
was shared by all sectors, it mostly went into technologically advanced (machinery and 
equipment) and scale intensive (car production, food, paper, chemicals) industries 
(OECD, 1990:65).
Foreign investment played an important role in the transformation process. It 
brought rationalisation and new technology, largely financed the current external deficit 
(4/5 in 1991) (OECD, 1984:33 and 1992:25), and it contributed to fixed capital 
formation and employment. Nevertheless, Spanish firms became dependent on the 
technological know-how of core countries (OECD, 1990:24). The increasing influence 
of foreign capital and the reliance on foreign technology was the inevitable price for 
economic development and securing employment.
Full membership of the EC was one of the priorities of the Suarez government. 
In fact, the political and economic elite thought that EC membership was the 
precondition of Spain's long- term healthy economic development (Medhurst, 
1984:32). For the Spaniards Europe was a model (Maxwell, 1991:9). In 1979 an 
opinion poll showed that 67% of the Spaniards and all the major interest groups 
(industrialists, the business community, both big and small and medium business
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organisations, chamber of commerce, trade unionists, farmers) were in favour of 
membership in the Community (Tsoukalis, 1981:122 and 127). In fact, the Spanish 
business community had been in close contact with the Community since the Franco 
years (Tsoukalis, 1981:127). Immediately after the first democratic elections in 1977 
the Suarez government prepared a plan called Programo Economico del Gobiemo 
(PEG) which set out the government's liberalisation plans as a prelude to Spain's 
eventual membership of the EC (Harrison, 1985:181).
From the semiperipheral development perspective EC membership constituted 
the most important developmentalist goal and an opportunity to adjust the Spanish 
economy to core-like production structures. Spain's expectations from the Community 
were that it would force Spanish entrepreneurs both to modernise and to compete in 
international markets. They also thought that could benefit in the medium and long­
term from its ability to sell in a market of more than 250 million people. Moreover, 
membership would expand the volume of foreign (European) capital in Spain; and 
expand Spanish exports to the EC (Liberman, 1982:297).
The Socialist government which came to power in 1982 also emphasised the 
importance of the EC for the development of the country. In 1983 Spanish Secretary of 
State said: “ ...[The Community] will present for us as the definitive modernisation of 
our productive apparatus and the country in general” (5). Indeed, the Socialist's policy 
was to ensure the rapid entry of Spain into the EC and the adjustment of the Spanish 
economy to EC norms and regulations as early as possible. Thus the economic policy it 
adopted aimed to accelerate Spanish entry into the EEC.
When Spain became a full member of the Community in 1986 the role of the 
EC in its transformation process increased significantly. A striking indicator of this 
development was the massive inflow of foreign (European) investment in Spain which 
played a decisive role in the upward mobilisation of the economy. Indeed, long-term 
European private capital inflow was one of the principal forces behind the sharp upturn 
in investment activity after 1985 (OECD, 1988:74 and 1990:62). In fact, Spain had
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become increasingly reliant on EC investments since 1975. While the main source of 
foreign investment was the US during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, after Franco's 
death the balance began to change in favour of the EC. In 1975 the figures for US and 
EC investments in Spain were 40.6% and 35.6% of the total respectively, but they 
decreased to 11% for the US and increased to 51% for the EC by 1983 (Salmon, 
1991:21 and Pollack, 1987:140). Furthermore, EC's share of direct investment 
increased from 48% on average in the three years to 1985, to 65% in 1986 (OECD, 
1988:25). Similarly, while the foreign direct investment shares of the EC and the USA 
were 38.4% and 18.4% respectively in 1984/5, between 1986 and 1989 the EC share 
increased to 52% and the US' share decreased to 4.9% (OECD, 1990:64). Spain began 
to be seen as an important springboard to Europe by American and Japanese investors 
(Hudson and Lewis, 1984: 187-88; Story and Pollack, 1991:141) who were eager to 
invest in assembly and export platforms into the unified European market (Petras, 
1993:115). Indeed, a large part of the foreign investment -especially in the second half 
of the 1980s - aimed to expand Spanish export capacity to the rest of the EC (OECD, 
1989:27).
Spain's trade relations were another indicator of its orientation towards Europe. 
In the immediate post-Franco period Spain signed an agreement with European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). Meanwhile EC-Spanish trade relations had been increasing 
since the 1970 agreement, particularly with regard to exports. In 1973 43.2% of imports 
and 48.5% of exports were from and to the EC. By 1985 these figures were 36.8% and 
52.2% respectively (Harrison, 1993:63). After Spain joined the EC in 1986, the 
Community share of Spanish exports and imports continued to increase (OECD, 
1988:22; 1990:70). In 1990, for example, the EC's share in total Spanish imports 
reached 59.2%, and the exports to the Community were 68.9% (Harrison, 1993:63).
The EC's contribution to the Spanish economy through traditional invisibles 
receipts continued in the post-Franco period. According to the OECD reports, until the 
1990s higher invisible earnings from EC countries virtually offset Spain's trade deficit 
(6). Most of the invisible receipts came from growing tourist receipts now, and
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emigrant remittances declined in importance since many Spanish workers had to 
returned home from the mid-1970s onwards.
EC transfers to the Spanish economy after 1986 provide further evidence of the 
Community's increasing role in Spain's economic transformation. Between 1986 and 
1988 Spain obtained more than 3.5 billion ECUs from various EC funds; most of the 
money was used to develop of public infrastructure and for training programme 
(OECD, 1990:61). According to OECD reports between 1989 and 1992 the net EC 
transfers to Spain continued to rise rapidly (thereafter they declined). After 1989 EC 
structural funds were directed to serve infrastructural development, regional 
development, industrial reconversion, youth training, reduction of long-term 
unemployment and agricultural support (OECD, 1990:61 and 1994:34).
An important development since the early 1980s was Spanish willingness to 
adapt and harmonise its economy to EC practices, indicating the determination to 
upgrade Spain in the hierarchy of states. The first step was the successful 
implementation of industrial reconversion and restructuralisation which led to the 
reorganisation and installation of modem plants in almost all industrial sectors and the 
promotion of research and development (Salmon, 1991:117-18). The aim was to 
transform production structures in order to cope with the competitive economies of the 
EC. Secondly, Spain paid particular attention to product differentiation strategies and to 
improving the country's international competitiveness by increasing the technological 
element in the added value of products and improving their quality and design (Aledo, 
1993b:34). Similarly, science policies and technology systems were reformed to enable 
Spain to participate in European and EC research programme (Aledo, 1993b:34). After 
1986, the interventionist policies of the state decreased in favour of market oriented 
reforms to align Spain with the EC economies. In this context, a new law in defence of 
competition was passed and a Competition Court was established in 1989 (OECD, 
1990:39). Foreign investment legislation was brought into line with EC laws (Salmon, 
1991:19), administrative impediments to competition between banks were lifted and 
financial institutions were restructured to improve efficiency (OECD, 1990:37). The
245
Spain: 1976-Early 1990s
banking sector was rationalised and transformed and restrictions on foreign banks were 
gradually lifted (OECD, 1990:38). Furthermore, a draft law was prepared giving the 
Bank of Spain complete independence and forbidding monetary financing of public 
sector deficits (OECD, 1993:49). The Peseta entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in June 1989. All remaining trade 
barriers (quotas, tariffs, taxes, etc.) were dismantled, trade flows were completely 
liberalised (OECD, 1988:7; 1990:53-55) and restrictions on the movement of capital 
were removed (OECD, 1989:41). Moreover, all foreign exchange controls were lifted 
in February 1992 and in March the government designed a convergence program for 
1992-96 to prepare for Spain's full participation in the next phase of European 
integration and to meet the strict Maastricht criteria (OECD, 1993:48-9; 1994:9). 
Finally, the construction of a high speed railway from Seville to Paris and, from there, 
to Europe constituted another important link to EC market (Petras, 1993:116). By the 
early 1990s Spain had successfully integrated into the EC.
There were other indications of Spain’s upward mobilisation. Since 1964 Spain 
had gradually increased its international market share of industrial products; by 1975 
finished industrial products (consumer and capital goods) constituted the most 
important item in total exports (various OECD reports from 1967 to 1975). The rapid 
expansion of Spanish industry was largely the result of the technological renovation of 
antiquated capital equipment (OECD, 1976:38). In the immediate post-Franco period 
Spain lost part of its previous market gains due to the international competition of the 
NICs. However, by 1978 Spain had regained its competitiveness and had gained 
substantial market shares (OECD, 1979:15-16). It continued to increase its 
competitiveness and expand its industrial exports and market shares in the period 
between late 1970s and mid-1980s (OECD Reports from 1979 to 1984), building up 
new outlets in EC and Latin American markets (Minet, 1981:49 and OECD, 1980:19), 
in the Middle East and OPEC countries (OECD, 1978:16; 1981:35) and in COMECON 
and Japan (OECD, 1982:15). Spain's export performance was strongly influenced by 
the foreign investment wave of the mid-1970s (OECD, 1984:12) and it performed 
especially well in intermediate technology sectors such as vehicles, machine tools,
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avionics etc. (Harrison, 1993:47). Furthermore, the Spanish capital goods industry 
competed in major international bids (7).
After 1986 Spanish exports to Latin America, OPEC and COMECON countries 
declined as a result of EC membership, while EC markets became more attractive to 
Spanish exporters (OECD, 1988:20-22; 1989:27-28). Nevertheless, export performance 
improved and export markets continued to grow (OECD, 1990:22 and 44): Spanish 
entrepreneurs increased their share by nearly a fifth and market share gains were 
concentrated in the EC countries. In the early 1990s sizeable gains in EC markets were 
obtained (OECD, 1992:23 and 71). In 1990/91 the market share gains by industrial 
goods was 7% on average, buoyed by the coming on-stream of a large number of new 
industrial plants (OECD, 1993:26).
Another development which is significant from the world-system perspective 
was the shift in product composition of Spanish exports towards goods with higher unit 
values. This resulted in big terms-of-trade gains (OECD, 1990:71): in 1993 export- 
import coverage rose to 76%, from 64% on average in the previous five years (OECD, 
1994: 21). The Spanish share in total OECD exports for medium and high technology 
products have increased by two-thirds and four-fifths respectively since the mid-1980s 
(OECD, 1994:21).
From the perspective of an "upwardly mobile semiperiphery Spain", another 
significant development has been the export of Spanish investment capital, particularly 
to Latin America and southern France at first, (OECD, 1973:25 and Tsoukalis, 
1981:94) and later to the EC and the US (OECD, 1981:36; 1986:14 and Salmon, 1991: 
21). Furthermore, this growth persisted in the early 1990s (OECD, 1992:25; 1994:23), 
indicating that Spain's upward mobilisation towards the core region of the world- 
economy continues.
The final index of Spain's upward mobilisation is the dramatic increase in the 
GDP per capita. As we have seen, according to world-system scholars successive and
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remarkable increases or decreases in the GNP (and GDP) per capita are a sign of 
upward or downward mobilisation in the world-system hierarchy of states. In parallel to 
the transformation in Spain's production system since the mid-1970s, Spanish GDP per 
capita has increased remarkably. Hence, Spanish GDP per capita, which was $2890 in 
1976 increased to $3960 in 1978, $5648 in 1980, (falling back to $4778 in 1982 and 
$4192 in 1984, but increasing steeply again) to $5927 in 1986, $7449 in 1987, $9658 
in 1989, $12,770 in 1990; $13,520 in 1991; and $14,704 in 1993 (OECD Country 
Reports from 1976 to 1994). From the world-system perspective these successive and 
steep increases together with the establishment 'core-like' production structures clearly 
demonstrate Spain's upward mobilisation.
From the perspective of world-system analysis, therefore all the economic 
developments in Spain between mid-1970s and early 1990s show that the process of 
upgrading Spain from its semiperipheral position towards the core region of world- 
economy has continued successfully.
3. The Political Environment
Let us turn now to the political sphere to see whether Spain's economic development 
coincided with semiperipheral political developments in the post-Franco period. There 
are two basic contentions of the world-system school about the political developments 
of upwardly mobile semiperipheral states in the contraction period of the world- 
economy: first, the old political structures collapse, second, the intervention of 
hegemonic/core powers into their domestic affairs come to an end.
Spain experienced radical developments in its political establishment in this 
period; the principal institutions of the Francoist establishment were either abolished or 
made to abandon their old roles and habits as a result of democratisation. First, the 
system of Francoist “representation” was abolished through the democratisation of the 
Cortes (Parliament). In the old system the Cortes, its members selected arbitrarily by 
Franco, was no more than a sounding board for Francoist speeches. The other chamber, 
the Council of Realm, was an “advisory” unit composed of dignitaries and the
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economically powerful families of the Francoist regime (Ben-Ami, 1984:2). When the 
Law for Political Reform of 1976 introduced the principle of popular sovereignty and 
universal suffrage, the Cortes was manoeuvred into voting itself out of existence, and 
the Council of Realm was abolished. Spaniards overwhelmingly (nearly 95%) approved 
of these reforms in a referendum in December 1976. In 1977, the 30-year old National 
Movement, the state party, was also dismantled by a Royal decree. A new Law of 
Political Association opened the way for the establishment of political parties. 
Furthermore, the outlawed Communist Party was legalised.
A second step was military reform which aimed to prevent the intervention of 
the armed forces into politics. Under Franco the military was a highly privileged body 
(Vinas, 1988:153). Its basic duty was to prevent possible internal revolts and defend the 
institutional order against the enemy from within (separatism and communism) (Ben- 
Ami, 1984:18). The first democratic government aimed to subordinate it to civilian 
power. At the organisational level the Military High Command was dismantled and the 
armed forces were brought under the authority of the Defence Ministry in 1977 
(Graham, 1984:200). In 1978, the first civilian Defence Minister was appointed, the 
scope of Military Justice was reduced, and promotion and retirement systems were 
overhauled. Article 97 of the 1978 Spanish constitution established the supremacy of 
civilian authority over the armed forces, stating that 'the armed forces must obey the 
civil authority of the government' (Giner and Sevilla, 1984:126). Furthermore, the 1980 
Law on Basic Criteria of National Defence redefined the jurisdiction and 
responsibilities of the leading civil and military authorities by re-emphasising the 
supremacy of the former (Payne, 1986:183-84). In 1981, the Defence Ministry's 
authority over the military budget was increased and its financial supervision was made 
even more complete under the Socialist government after 1982. The National Defence 
Law of 1984 further reinforced civilian supremacy over the military (Payne, 1986 
: 185-86), giving real power in decision making regarding military issues such as 
defence policy, command and co-ordination of the armed forces, the approval of 
defence and strategic plans, economic and financial programme for equipping the
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armed forces to the Prime Minister, Defence Minister, and government (Vinas, 
1988:175).
The active participation of the military in politics was restricted and promotion 
and retirement system were revised. The Armed Forces were ordered to respect all 
political options, to refrain from publicly expressing any political preferences, and to 
avoid participation in politics (Jordan, 1979:8 and Gilmour, 1985:235). Moderate and 
reformist generals were appointed to key posts and several generals whose opposition 
to the new regime was well known were removed to posts outside Madrid, fired or 
retired (Jordan, 1979:4 and 7; Gilmour, 1985:235). After an attempted coup in 1981 
new legislation was passed to eliminate pretexts for future coups (Diaz-Ambrona, 
1984:33).
A third reform provided new objectives to soldiers to shift their attention from 
domestic to external issues. The new constitution defined the military's mission as 
guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of Spain and defending its territorial 
integrity and constitutional order (Graham, 1984:202).
Both the Suarez and Gonzalez governments paid special attention to turning the 
Spanish military into a professional institution ideologically compatible with other 
Western armed forces (Jordan, 1979:8 and Graham, 1984:201). Accordingly, the 
defence budget was increased and resources were invested in equipment and material 
(Vinas, 1988:154). An extensive modernisation process was carried out and the size of 
the military was reduced. Above all, the army was turned into a professional defence 
force with an international perspective (due to NATO and WEU membership) rather 
than an internal force charged with suppressing domestic disorder (Heywood, 1987:397 
and Moxon-Browne, 1989:28).
State-Church relations were also transformed. The Spanish church had been 
dominated by Franco and the Church had identified itself with the Franco regime 
functioning a dictatorship's principal legitimise (Szulc, 1976:67 and Graham,
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1984:215). In return the Church was supported by grants and incorporated into state 
structures through representation in the government, the Cortes and the Council of 
Realm (Szulc, 1967:67; Graham, 1984:215; and Bardaji, 1976:201). In the immediate 
post-Franco period the church was separated from the state by the constitution 
(Graham, 1984:219). In fact the transition was greatly facilitated by the church. Since 
the early 1970s some Church groups (especially the younger generation) had 
progressively dissociated themselves from the Francoist system and by the mid-1970s 
the Church had abandoned its strong anti-democratic characteristics (Carr and Fusi, 
1981:155). In the post-Franco period upper Church echelons of distanced themselves 
from Francoism and support the transition to democracy. Further, they refused to be 
identified with any political party, and for the first time in its history, the Spanish 
Church deliberately disengaged from the political realm (Graham, 1984:212 and 
Brassloff, 1984:61).
Labour relations were another important indicator of structural transformation. 
Throughout the forty years of Franco rule, trade unions were banned and the employers 
and employees were organised in a Syndicate system in which the corporatist state 
acted as final arbiter between labour and management. One of the priorities of the new 
government was a complete break with the old corporatist practices. Accordingly, in 
1976/7 a series of law were enacted allowing independent unions to organise and 
engage freely in collective bargaining. The right to strike and dismissal of employees 
were regulated (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:123; Liberman, 1982:328).
A further step in political restructuring was the official recognition of regional 
autonomies. The autonomy of Basque and Catalunia were approved by the parliament 
in 1977 and ten other regions were granted pre-autonomous status. The 1978 
Constitution recognised and guaranteed the right to autonomy of the nationalities and 
regions which constituted the country (Gilmour, 1985:199).
From the perspective of “upwardly mobile semiperiphery Spain”, perhaps the 
most important point was the extremely favourable attitude of the economic elite to
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political reorganisation/democratisation. Important sectors of Spanish capitalism 
informed the King that they were anxious to abandon Francoist political mechanisms 
(Preston, 1986:77). Furthermore, the governing party between 1977-82, UCD, was a 
coalition of financial and industrial elites (Preston, 1986:23). The positive attitude of 
the economic elite towards democratisation was confirmed by data revealing strong 
support on the part of Spanish capitalists for a democratic system (Martinez, 1993:118). 
First, they did not support the conservative Popular Alliance Party (AP), but voted for 
Suarez's moderate-centrist UCD between 1977 and 1982 (Martinez, 1993:124). Indeed, 
AP was the representative of the old-fashioned, subsidised (periphery-like) 
businessmen (Menges, 1978:52). Second, Spanish capitalists strongly supported the 
institutionalisation of the democratic system by voting “yes” in the 1978 Constitutional 
referendum (Martinez, 1993:121). Moreover, their public actions and statements after 
the abortive military coup in 1981 showed their firm support for democracy (Martinez, 
1993:126). Although they withdrew support from the UCD government in the 1982 
elections, they voted not for the old-fashioned conservative AP but for the Socialists 
Party (PSOE). In accordance with their aspirations to become part of the EC (core area) 
they recognised that the country required coherence between its increasing economic 
well-being and its political system. As Martinez argued, Spanish business wanted a 
political voice which reflected its economic and market confidence (Martinez, 
1993:136).
The world-system school also maintains that in contraction periods, the 
intervention of hegemonic/core powers in the domestic affairs of semiperipheral states 
comes to an end. In the previous period American intervention had been realised in two 
ways: first, Americans did not object to Franco's dictatorship and hence they indirectly 
allowed its continuation until the mid-1970s. Second, they managed to reduce the 
power of the autarkic political cadres and institutions in return for economic aid. 
However, American intervention in Spanish domestic politics came to an end after 
Franco. For example, when US Secretary of State H.Kissinger, suggested a slow and 
essentially Francoist transition, and encouraged the Suarez government not to legalise
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the Spanish communist party (Ben-Ami, 1984:6 and Gilmour, 1985:174), his proposals 
were ruled out by the King and the Suarez government.
In fact, there was a consensus among Spaniards across the political spectrum 
that the US had given credibility to the Franco regime by its economic and military 
support, and hence had sustained him in power (Pollack, 1987:153 and Treverton, 
1986:6). The leader of the Spanish Socialist party, F.Gonzalez, stated in 1981 that 
“America helped Europe to free itself from fascism and it not only did not help Spain 
but condemned it to dictatorship for many more years... We have little for which to 
thank the United States” (8). According to survey data only 24% of Spaniards favoured 
friendship with the US in 1979 (Leon, 1986:202), and in 1985 a public opinion poll 
showed that 74% of Spaniards disagreed that the US and its president were loyal and 
sincere friends of Spain (Maxwell, 1991:8). S.Eaton, the US Deputy Chief of Mission 
in Spain and Minister Counsellor of the American Embassy between 1974-78, 
describes the American position in Spain in the post-Franco period as follows:
... the relationship ...was a delicate one and for the sake of sound long­
term relations we had to be careful how we managed our side of it.
We had to be sure we did not appear to be intervening when we 
merely wanted to be helpful. We had to be sure we did not appear to 
play favourites among the democratic parties... Of the all democratic 
parties [Socialists] distrusted us most because of our past intimacy 
with Franco (Eaton, 1979:118).
In 1986, F.Gonzales, this time as Prime Minister, of Spain, expressed Spanish anti- 
Americanism at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, referring to the warm 
relationship between the Americans and Franco, and American protection of Franco's 
dictatorship (Maxwell, 1991:7-8).
In contrast to their anti-Americanism, Spanish political parties revealed pro- 
European attitudes and increased their co-operation with the European political parties. 
There was a consensus about Spanish accession to the EC (Medhurst, 1984:45). The 
support of leading conservative, liberal, and Christian-Democrat parties of Western
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Europe was appreciated at the first congress of the UCD (Kohler, 1982:33). The 
Socialists (PSOE), on the other hand, were supported by the Socialist International, the 
Confederation of European Socialist and Social Democrats, and by the German 
Socialists (Kohler, 1982:42 and Coverdale, 1977:621). European support to both 
parties included extensive financial and organisational assistance (Kohler, 1982:43).
A final point worth mentioning is the advent of the Socialists, persecuted 
throughout the Franco years, to power in the early 1980s. This was a significant 
indication of the success of transition and the consolidation of democratic practices.
4. Foreign Policy: Europeanization
World-system analysis proposes that following main developments are expected in the 
external relations of an upwardly mobile semiperipheral state in contraction periods of 
the world-economy: they change their international alliances, give up satellite-type 
foreign policies, and pursue relatively independent foreign policies, they also compete 
with other semiperipheral states for economic and political gains, tend to assert their 
intermediary and bridge (or sub-imperial) role between core zones and areas (or 
countries) with which they have geographical proximity and/or cultural and historical 
ties. Furthermore, they seek to become involved in the management of international 
problems.
Spanish foreign policy in the post-Franco period was conformed with these 
expectations. First, bilateral agreements with the US on bases and installations had to 
be reformulated. Second, integration into NATO was seen as desirable but not a 
priority. Third, integration into the EC was perceived to be the most important 
objective. Fourth, Spain's active presence had to be ensured in the Council of Europe; 
relations between Spain and Latin America and the Middle East had to be improved. 
Spain's role in the Mediterranean and North Africa had to be increased, and Spanish 
national interests which did not overlap with allies interests in these regions had to be 
emphasised.
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An important indicator of Spain's “semiperipheral foreign policy” was its break 
with postwar Atlanticism and its shift to Europeanism. This indicated a change in 
Spain's international alliances. The evidence was clear. First, the Spaniards redefined 
the status of US bases and installations. The 1976 bases agreement established Spanish 
sovereignty over US bases (Vinas, 1988:157). The Americans agreed to reduce the 
number of US air-refuelling K-135 tankers to a maximum level of five, to withdraw the 
US nuclear submarine squadron by 1979, and not to store nuclear devices or their 
components on Spanish soil. Furthermore, the use of bases in emergency cases was 
subjected to urgent consultations between the two governments, and a joint council was 
set up for this purpose (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:117 and Klepak, nd:87). Eaton 
emphasises that the Spaniards were attempting ‘to establish a lower profile for Spain's 
relations with the US as part of the better balance in Spain's total foreign policy’. This, 
he says, was apparent from the attitudes of the Spanish government. While official 
foreign policy speeches on Europe, Latin America, Arab countries and the Third World 
tended to be long, for example, only short references were made to relations with the 
US. Furthermore, the government was careful to interpret the terms of the 1976 Treaty 
strictly so as to avoid charges of weakness towards the Americans (Eaton, 1981:114- 
15). On the other hand, Spanish Chiefs-of-Staff bitterly criticised the US, even arguing 
for breaking the relationship and closing the bases (Eaton, 1981:114).
A new bases agreement in 1982 was more balanced and precise than the 
previous agreements (Vinas, 1988:163). First, it precisely defined the notions of 
“operational and support installations” and “authorisations of use”, terms which the 
previous agreement left vague. In this way possible misinterpretations of the agreement 
in critical moments were eliminated. Second, the status of US forces in Spain was 
brought in line with their status in other West European countries. Third, the notion of 
'geographic area of common interests' which existed in the previous agreement was 
eliminated. The new agreement did not limit Spain's freedom to develop a security 
policy out of NATO.
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A second sign of a shift from Atlanticism was democratic government's 
lukewarm attitude towards Spain's integration into NATO. During the Franco period 
Spain had demanded a special security guarantee, either through bilateral agreements 
with the US or by becoming a member of NATO (Eaton, 1981:15). Although the first 
democratic government advocated Spain's eventual integration into NATO, it clearly 
stated that NATO membership was not a priority (Pollack, 1987:154). According to 
Suarez, a national debate was required on the issue and it could not take place at short 
notice. The matter, he felt, was neither urgent nor immediate (Minet, 1981: 14). 
According to Suarez, Spain needed a special arrangement for NATO membership. 
Spaniards felt that NATO served the interests of the US more than anything else. On 
the other hand, the widespread view in the army was that NATO needed Spain much 
more than Spain needed NATO (Preston and Smyth, 1984:54).
The anti-NATO, anti-American opposition argued that NATO membership 
would not provide additional security for Spain's two small African possessions of 
Ceuta and Mellila since they lie outside the NATO area. Furthermore, it was feared that 
the US would support the transfer of the two cities to Morocco if Gibraltar returned to 
Spanish sovereignty. The opposition also pointed out that NATO did not promise 
support for Spain in the dispute over British sovereignty and Spanish claims over 
Gibraltar. In any case, NATO membership would raise the tension in East-West 
relations and place Spain directly against the Soviet Union in a possible East-West 
conflict. Nor would NATO membership protect the nascent Spanish democracy against 
military coups as exemplified in the Greek and Turkish cases. The assessment of the 
1981 attempted military coup by the US Secretary of State, A.Haig, as 'an internal 
Spanish question' strengthened negative feelings towards the US and NATO among 
Spaniards (Preston and Smyth, 1984:20-22).
All these changes and attitudes were clear indications of a policy of getting rid 
of the old American shadow over Spanish foreign and defence policy, while 
emphasising the primacy of Spanish national interests and independence. The new 
Spanish position vis-a-vis the US and NATO did not also go unnoticed by the
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Americans. At the end of 1978 an American army observer's report concluded that" the 
Spaniards seemingly would steer an independent political course, permitting the US to 
retain a reduced number of military bases there in return for direct military aid, with no 
allegiance to NATO" (9). According to Eaton, the Americans had began to worry about 
US vital interests in Spain in the face of such anti-Americanism (Eaton, 1981:26).
The policy of breaking with Atlanticism went hand in hand with a European 
oriented foreign policy. The Spaniards were anxious to be a part of the political and 
economic map of Europe. Indeed, only two days after the Franco's death, J.Carlos, the 
King, expressed Spanish orientation towards Europe to parliament: “The idea of 
Europe would be incomplete without a reference to the presence of the Spaniards and 
without a consideration of the activity of many of my predecessors. Europe should 
reckon with Spain and we Spaniards are Europeans” (10). Spanish interests, he 
maintained, lay in the 'integration into the unity of western nations and in all principal 
European institutions' (Story and Pollack, 1991:129). Accordingly, the Spanish Foreign 
Minister started a series of visits to European capitals to establish closer relations 
between Spain and Europe. During his meetings with the Europeans, the Foreign 
Minister emphasised the democratic intentions of the King and Spain's wish for full 
membership in the EC (Eaton, 1981:110).
The Suarez government gave priority to EC membership (Pollack, 1987:154), 
and in July 1977 Spain applied for membership. Another important development was 
Spanish accession to the Council of Europe in November 1977. In 1978 the Spanish 
Foreign Minister announced that “Spanish preoccupations... are identical to those of the 
member states of the European Community whose political acquis (Spain) fully shares” 
(11). A cabinet level position was created for relations with Europe and Suarez 
travelled to each EC state to explain Spain's candidacy (Salisbury, 1980:104 and 116). 
Negotiations opened in 1979 and Spanish officials announced the government's 
intention to approximate Spanish foreign policy to European Political Co-operation 
(EPC). In this context the EC Council of Ministers began to inform Spain about 
discussions in the EPC Committee (Minet, 1981:67). It was not only the centre-right
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UCD, the Communists and Socialists also strongly supported Spain's membership in 
the Community (Vinas, 1988:152 and Klepak, nd:138 and 190). In sum, for Spain 
Europe was both a model and an aspiration, and hence priority was given to full 
membership.
The process of Europeanization was further accelerated when the Socialist 
government came to power in the 1980s and the presence and influence of the US in 
Spain was further degraded. In this context, Spain became a member of NATO but 
remained outside its integrated military structure. Second, Spaniards separated NATO 
interests from those of the US, and underlined Spain's sovereign rights. However, the 
Spaniards were careful not to become a trouble-maker in the Western Alliance.
By 1980 the Suarez government believed that integration into NATO was a 
necessity for Spanish integration into European politics (Minet, 1981:29). The policy of 
keeping EC and NATO membership apart was abandoned. This did not mean a U turn 
but rather indicated that foreign policy was being framed in line with the core states of 
Europe. The remarks made by the Spanish Defence minister about the meaning of 
NATO membership in 1981 were revealing:
In the first place, being in the same system of defence as the majority 
of democracies. In the second place, it is not a question of what 
NATO is offering, rather it is that Spain... has a right, on account of its 
own essence as a European country, to be a power within the group of 
European democracies...In this sense I believe that it is necessary to 
take Spain's European dimension to those heights which it must attain 
(12).
It was thought that NATO membership would be a meansto influence decision-making 
in one of the principal organisations of the Western World (Minet, 1981:28). Spain 
became the 16th member of NATO in June 1982, just before the Socialists came to 
power.
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Once in office (October, 1982), the Socialists announced a freeze on the 
incorporation of Spanish armed forces into NATO's Integrated Military Command, and 
repeated their commitment to a referendum on remaining in NATO which they had 
promised during the election campaign. At the Atlantic Council in December 1982, the 
foreign minister explained that his government's policy was “to act as a loyal, co­
operative and solid member but to detain the process of integration into the military 
structure with the objective of studying rigorously Spanish national interests” 
(Marquina, 1991:36). It was believed in Spain that NATO was not an effective means 
to meet Spain's defence and diplomatic needs (Preston and Smyth, 1984:2). 
Furthermore, army circles complained that the UCD had failed to negotiate more 
concessions in return for accession (Preston, 1986:205).
The Socialists' policy vis-a-vis the Atlantic Alliance in 1984 was to remain a 
member without becoming part of its military structure. The government would 
maintain a prohibition against the deployment, storage or entry into Spain of nuclear 
weapons, would work to reduce progressively the US military presence in Spain while 
increasing military co-operation with other European nations and seeking membership 
of the WEU (Vinas, 1988:171 and Treverton, 1986:11). These conditions were the 
essence of the referendum on NATO membership which was held in 1986. Although 
the Socialists recognised that Spain's membership in NATO secured an important link 
with Europe, they defined the Spain's position in NATO in their own terms. In 1985 the 
Socialist Defence Minister argued that:
The unequivocal decision to be in Europe assumes collaborating in 
Europe's defense, and it is possible to do so while maintaining the 
sovereignty to decide our own defence policy...It would be a historic 
irresponsibility if Spain were to abandon the Atlantic Alliance (13).
A second Socialist challenge to postwar Atlanticism came in the form of further 
limitations on the use of the American bases. The American material and human 
presence in Spain was substantially reduced and US interests were strictly separated US 
interests from those of NATO in the bilateral Spanish-American Defence and Co­
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operation Agreement which was renegotiated in 1983. It contained important clauses in 
favour of Spain, including the provision that no clause or circumstance should 
presuppose Spain's integration into NATO's Integrated Military Structure. Each 
government reserved to itself the right to initiate the procedure for the revision or 
modification of the Agreement, and, if in the future the Spanish government were to 
decide to modify its attitude with respect to the Atlantic Alliance, the relevant texts 
could be re-examined (Marquina, 1989:60-61). The Agreement also provided stricter 
Spanish control over the US use of bases (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:144). As the 
Spanish Minister of Defence put it, “there are no US bases in Spain, rather there are 
Spanish bases which are loaned to the US under certain conditions for certain uses and 
in return for certain benefits” (14).
In 1986 the Socialist government decided to make substantial reductions in the 
number of US troops in Zaragoza base, and to replace US forces at the Torrejon air 
base with Spanish military personnel and aircraft (Pollack, 1987:172). The aim was to 
replace Americans where Spanish personnel of equivalent competence was available 
(Gooch, 1986:312). In 1986 the Americans agreed to reduce their military personnel in 
Spain by approximately 50%, and in 1988 they unwillingly accepted the complete 
withdrawal of American fighter planes from Torrejon air base and the replacement of 
American by Spanish personnel at the 16th Air Force General Headquarters. This was 
important because the activities of Torrejon wing included out-of-area missions 
(Marquina, 1991:59).
Any formal link between the American use of bases and Spain's precise 
relationship to NATO was removed (Treverton, 1986:3). Thus the negotiations about 
the renewal of the Defence and Co-operation Agreement were purely a bilateral affair 
(Marquina, 1989:62). The Spaniards acted to prevent the US using of Spanish facilities 
in crises outside the NATO area without prior authorisation (Marquina, 1989:62-63). In 
the 1988 Spanish-US Defence and Co-operation Agreement a regulation for the use of 
the bases and facilities for out-of-area activities was introduced limiting the area of 
agreement to the area covered by NATO and establishing a mechanism for consultation
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and authorisation for out-of-area activities (Marquina, 1991:59). The 1988 Agreement 
clearly remained within the framework of NATO and reinforced Spanish command 
over all US installations and bases (Marquina, 1989:70).
On the other hand, the Socialist government followed a pro-European/EC 
policy announcing that “Spain belongs to Europe” (Klepak, nd:138). The socialists 
declared themselves 'the only party that could unlock the European door' (Leon, 
1986:209), and made accession to the EC the first priority of their foreign policy. An 
intensive diplomatic campaign was conducted in EC capitals for rapid and favourable 
accession and the Europeans were impressed by their determination and seriousness 
(Preston and Smyth, 1984:78). They also supported security and defence co-operation 
in Europe. In 1984, Prime Minister Gonzalez stated in an interview that “If Spain 
wishes to be political, economic, institutional and cultural part of Europe's destiny, then 
(it) must also make contribution to that European destiny in terms of security policy” 
(15). The socialists argued that a united Europe could increase European leverage vis-a- 
vis the Americans on political and strategic decisions (Leon, 1986:229 and Gooch, 
1986:305).
As we have seen Spain became a full member of the EC in January 1986 and 
one of the strongest supporters of integrated Europe in monetary matters, in concerted 
action on social legislation, and especially on foreign policy and security matters. In 
1987, Prime Minister F.Gonzalez declared that “the moment has come to make a reality 
of the idea of reinforcing the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance...both in the field 
of harmonisation of their policies and in the production of defence means” (16). Indeed, 
the Spaniards wished to enter the WEU as soon as possible in order to participate in the 
construction of a European Defence System. It became a member of the organisation in 
1990. Spain also participated in various arms co-production programmes and 
agreements to homologise weapon systems with other European countries (Marquina, 
1991:59; Story and Pollack, 1991:137).
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The European dimension of Western security turned into a more important 
issue after Spain's accession to the WEU. At a special NATO summit in July 1990 
Prime Minister Gonzalez argued that:
The reduction of US and Canadian troops in Europe and our own 
European vocation make it imperative that the Europeans fortify the 
pillar of a renovated Alliance on this side of the Atlantic. In this 
scenario the EC has a decisive role to play in building up a common 
foreign and security policy and becoming a privileged interlocutor of 
its North American allies (17).
Similarly, in an Atlantic Council session in the early days of the Gulf Crisis, Spain 
proposed that the WEU should co-ordinate any military action that would be 
undertaken by European NATO members (Rodrigo, 1992:101-102). In the early 1990s 
Spain became an ardent supporter of European Political Co-operation and advocated 
the incorporation of all aspects of security into the EPC (18).
Another semiperipheral aspect of Spanish foreign policy was to abandon the 
country's postwar satellite-like position and to emphasise its independent stance. One 
component of this line was the determination to achieve a swift incorporation into the 
EC. A second component was degrading the importance of the US in Spanish foreign 
and defence policy. A third important aspect of Spain's relatively independent foreign 
policy can be seen in the caution about being identified with the US in world politics 
(Treverton, 1986:17). In this connection Spain banned the US from refuelling a 
squadron of F-15 fighter planes en route to Saudi Arabia during the Iranian Crisis in 
1979. The Spanish government also gave full recognition to the PLO, then considered a 
terrorist organisation by the Americans while refusing to establish full diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Furthermore, the Spaniards participated in the non-aligned summit 
in Cuba as an observer in 1979. Moreover, Spain called for the creation of a regional 
co-operation system in the Mediterranean in order to reduce the level of extra- 
Mediterranean forces. Similarly, Suarez implied that NATO entry might jeopardise 
Spain's special relations with the Arab and Latin American countries (Preston and
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Smyth, 1974:71). These actions were a clear manifestation of the fact that that Spanish 
interests did not necessarily coincide with those of US.
The Spanish Foreign Minister explained his foreign policy in Brussels in 1979, 
arguing that 'the Western world is a free world rather than a monolithic one in which 
each individual state may follow its own policy to protect its own interests' (Minet, 
1981:4). Spain's broader options and wider interests were pursued through 
multilateralism and 'the principle of universality' in foreign relations. Closer relations 
were cultivated with Latin American and Arab countries, contacts and connections 
were expanded with the neutralist and Third World blocks.
After a 40 year gap diplomatic relations were resumed with the Soviet Union 
and East European states. The King's visits to Soviets and China emphasised this new 
opening to the Communist world. Spanish and Soviet views on Middle East issues, 
Mediterranean co-operation and aspects of disarmament converged in this period 
(Minet, 1981:22), and bilateral relations with East European countries improved. Thus 
Spanish foreign policy was no longer under the tutelage of the US and Spain pursued a 
relatively independent course with special emphasis on Spanish national interests.
The Socialists also followed an independent foreign policy line, although they 
were careful not to create major discord in the Western (especially the European) 
alliance. They increasingly considered themselves a partner in the Western alliance, not 
a client and satellite state (Gooch, 1986:313). In 1983 Gonzalez described Spain as ‘a 
part of the Western defensive system but with a margin of its own’ (Preston and Smyth, 
1984:84). Accordingly, the Socialists would not allow the use of air bases and Spanish 
air space for the US attack on Libya in 1986. Gonzalez replied to the American request 
that “Spanish bases that have American forces stationed on them will be used by those 
forces for the defence of the West but never in any bilateral conflict between the US 
and another country” (48). Similarly, throughout the 1980s the Socialists were sharply 
critical of American support to Contras in Nicaragua and of the US invasion of Panama 
in 1989 (Marquina, 1991:13). They saw the roots of Central American conflict in
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domestic economic and political factors, rather than in East-West conflict as presented 
by the US. Another proof of Spain's independent stance was the refusal to accept 
economic counter loans from the Americans in 1988 anymore for the use of the bases.
A significant PSOE initiative was to support the Spanish arms industry to 
reduce Spain's dependency, especially on the US. Instead, Spain became involved in a 
series of agreements with its European partners for the co-production of defence 
equipment (Heywood, 1987:394). In the new national defence plan of the PSOE 
priority was given to strengthening southern Spain militarily in order to face any 
possible conflict with Morocco (and/or any other Northern African state) over the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila, and of the Canary islands against threats that 
might come from the Saharan Corridor in Africa (Vinas, 1988: 179-81).
Spain also intended to play a bridge (intermediary) role between the EC and 
regions with which Spain had historical ties and/or geographical proximity - namely 
Latin America and the Arab world - and to strengthen Spanish sphere of influence in 
these regions. In this context, Latin America turned into a central concern. Mexico 
supported Spanish claims to act as a link between Europe and Latin America and stated 
that this initiative would enable developing countries in the region to diversify their 
economic contacts abroad, in particular with the EC countries (Minet, 1981:50). 
Moreover, the 1979 EC Commission's report (Opinion) on Spain stated that “...Because 
of the historical ties between Spain and the countries of Latin America the enlarged 
Community may be able to forge new political and economic links with this part of the 
world” (Opinion, 1979:55). Accordingly, at a meeting of the Andean Council in 
Madrid in 1980 negotiations were opened between the Andean Pact and the EC, and a 
month later, a declaration in Brussels was made for closer links between Latin America 
and the Community (Minet, 1981:52-53).
The Socialists also emphasised Spain's function as a bridge between the EC and 
Latin America. During the accession negotiations the Spanish delegation tried, without 
success, to obtain a preferential position for the Latin American countries similar to that
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given all former colonies of member states (Treverton, 1986:18 and Grugel, 1987:606). 
The Socialist government was more successful in lobbying for the passage of a motion 
supporting the Contadora process at the European Parliament (19). Due to Spanish 
efforts, the Contadora Group, composed of 12 EC, 5 Central American and 4 Latin 
American ministers met in Costa Rica in 1984 to promote the Contadora process 
(Leon, 1986:235). Furthermore, Spain became a meeting place for European and Latin 
American social democrats to discuss Latin American issues. The aim of the Socialists 
was to increase European sensitivity towards the region in the belief that in the long 
term it would eventually bring increased private investment, bigger aid and softer 
credits to Latin Americans, and also international support for political sovereignty 
(Gmgel, 1987:605). During the Spanish presidency of the Community in 1989 special 
emphasis was put on promoting relations between Latin American and European states. 
However, the Community has remained reluctant to implement radical programmes in 
Latin America. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s the Spaniards still considered Spain 
‘...the natural spokesman for Europe in Latin America and for Latin America in 
Europe’ (Gooch, 1992b: 133-34).
Spain also wished to play a “bridge role” between the West and the Arab world. 
Compared to Latin America, however its activities remained weak in this region. 
Nevertheless, in 1980 Spain actively attempted to explain the Arab position in the 
Middle East to the Americans and Europeans and the Jordanians, Syrians and Saudi 
Arabians expressed their gratitude to Spain for its efforts to make the Western world 
understand the Arab posture (Minet, 1981:37). The Socialist governments continued to 
presenting Spain as a bridge that linked the Arab world to Europe and vice versa 
(Moxon-Browne, 1989:100 and Gooch, 1992a:5).
Spain also hoped to create a sphere of influence (or what world-system scholars 
call a kind of sub-imperialism) in Latin America and the Arab World. In this way, the 
Spanish government aimed to increase Spain's influence and bargaining power in 
external relations. The Spanish policy towards Latin America was based upon 
interdependence and multifaceted co-operation. The new constitution endowed the
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King with a special responsibility in relations with Latin Americans (Minet, 1981:51). 
In this context, an Ibero-American Centre for Co-operation was established (later Ibero- 
American Institute for Co-operation) (Pike, 1980:205) and co-operation agreements 
were concluded on Spanish participation in Latin American industrial, civil 
engineering, and fishing projects. Agreements were signed with Mexico and Venezuela 
for the transfer of technology and capital, for example, and a series of joint- ventures 
were agreed, notably with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (Minet, 1981:50).
The Spanish quest to increase its presence in Latin America led to other 
developments. Spain was admitted to the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America in 1979 and it transferred its membership in the IMF Executive Committee 
from Southern Europe to the Northern Latin America group. Furthermore, Spain joined 
the Inter-American Development Bank in 1976, and became an observer in the Council 
of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Andean Pact in 1979. The Spanish-Latin America 
volume of trade increased steadily in the second half of the 1970s, and over half of the 
Spanish foreign investments went to Latin America in this period (Minet, 1981:49).
The Socialist governments continued to build a sphere of influence in Latin 
America, arguing that Spain's influence in Europe and the US would depend on 
establishing stronger “special relationship” outside Europe and North America, even 
against the US wishes (Grugel, 1987:604). The main emphasis was given to 
development programme in Latin America under the umbrella of the “Plan for 
Integrated Co-operation” which included projects in the scientific, technological, 
agricultural, educational, transport, health, shipping and engineering areas (Grugel, 
1987:610-11 and Pollack, 1987:72). The most important part of this general scheme 
was implemented in Nicaragua, Cost Rica and Honduras in conjunction with the Ibero- 
American Institute for Co-operation (ICI). By 1987 the plan's budget had more than 
quadrupled (Grugel, 1987:611). Furthermore, Spain extended financial aid to the 
Southern Cone countries like Argentina and Chile (Leon, 1986:235) and gave import 
credits to Nicaragua during the US economic blockade of that country (Grugel, 
1987:614).
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These initiatives created a new image of Spain in Latin America. Hence Latin 
American countries hoped to see Spain or the EC as a counter-balance to US influence 
and to US support for oligarchic and military dictatorships in the region (Grugel, 
1987:603 and Pollack, 1987:71). Moreover Latin Americans saw Spain as a model for 
their own future development (Grugel, 1987:603). The PSOE governments emphasised 
Spain's support for the strengthening of democracy and extended financial support for a 
number of projects in order to foster democratic development, participation and human 
rights in Latin America (Pollack, 1987:92). However, in both the economic and 
political spheres, Spanish attempts to create a sphere of influence had modest outcomes 
mainly because of financial constraints and the little concern paid by the EC to Latin 
America. Nevertheless, some scholars have concluded that these attempts provided 
Spain with a role in the region and underlined its intentions to build up a sphere of 
influence, and act as a bridge between the Western and the Latin worlds (Pollack, 
1987:92 and Gooch, 1992b: 133-34).
As we have seen, upwardly mobile semiperipheral states also attempt to 
strengthen the country's position in the international system and search for a wider role, 
in the management of international or local problems. After 1980 Spanish foreign 
policy revealed these characteristics.
After establishing a margin of autonomy in NATO and clearly separating 
NATO and American interests the Socialists gave their full support to 
Western/European unity and cohesion. In 1983, for example Gonzalez expressed 
sympathy with the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and Crusie missiles in Europe. 
And in 1985, he declared Spanish support for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 
(Pollack, 1987:171). Moreover the Spaniards adopted a very narrow definition of 
Spanish non-involvement into NATO's military structure and tried to maximise Spain's 
importance in NATO. Spanish Foreign and Defence ministers participated in the 
Atlantic Council and NATO Defence Policy Committee, Spanish representatives 
attended meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group (despite Spain's anti-nuclear policy); 
Spain's air defence and radar network was co-ordinated with that of the Alliance,
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Spanish forces participated in NATO exercises, and Spain participated in NATO's 
Military Committee (Leon, 1986:225 and Gooch, 1992c:243).
On the other hand, Spain's incorporation into the WEU, and its policy of 
reinforcing the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through harmonisation (George 
and Stenhouse, 1991:94) also consolidated and strengthened Spain's position in the 
international system. As we have seen the Spaniards were determined to contribute to 
the European destiny (Leon, 1986:227) and hence enthusiastically gave their support to 
the common European defence and foreign policy (George and Stenhouse, 1991:99; 
Gooch, 1992a:7).
While harmonising its policies with the Western world (especially with 
Europe), Spain also improved its relations with its neighbours, signing defence and co­
operation agreements with Tunisia (1987), Morocco (1989 and 1991), Mauritania 
(1989) and establishing much more cordial relations with Portugal (Gooch, 1992d:61).
Spain further strengthened its position in the international system by increasing 
its capabilities and influence in the defence field. By the early 1980s Spain was capable 
of producing much more sophisticated weaponry (Payne, 1986:190). However, the 
central aim of the Socialist governments was to bring Spanish defence structure into 
line with the West European countries and to make it more independent from foreign 
suppliers (especially from the US) (Vinas, 1988:175 and Moxon-Browne, 1989:19). 
That is why Spain participated in the Independent European Programme Groups for the 
co-production and development of weapons systems; co-operating in the production of 
the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) project with Germany, and with the UK and Italy 
for the acquisition of new technologies in aeronautical research (20). As a result of the 
rapid modernisation of the defence industry during the 1980s Spain became 
technologically competitive with its European partners and became the eighth leading 
arms exporter in the world (Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994:56) (21).
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Spain has also aspired to a wider role in the world and to increase its weight in 
the interstate system by becoming involved in the management of international and 
local problems. As we have seen, Spain gave full support to the Contadora group of 
Central American States which came into existence to stop the conflict in the region 
without the interference of outside powers. On the other hand, Spain supported a 
peaceful solution to the problems in Nicaragua and in 1986 offered to mediate between 
Sandinistas and the opposition. However, while the Nicaraguan government showed its 
sympathy to this offer the civilian opposition which was supported by the US refused it. 
We have already mentioned Spain's wish to strengthen democracy in Latin America. 
This policy was supported with a number of projects for democratic development, 
participation and human rights in the region (Pollack, 1987:92). In El Salvador Spain 
contributed with 120 observers to the UN mission and provided technical and financial 
support. The Spaniards also announced that they were willing to increase their financial 
contributions for peace-keeping operations in Latin America (Maxwell and Spiegel, 
1994:54 and 83-4). In Cuba, however, Spain criticised human rights abuses, while 
keeping the channel of communication open in order to contribute to a democratic 
transformation. Finally, in order to deepen its influence in Latin America, Spain 
brought Latin American leaders together in series a of conferences in Mexico, Madrid 
and Bahia (Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994:84) (22).
Spain also became involved in the Middle East peace processes. Based on 
Spain's historical ties, good relations and special contacts with the Arab world the UCD 
governments intended to play a role in the Middle East in the early 1980s and they 
received encouragement from the Germans and the Americans as well as from the 
Arabs (Minet, 1981:37). Accordingly, Suarez took diplomatic initiatives in Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia where there was a warm reaction to Spain's potential 
mediatory. In the second half of the 1980s, after the Socialist government had 
recognised Israel, Spain presented itself as an “honest-broker” for a pragmatic solution 
for the problems in the region. The selection of Madrid for the opening of the Middle 
East peace talks in 1991 was a clear indication of Spain's favourable position vis-a-vis
269
Spain: 1976-Early 1990s
the Arabs and Israel, and an acknowledgement of its increasing international status 
(Gooch, 1992a:7; Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994:55).
During the Gulf Conflict, Spain supported the UN embargo imposed on Iraq, 
and played its part in Western alliance, allowing the US to use the bases in Spain before 
and during the hostilities. Furthermore, the Spanish government sent one frigate and 
two corvettes to the Gulf region to participate in the blockade, and committed itself to 
defend Turkey in the event of an Iraqi attack to this country. Prime Minister Gonzalez 
stated that Spain was:
... not going to follow the traditional policy of not participating in the 
destiny of Europe or not sharing the international unanimity about the 
conflict. I am not for an isolated Spain. We are going to remain firm in 
our new role" (23).
Spain's call for the creation of a regional security and co-operation system in the 
Mediterranean was another manifestation of its aspiration to a wider role in world 
politics. In 1990 Spain and Italy proposed an International Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Mediterranean (CSCM) similar to the Conference on Security and Co­
operation in Europe (CSCE). The Spanish Foreign Minister introduced this idea first in 
a CSEC meeting in 1990 pointing out that the basic problem in the Mediterranean was 
the increasing economic, demographic and value differences between the Northern and 
Southern shores which could lead to future instability. Hence, an overall approach 
(rather than bilateral ones) was needed to face up those problems and to prevent a 
possible confrontation between “Islam and the West” (Rodrigo, 1992:112). This 
initiative was not supported by the US or other European states but Spain did 
participate in the 5-plus-5 talks between Northern shore countries (Spain, France, Italy, 
Portugal and Malta) and Arab Union of the Maghreb (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Libya) in an attempt to improve communication in the region. However, 
these talks were adversely affected by the intensification of the Bosnian war.
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Another example of Spanish involvement in the management of international 
problems was the deployment of over a thousand Spanish soldiers in Bosnia under the 
command of UN peace keeping forces, and the Spain's contribution to the cost of the 
UN mission in Bosnia (approximately $25 million) (Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994:57). 
Spain was made one of the vice-presidents in the UN Peacekeeping Commission for 
former Yugoslavia at the Hague (Mojon, 1993:101). Spain's participation in the 
peacekeeping forces in Namibia, Angola and Central America as well as in Bosnia has 
further marked its active participation in international problem solving mechanisms. 
Thus Spanish armed forces have turned into a crucial element of Spain's international 
activism. The plans to create a Rapid Action Force (FAR) by 1997 for WEU's 
operational activities in crisis situations (Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994:82) can be seen as 
an important component of this strategy.
At this point it would not be unrealistic to say that from the world-system point 
of view, the further integration of the Spanish economy into the international 
(especially the European) economy requires a military capable of fulfilling Spain's new 
role as a [junior] partner in policing European interests (see also Petras, 1993:117). 
Moreover, Spain has become the ninth largest contributor to the UN budget (Maxwell 
and Spiegel, 1994:83) and has participated in humanitarian and technical assistance 
programmes in the former Soviet republics (Mojon, 1993:101). Finally, the election of 
J.Solona, former Spanish Foreign Minister, as the new General Secretary of NATO 
clearly indicated the increasing status of Spain in the interstate system.
5. Conclusion
As a conclusion one can say that in the contraction period of the world-economy 
"semiperiphery Spain" achieved economic modernisation, and showed a certain ability 
to adapt its production structure to the core-like production patterns. As predicted in the 
world-system analysis, the transformations in production system went hand in hand 
with radical developments in Spanish politics and foreign policy. Accordingly, while 
democratisation occurred in the domestic sphere, Spain, an upwardly mobile 
semiperipheral state, gave up satellite type foreign policy, asserted its intermediary and
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bridge role between core zones and periphery, and increasingly involved in the 
management of international problems. In short, unlike Greece, Spain has achieved an 
upgrade in its status from semiperiphery towards core region in the world-system 
hierarchy of states.
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Notes to Chapter Eight
1. For state's activities in the economy in the late 1970s, see also Baklanoff,1978, 
pp.35-36; Tsoukalis, 1981, p.82.
2. For an analysis of Spain's scientific and technological policy before and after the 
mid-1980s see, Aledo, 1993b.
3. Other ascending sectors in which Spanish research activities have been focused on 
are, micro computers, food technology, bio-technology, space, pharmaceutical R&D, 
aquaphonics, Antarctic research, high energy physics and research personnel training, 
see Aledo, 1993b, p.32.
4. Cambio 16 June 18,1984, quoted in Gunther, 1986 p.34.
5. Cambio 16 June 20,1983, quoted in Preston and Smyth, 1984, p.14.
6. On the contribution of invisibles to the trade deficits, see also Harrison, 1985, pp.75- 
76 and 1993, p.64; Salmon, 1991, p.167.
7. For instance, CAMER international SA., an organisation formed by major Spanish 
banks, involved in capital goods business throughout the world and with the backing of 
credit guarantee from the Spanish government. CAMER concluded major credit 
agreements with Latin American central banks in support of Spanish machinery and 
equipment exports, see Baklanoff, 1978, p.69.
8. Ya 1 November, 1981, quoted in Treverton, 1986, p.6.
9. Congressional Record US Senate, 4 April 1979, p.3945, quoted in Minet, 1981,
p.12.
10. A.R. Ventura, Agonia y muerto del Franquismo, Barcelona, 1978, p.390, quoted 
in Preston and Smyth, 1984, p.24.
11. La Libre Belgique 21 December 1978, quoted in Minet, 1981 p.67.
12. Cambio 16 14 September 1981, quoted in Preston and Smyth, 1984, pp.22-23.
13. El Pais 20 January, 1985, quoted in Treverton, 1986, p.32.
14. Excelsior Mexico City, April 23, 1983, quoted in Rubottom and Murphy, 1984, 
p. 144.
15. Frankfurter Allgemaine Zeitung December 1, 1984, quoted in Leon, 1986, 
p.227.
273
Spain: 1976-Early 1990s
16. R.Estrella and J.Gama Initerim Report on New Patterns of European Security 
Collaboration, North Atlantic Assembly, 1988, p.8, quoted in George and Stenhouse, 
1991, p.94.
17. El Pais, 6 July,1990, quoted in Rodrigo, 1992, p. 105.
18. For further information on Spanish position in European Common Foreign Policy 
and Security issues see, Rodrigo, 1992, pp. 108-111; Gooch, 1992a, p.7.
19. This motion supported the view that the crisis in Central America could be 
overcome by a change in social structures and the establishment of liberties, and the 
principles of the representative system.
20. Moreover Spain participated in the NATO frigate replacement project and the A- 
129 light-attack helicopter and modular stand-off weapons project. Similarly, Spain, 
Netherlands, France, Germany and the UK co-operated in the generation of an anti-tank 
weapons programme. Spanish electronic sectors and manufacturers were involved in 
multinational military equipment production programme. Spain, France and Italy have 
co-operated to create the Helios military satellite observation system (Zaldivar, 
1991:209; George and Stenhouse, 1991:110-11; and Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994:82) 
The Spaniards have also built an aircraft carrier navy vessel and reduced their 
dependence on US equipment for F-18 aircrafts by establishing software development, 
validation and integration centre (Moxon-Browne, 1989:19 and George and Stenhouse, 
1991:111).
21. Much of the production was realised through state owned companies which have 
been aggressive in the world arms market: the three main firms, CASA (air), BAZAN 
(navy) and ENESA (tank) exported their products to Far-East, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, 
Libya, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Congo, Mauritania and even to Portugal (Treverton, 
1986:26; Pollack, 1991:137: and Payne, 1986:190-91).
22. However Spanish efforts to increase EC's sensitivity towards Latin America was 
unsuccessful partly because of the developments in Eastern Europe and the subsequent 
shift of EC's interest to that region since 1989.
23. El Pais 20 August, 1989, quoted in Rodrigo, 1992, p. 102.
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In the study of foreign policy one of the main discussions concerns the relative 
influence of internal/societal and external/systemic sources and of political and 
economic factors on foreign policy. In conventional thinking, and in majority of the 
foreign policy case studies internal/societal and political factors have been treated as 
the main sources of foreign policy. In fact because foreign policy is a complex 
phenomenon in which both domestic and external, and political and economic 
determinants are in constant interaction the question should not be formulated as to 
which one of these factors determines the final outcome. Different variables (or 
combinations of variables) explain foreign policy best in different contexts, and only 
one or some of these variables can be the determining factor in some individual 
cases. Accordingly, the main issue should be to determine a starting point around 
which these different sources and/or factors of foreign policy converge and can 
produce a web of interaction among them.
At this point the world-system perspective provides us with a “social totality” 
in which the links between the internal/societal, external/systemic, political and 
economic determinants of foreign policy can be established. In world-system analysis 
the starting point is the production structure and the production relations around 
which the political and economic external/systemic and internal/societal determinants 
of foreign policy converge. The world-system perspective provides us with tools to 
examine how power and production are organised at the world and national levels 
and, accordingly, how these complex organisations are related to foreign policy. In 
this context one can understand the impact of the world level organisation of power 
and production on the formation and functioning of national level organisations. This 
is not to say that national level organisation is determined solely by the world level 
organisation (or by changes at this level). In world-system analysis the world level 
organisation provides opportunity structures for the reorganisation of national level 
organisations of power and production. But how to benefit from these opportunity 
structures is basically up to the national level actors (i.e., political (power) and 
economic (production) elites, state institutions etc.). It follows that in world-system 
analysis foreign policy is a function of the interaction between the world and national
Conclusion
levels of organisation of power and production. More specifically it becomes a 
function of how national power and production elites organise their interests in the 
state structures in relation to the opportunities provided by the world level 
organisation of power and production. In short, in the world-system perspective 
foreign policy is a part of a totality which is composed of a complex web of 
interactions among the world and national level organisations (structures), national 
economic and political elites, state structures, external actors (other states, foreign 
political and economic elites) etc.
In analysing the foreign policy of an individual state, world-system analysis 
starts by explaining how power and production are organised at the national level at 
any point in “world-system time” (i.e. in expansion and contraction periods of the 
world economy). Accordingly, it first establishes the “structural” and “temporal” 
components of the foreign policy environment. The “world-system time” is the 
temporal component, and the “category of a state” in the world-system hierarchy is 
the structural component of this environment. In this study, “world-system time” 
means whether the “world-economy” is in an “expansion” or “contraction” period, 
and whether the “inter-state” system is passing through a stage of “hegemonic rise” 
or “hegemonic decline”. On the other hand, the “structural category of a state” means 
whether the state under examination is a “core”, “peripheral” or “semiperipheral” 
state in the “world-economy” and in the “inter-state” system. This is important 
because in analysing foreign policy it is assumed that states that belong to the same 
category have similar characteristics and are subjected to similar opportunity 
structures during “cyclical rhythms” of the “rise and decline of the hegemonic 
powers” and the “expansion” and “contraction” periods of the world-economy. 
However, they do not necessarily benefit from the opportunity structures provided by 
the world level organisation in the same way because there are differences in their 
internal organisation of power and production.
After establishing the “temporal” and “structural” components of the foreign 
policy environment, the world-system perspective focuses on how national actors
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organise power and production at the individual state level in this environment, and 
to what extent this organisation is influenced by external actors. It is argued that 
foreign policy is strongly affected by the specific national organisation of power and 
production since foreign policy is the output of this specific organisation into the 
external environment. There is a constant and significant interaction between the 
production and power structures and the foreign policy of the national system. In 
other words, a structural change in foreign policy is the result of a structural change 
in the organisation of power and production at the individual state level. Accordingly, 
the first step in analysing foreign policy in world-system analysis is to define the 
power-production structure of the state in the period under consideration and then to 
see how a structural change in this organisation leads to change(s) in the foreign 
policy of a state.
In analysing foreign policy, the type of state under investigation is important 
because the role played by the state in the functioning of the power-production 
structures differs depending on the category of the state in the world-system 
hierarchy of states. In the semiperiphery the state is believed to play the most 
important role as an agent of both power and production. And because of its central 
position, and the absence of hegemonic economic elites (periphery- or core-like) in 
the semiperipheral zone of the world-economy, different groups in the production 
sphere try to influence state policies in order to promote their own interests. 
Accordingly, the collaboration of the state with, or its support for any group of actors 
(or its domination by any group of actors) will change the balance of power in the 
power-production structure, and this change will be reflected in the foreign policy. 
Thus, since the state is also the main actor of foreign policy, and since such changes 
in the power-production structure are more likely in the semiperiphery, one can 
analyse the complex relationship between external/systemic and internal/societal 
determinants in semiperipheral foreign policies.
Thus, in world-system analysis once the world-system time and type of state 
under investigation are determined, the next step in analysing foreign policy is to
277
Conclusion
examine the power-production structure. In this way the web of relations between the 
state, domestic political and economic elites and external actors (states, multinational 
corporations, foreign economic elites) are clarified, and it also becomes possible to 
measure to what extent the state under investigation reveals typical characteristics of 
its world-system category. The nature of the web of relations, in turn, greatly shapes 
the basic orientation of the foreign policy of the state. Here, again, one can assess to 
what extent the foreign policy of the state under investigation follows the general 
characteristics of its category prescribed in the world-system framework.
An interesting aspect of analysing foreign policy in the framework of world- 
system analysis is to compare the foreign policies of individual states during and after 
a transition from one world-system time (say, an expansion/hegemonic period) to 
another (say, a contraction/hegemonic decline period). This gives us a comparative 
perspective and we can see whether a change in the world-system time and a change 
in the power-production structure at the global level result in a change in the power- 
production structure of individual states, and hence a change in their foreign policies. 
The crucial point is that, as we saw in the Greek and Spanish cases, a change in the 
global environment can only provide opportunity structures, it cannot determine the 
specific responses/behaviours of the actors (the state and economic and political 
elites, etc.) of individual states. In other words it depends on the political will of the 
domestic actors whether or not they benefit from the changing environment and 
whether they reorganise their domestic power-production structures in accordance 
with the new global structures.
In this framework, analysing the foreign policies of Greece and Spain in a 
comparative way gave us the opportunity to asses how two similar countries from the 
semiperipheral zone of the world-economy (and their domestic actors) responded 
differently to changes in the world-system power-production structure, and 
reorganised their internal power-production structures in different ways. We also 
saw that their foreign policies were significantly affected by changes in the global 
and national level structures. In other words, their foreign policies were usually in
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conformity with their semiperipheral power-production structures in the two different 
sub-periods examined. Finally, I tried to evaluate to what extent these changes in 
foreign policy confirm with the semiperipheral foreign policy behaviours prescribed 
in world-system theory.
My analysis of Greece and Spain in the postwar period in chapters 5-8 of this 
study shows that the foreign policies of both countries were strongly affected by 
their semiperipherial development patterns. In both “expansion-hegemonic rise” and 
“contraction-hegemonic decline” periods of the world-economy, their internal power- 
production structures (the structures that organise and greatly determine the 
developmental path) revealed the general characteristics of a semiperipheral country 
defined in the world-system framework. In other words, in both periods the Greek 
and Spanish states occupied a central place in the developmental processes of the 
national economies either through favouring the accumulation of capital in the hands 
of one particular kind of production elite (periphery- or core-like) or through taking 
on an entrepreneurial role themselves. On the other hand, as a result of the state 
oriented activities of the different central internal and external actors, close 
relationships were established between these groups and the Greek and Spanish 
political establishments. Political establishments, in turn, promoted the interests of 
different internal and external actors in different periods depending on which group 
became effectively dominant over the others.
However, because of the different responses of the Greek and Spanish internal 
actors to the opportunities provided by the world-system power-production 
structures, their semiperipheral developmental processes (which were very similar at 
the beginning) followed somewhat different paths and this took them to different 
points in the world-system hierarchy of states. This does not mean that either Greece 
or Spain is not semiperipheral. It simply means that they are located differently in the 
intra-semiperipheral hierarchy. Indeed, both of them followed semiperipheral 
development patterns. However, while “developmentalist-state” and “core-like 
producers” dominated the power-production structure in Spain (as we saw in the
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chapter 8), their counterparts in Greece (as I demonstrated in chapter 6) failed to 
establish their hegemony over “periphery-like power-production” groups and 
structures. Accordingly, in the contraction period of the world-economy Spain 
became “a strong and an upwardly mobile semiperipheral state”, while Greece’s 
attempt to achieve upward mobility was unsuccessful and it remained “a weak 
semiperipheral state”. Consequently, their different semiperipheral developmental 
patterns were reflected in their foreign policies. In other words, while Spain revealed 
the foreign policy of an upwardly mobile semiperipheral state, Greece failed to do so.
Semiperiphery is still one of the problematic concepts of the social sciences. 
Although debates on various aspects of the semiperipheral zone of the world- 
economy have continued even among modem world-system scholars (see 
Arrighi,1985 and Martin, 1990a), there is more or less general agreement that such an 
intermediate zone exists. However questions about the “shape, size and the method 
of membership within - and entrance into and exit from - the zone remain an 
unexplored realm” (Martin, 1990b:4). Furthermore, other crucial questions and issues 
relating to ‘how we know the semiperiphery when we see it, ‘what the nature is of 
semiperipheral movement within the world-economy’ and ‘what the role is of geo­
strategic position in the upward mobility of semiperipheral states’ have not been 
satisfactorily answered and need further clarification at both theoretical and empirical 
levels.
Since the concept semiperiphery is still contentious, it may be legitimate to 
conclude with the question of ‘whether it is correct to use it in analysing the foreign 
policies of individual states’. The answer depends on one’s understanding of foreign 
policy phenomena. If one sees foreign policy basically as the product of internal or 
external political factors and processes, the answer is clearly “no”. However, if one 
believes that foreign policy behaviour is best explained by linking ‘politics’ with 
‘economics’, and intemal/societal factors with external/systemic factors “the concept 
semiperiphery” can be a useful tool in the hands of the researcher. In other words, if 
one looks at foreign policy phenomena from the perspective of national and
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international political economy, “semiperiphery” can be far more useful than other 
terms such as, “newly industrialising countries” (NICs), “middle income countries”, 
“developing countries”, etc. The reason is that by employing “the concept 
semiperiphery”, as I have tried to show in the Greek and Spanish cases, one can 
identify and establish the relative impact of international and national structural 
factors, the distribution of wealth and power, the state, external and internal 
economic and power elites on the foreign policies of “intermediate countries”. 
Moreover, unlike the other terms used to describe these countries, the concept 
semiperiphery enables the analyst to explain changes in foreign policy. Thus its use is 
fully justified.
It is widely accepted that foreign policy analysis is an interdisciplinary field. 
Similarly the “world-system school” in general and the concept of “semiperiphery” in 
particular provide us a totality called a “social system” which requires 
interdisciplinary investigation. In this respect, studying foreign policy in the 
framework of world-system analysis will lead to fruitful research, and it will provide 
students of international relations with new fields to explore in analysing foreign 
policy.
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